From the Director's Desk

The Centre for Public Policy and Governance is five years old and it seems like yesterday! This is a moment of reflection—where are we and where do we want to go? During this time period we have organized over 50 seminars, 10 policy dialogues, three trainings and one international conference. Executive Master’s in Public Policy was launched in 2009 and so far 21 students have graduated and another 12 would be graduating this year. Earlier this year, I was invited by the College of Wooster, as Visiting Professor for the spring semester. It has been a rewarding experience and my expectation and effort now is to institutionalize it into an exchange program. Personally, I am indebted to Dr. Peter Armacost, the then Rector FC College for allowing me to accept the offer and Dr. Grant Cornwell President, the College of Wooster and the Great Lakes Colleges Association (GLCA) for making it happen.

I remain thankful to my colleagues at the CPPG, whose dedication and support have contributed enormously in enriching the scale, scope and diversity of our activities. This, along with the support of our new Rector, Dr. James Tebbe, now we are poised to develop into a Resource Centre and a Think Tank. This Quarterly is a 5 Year Special Number with two solicited and peer reviewed articles, one by a brilliant Wooster graduate. Its volume, and range of topics covered is an indicator of where we are headed. As always, we look forward to our readers/participants comments for any further improvements in our program and activities.

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Ageing: Gender, Social class and Health in Pakistan

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Introduction

Pakistan is not yet facing the problem of broadly ageing populations as in the global North, although it is on the verge of ageing rapidly. The over 60s have not been increasing as a proportion of the population in Pakistan since the 1960s. This is due to poor gains in survival in late middle age, which identifies the welfare of the elderly as a priority area for public policy. This paper offers a gender analysis of the health of the elderly in Pakistan. It explores how gender relations in Pakistan shape the ageing of men and women’s bodies and encroachment of ill-health and disability.

Gender relations are also extremely important in shaping the management and care for ill-health amongst the elderly in Pakistan. The experience of ageing in South Asia is ‘anchored in the household’ (Croll 2005). Historical and ethnographic accounts point to the centrality of family and household to the care for the elderly in South Asia, as compared with North-West Europe, for example, where, even historically, much of the work of caring for the elderly has been provided by the community (Cain 1991a). Mead Cain advances the idea that there is no concept of old age as being a burden on the family in South Asia, and that the elderly are not perceived as being ‘on the dole’, but rather, as receiving their due (Cain 1991b). Critical gerontology further historicizes the construction of old age as ‘burden’ and reminds us that this is not ‘natural’. It sees old age dependency as the product of a particular division of labour and structure of inequality, as part of the political economy of advanced capitalism (Townsend 1981; Walker 1981; Phillipson 1982). Anthropologists of ageing have further unsettled the notion of old age dependency, showing that the construction of elders as a ‘burden’ is not merely the product of ‘modernization’. Old age is viewed as an inherently ambiguous state: “a time both of maximal experience and maximal debility, simultaneously vaunted and evaded” (Cohen 1994).

Lawrence Cohen’s work on ageing in North India argues that ideologies about strong family values and the family care of elders are a resistive narrative against modernization and the West, where elders are said to be abandoned by their families and put into ‘old homes’ (Cohen 1998). In face of this, descriptions of the realities of intergenerational relations, in the context of impoverished families in countries like Pakistan, can be read as an indictment of culture and identity. However, this paper intends not to malign family care in Pakistan, but rather to unpack the normative discourses surrounding old age support by looking at variation in welfare in old age and the social and gender relations that underpin this variation.

Methods and study setting

This study combines qualitative and quantitative methods. Quantitative data is used to establish the extent and distribution of health problems amongst the elderly, and the qualitative data describe the processes through which ill-health amongst the elderly is managed. The quantitative data provide a sense of scale, generalisability, and allows for comparisons with other countries, whereas the qualitative data allow us to look at life experience and social life in the round (Wallman and Baker 1996).

Various types of quantitative data were used in this study. Initially, the paper brings together nationally representative demographic data on the progress of ageing in Pakistan, taken from the 1998 Census of Pakistan and the yearly Pakistan Demographic Surveys (PDS), which collect data on mortality and causes of death.

“Understandings about the body and physical capacity were gendered, and conditioned by socio-economic class and kinship relations in the household.”

Secondly, new analysis was carried out on surveys specifically on the elderly, to test hypotheses about the factors underlying variation in the welfare of the elderly. In particular, with the support of Dr Jahangir Khan of the Pakistan Medical Council, we consulted the Survey on the Health and Living Conditions of Elderly Population...
(SHLCEP) carried out by the Pakistan Medical Research Council in 1999-01. With the support of Dr Syed Mubashir Ali of the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, we analysed the Pakistan Socio–Economic Survey Round 2 (PSES2) carried out by PIDE in 2001. The SHLCEP is a national survey of the over 60s with a sample of 2,899 elderly. Although the survey was not conducted using random sampling, it is representative of the country, comprising data from 12 Primary Sampling Units representing rural and urban elderly of different ethnic groups from all the provinces of Pakistan. The PSES2 is a nationally representative survey conducted using simple random sampling of villages and enumeration blocks, stratified by rural and urban area. It included a specific module on the circumstances of the elderly, including 1,174 individuals over 60 years. The methods of analysis comprised simple cross tabulations, z-tests, X2 analysis and Analysis of Variance.

The qualitative data in this study represent a sub-set of the quantitative data, giving the perspectives of rural elderly. The data were generated through fieldwork in a village in Punjab employing the ‘micro-demography’ approach influenced by Caldwell, (Caldwell and Reddy 1988). I have given the village the pseudonym ‘Pind’. I collected data in Pind during February–March 2005. Pind is in Lahore district in the North-East of Punjab. It lies along one of the main roads leading out of Lahore, 26km from the centre of the city, and 6km from the Indian border. It is relatively small, comprising 10,000 inhabitants, 90% of whom were Awan Muslims and 10% of whom were Christians, and some 500 acres of land, cultivated for wheat, rice, and cow-feed. The village was unusual in having its own health centre, which was run by an NGO in Lahore. With the help of lady health visitors and dais (traditional maternal health providers) at the health centre, I interviewed villagers from over 40 elderly households. Research participants were purposefully selected from amongst the contacts of the dais at the centre, all of whom had worked in Pind for more than 2 years, and some for all their lives. Initially they took me to visit the elderly households they knew closely. To explore variation in circumstances, I then asked the centre women to introduce me to elderly people they considered not to be doing so well. The case histories collected cannot be considered representative in any statistical sense. However, I would claim that they document the range of living arrangements of elderly people in Pind.

Defining old age
For the purposes of collective survey data, old age in Pakistan is arbitrarily set at the age of 60, as in other developing countries where life expectancy at birth has only recently approached this age. In the quantitative data in this paper, therefore, the elderly are usually defined as the over 60s. However, being elderly is not, of course, just a matter of chronological age. Christine Fry (2002) suggests that the way to minimize a ‘chronocentric’ view of age is to look at how differences in maturity are used socially. In carrying out the qualitative research, the category of ‘old’ was understood to signify ‘somebody whose body, demeanour, behaviour, social position, or history is suggestive of the later decades of the life-course in a given place or time’ (Cohen 1998: 33). The qualitative parts of this paper reflect how ageing is understood and socially constructed in the village, Pind. In this context, the elderly were those who are regarded as elders (barhe), and behave as elders.

Old age was substantially a matter of generation and household developmental cycles. People become elders when they had lived long enough for their children to become jawaan....

There are manifold ways in which old age is constructed in Pind. Clearly, physical maturity is an important element of ageing. People in Pind referred to old age (bohrappa) in ways synonymous with frailty (kamzoor). Physical deterioration was thus naturalized. Unlike certain schools of gerontology, which view ageing as distinct from pathology, ageing in Pind was understood as an inevitable process of encroaching physical incapacity. However, physical ageing was an uneven process. Understandings about the body and physical capacity were gendered, and conditioned by socio-economic class and kinship relations in the household.

Aging: Gender, Social Class and Generational Differences
In her work on the Gambia, Caroline Bledsoe (2002) presents a gendered view of ageing in which she suggests that, for women, ageing is not equated with the passage of linear time but with ‘contingency’: the salutatory, cu-
mulative hardships of personal history, particularly obstetric trauma. Gambian men, who do not bear children, have a much more linear pattern of ageing than women. These understandings about the ageing process were echoed in Pind, where women were said to become old quicker than men. Childbearing was said to wear women out and make them age prematurely. Ageing was thus embodied in gendered ways.

Ageing was faster and more debilitating for landless labourers, who endured arduous working conditions, malnutrition and inadequate levels of medical care, than it was for landowners...

Ageing was furthermore patterned by social class. It was faster and more debilitating for landless labourers, who endured arduous working conditions, malnutrition and inadequate levels of medical care, than it was for landowners (see Vera-Sanso 2004b). In Pind, work was said to prevent physical decline, and hard work was celebrated for keeping elders healthy (tandrust). In Pind, the hard work and strength of the working elderly was contrasted with the opulent lifestyle of landowners, city dwellers and ‘modern people’, whose laziness was said to be the root cause of chronic illness and early mortality. Moreover, whether the physical changes of ageing were socially recognized varied according to necessity (majboori). In poor households, elders continued to work despite grinding physical frailty, as did elders who were without available children. Thus, socio-economic location and kinship relations condition the degree of frailty (kamzoori) that is endured before a person can step into the full social role of being an elder (Erb and Harriss-White 2002).

Generational difference is an extremely prominent element in the construction of ageing in Pind. Old age was based on a subjectivity of where a person stood in relation to other people and thus was inherently contextual. Old age was substantially a matter of generation and household developmental cycles. People become elders when they had lived long enough for their children to become jawaan (young adults). Most decisively, people start to be classified and behave like elders when their sons get married and have children of their own. The relationships between parents and children hinge around changes of sexuality and reproduction in the life-course. When sons became sexually active, it was considered appropriate for parents to withdraw from sexual activity, and this was particularly the case for women. For instance, Shahida, in her early 40s, was ashamed of her pregnancy, as she had five grown-up children and a daughter-in-law who was also pregnant with her first child. She was seeking a termination as she felt that it ‘didn’t look good’ for a mother-in-law to be pregnant at the same time as her daughter-in-law. There is usually a close overlap between the ages of the mother-in-law’s last child, and the oldest daughter-in-law’s first child. The observations from Pind thus suggest that the physical changes associated with maturity can be less important than generational differences.

The demography of the elderly
Currently, 6% of the population of Pakistan is over the age of 60 (7.3 million people), whilst 40% of households contain an elderly person. The elderly have stayed at approximately 6% of the population since 1961. Throughout the last half century, the greatest population growth has been in the section of the population which is at ‘working-age’, partly due to population momentum and partly due to poor gains in survival in late middle age (Government of Pakistan 2002).

Pakistan is on the verge of ageing rapidly. Mortality has been in decline since the 1950s, and an incipient fertility decline has been identified since the late 1990s (Sathar 1991; Sathar and Casterline 1998). Population ageing is built into the momentum of current growth, and it will take place in a matter of decades, rather than centuries. By 2050 Pakistan is predicted to have 42.8 million elderly, making up 12.4% of the population, and the elderly population will be growing much faster than the rest (United Nations 2002). Already there is geographic variation in the progression of population ageing. District-level census data show that the proportion of elderly varies between 3.2% and 8.9% (Government of Pakistan 1998).

The gender balance is a very important characteristic of the elderly population in Pakistan. Women live longer...
than men in most countries in the world, giving rise to a preponderance of women in the elderly population (Austad 2006). In Pakistan, however, there has been a stark preponderance of older men until very recently. In 1950 there were 134 elderly men to every 100 elderly women. Current estimates of the extent of sex bias in Pakistan vary slightly, from 119 in the 1998 census (Hashmi 2003) to rough parity in the UN 2000 population estimates (United Nations 2002). Life expectancy at birth is still longer for men in Pakistan (61.2 years) than women (60.9 years) (United Nations 2002). This phenomenon is only observed in a few countries such as India, Bangladesh, Egypt, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, and is likely to reflect a heavy burden of maternal mortality and relative female neglect throughout the life-course (Mubashir Ali and Kiani 2003). The ‘missing’ elderly women (Sen 1992) are an embodiment of the manifold ways in which gender relations prevent women’s potential for longevity from being realized.

By 2050 Pakistan is predicted to have 42.8 million elderly, making up 12.4% of the population, and the elderly population will be growing much faster than the rest...

Mortality
Life expectancy at birth has increased in Pakistan from 41 years in 1950 to 61 years in 2000. Most of this improvement in life expectancy at birth is driven by reduced infant-child mortality, but also by a general decline in adult mortality (Sathar 1991).

We examined trends in age-specific mortality rates between the 1980s and 1990s using the Pakistan Demographic Survey (PDS), which is the only regular source of data on adult mortality in Pakistan. The sample of deaths is relatively small and there may be considerable error around the estimates. However, the data from successive rounds of the PDS can be pooled to give a more consistent picture (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: Changes in age-specific mortality rates 1984–90 to 1991–01

Amongst the over 65s, there has been no clear change in mortality between the 1980s and 1990s. Female mortality amongst the elderly appears to have declined more than male mortality (a 6% decline compared to 0.95% for elderly men). However, for those aged 50–64, mortality appears to have actually increased between the 1980s and 1990s. Thus, survival in late middle age and older life seems to have deteriorated since the 1980s, particularly for women. This highlights the welfare of the elderly as a priority area for public policy.

Healthy life expectancy
Healthy life expectancy measures the number of years people can be expected to live, free of disability. Currently, men in Pakistan can expect to live 54.2 years without disability and women 52.3 years. At age 60, disability-free life expectancy is only 11.4 years. The loss of healthy years of life is greater for women than for men. Women can be expected to lose 9.3 healthy years of life (15% of their total life expectancy) whereas men only lose 6.9 years (11.3%) (World Health Organisation 2003).

Ill-health
Non-communicable chronic illness is the most important cause of mortality and morbidity amongst the elderly in Pakistan (see Table 1). Cardio-vascular and musculoskeletal disease are the most common sources of morbidity. As would be expected, elderly women tend to report higher rates of morbidity than elderly men.
Furthermore, as the table suggests, the prevalence of chronic illness is strongly socially patterned. Higher levels of chronic illness are generally found amongst elderly living in urban areas, and amongst those who are of a higher socio-economic class (when this is measured) (Pakistan Medical Research Council 1998).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1: Chronic health conditions among the elderly in Pakistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Health Survey of Pakistan (65 yrs and above)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHLCEP (60 yrs and above)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men                           Women                           Men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypertension</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29% rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37% urban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diabetes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9% rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14% urban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heart disease</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cardio-vascular disease</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18% rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29% urban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Musculoskeletal disease</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renal impairment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17% rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12% urban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chronic bronchitis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7% rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10% urban</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: National Health Survey of Pakistan (1990-94) and SHLCEP (1999-01)

The elderly in Pakistan are increasingly being afflicted by 'diseases of affluence', which are precipitated by the sedentary urban lifestyles associated with 'modernization'. However, alongside the growing epidemic of non-communicable chronic illness is a persistent force of ill-health from communicable disease. Tuberculosis and viral hepatitis are still major causes of death amongst the elderly (Government of Pakistan 2002). Pakistan is thus suffering a double burden of mortality in which non-communicable chronic disease amongst the urban rich coexist alongside malnutrition and infectious disease amongst the poor.

The importance of family care

Financially, elderly people benefit economically from living in joint families. Using econometric data on Pakistan from the 1991–92 World Bank Living Standards Measurement Survey Anjini Kochar found that fathers worked fewer days as their sons’ wage earnings increased, indicating that fathers benefit from their sons’ incomes. She identified that these benefits arise mainly due to the joint consumption of household public goods. Sons’ incomes finance expenditures on consumer durables and ceremonial events, particularly weddings (Kochar 2000).

Similar findings are also reported using more holistic measures of quality of life. Using an index that combined measures of socio-economic status, health status, autonomy and happiness, Syed Mubashir Ali and Mohammad Kiani found that the elderly living in extended families had a better quality of life than those living in joint or nuclear families. This association persisted after taking account of the variation in quality of life associated with other cross-cutting factors such as age, gender, urban–rural residence, and poverty. Notably, elderly women had a poorer quality of life than elderly men, even in the multi-variate model (Mubashir Ali and Kiani 2003).

Here, we chose heart disease as a case study to examine the factors associated with ill-health in the SHLCEP. Heart disease is particularly informative as it is associated with high levels of morbidity amongst the elderly, and is also one of the leading causes of mortality. Heart disease was reported by 10.8% of the elderly men in the survey and...
15.4% of the elderly women. The factors associated with variation in health status among the elderly in a bivariate X2 analysis are shown in Table 2.

Table 2: Percentage of elderly with heart disease according to various risk factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risk factors</th>
<th>All</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urban-rural residence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly family income</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt; 6000 Rs</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
<td>1551</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-10,000 Rs</td>
<td>17.0%</td>
<td>15.6%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>1370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 10,000 Rs</td>
<td>18.4%</td>
<td>16.8%</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
<td>304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
<td>11.6%</td>
<td>398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital status</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Now married</td>
<td>11.3%</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
<td>798</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Widowed</td>
<td>17.3%</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
<td>19.3%</td>
<td>622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic dependence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent</td>
<td>14.4%</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
<td>2181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not dependent</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
<td>743</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent on whom</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spouse</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
<td>465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sons</td>
<td>15.1%</td>
<td>13.1%</td>
<td>16.9%</td>
<td>1525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
<td>934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family type</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear</td>
<td>16.5%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literacy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illiterate</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
<td>1903</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt; Matric</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
<td>18.7%</td>
<td>663</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; Matric</td>
<td>16.2%</td>
<td>15.7%</td>
<td>18.9%</td>
<td>352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Currently working</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>26.1%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>13.7%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SHLCEP (1999-01)

As the table shows, the risk of heart disease is associated with factors concerning family support as well as socio-economic status. In relation to family support, the prevalence of heart disease is considerably higher amongst those who are widowed, compared to those who are currently married, never married, divorced or separated. This relationship is statistically significant at the p<0.001 level. The strength of the association is, however, driven by the strong association between widowhood and heart disease amongst women (19.3% of widows compared to 12.3% of currently married women); amongst men there is little difference in the prevalence of heart disease by marital status. Elderly people who are living in nuclear families and rural areas. Elderly who are dependent on their sons have higher rates of heart disease than those who are dependent on their spouse or ‘other’ relatives (p=0.00012). However, these is likely to be confounded by the age of the elderly person, as widows, who also tend to be dependent on their sons rather than on their spouses, are likely to be older than elderly who are still married.

Looking at the associations with socio-economic factors, heart disease appears to be associated with factors usually thought to indicate high socio-economic status, such as living in an urban area (p<0.001), having a high family income (p<0.001) and being well educated (p=0.046),
thus bearing the characteristics of a disease of affluence. The quantitative data thus lead us to examine the family care for the elderly as an important input to their welfare, especially for elderly women.

**Doing Khidmat (Obligatory Service)**

In Pind, family care for the elderly was referred to as doing khidmat, which literally means ‘to serve’. Doing khidmat is a complex socio-cultural formulation of the care relationship, legitimated with reference to culture and religious tenets. People in Pind understood khidmat in terms of religious obligations (farz) to care. Children also did khidmat for their parents in repayment for the sacrifices that the parents made in bringing the children up (Murtuja 2005).

As Sylvia Vatuk (1995) argued for North India, socialisation into these expectations about khidmat begins from the early stages of childhood. Using the language of doting and teasing, mothers in Pind explained to their sons from a young age how they hope they will give them khidmat in old age and be their bohrappe da sahara (support for old age). To make such explicit claims to intergenerational reciprocity are not associated with emotions like shame or guilt, as have been reported for western elderly people unable to conform to their cultural ideals of self-reliance in later life. People in Pind are taught to think of the parent-child relationship not in terms of a selfless one-way flow of attention and resources, but as a form of mutuality or reciprocity enacted over the life-course.

The elderly in Pakistan are increasingly being afflicted by ‘diseases of affluence’, which are precipitated by the sedentary urban lifestyles associated with ‘modernization’.

Khidmat was done for elders in accordance within a strong and gendered normative framework. In general, forms of economic support were provided by male kin, particularly sons. There was strong stigma and taboo surrounding the receipt of economic support from married daughters, particularly transfers of financial resources and accommodation. Elderly parents who found themselves majboor (in need) and requiring support from their married daughters might largely spend parts of the day in their daughter’s household, but whilst they still had the choice, they refused to sleep under her roof. By contrast, practical support and personal care was typically provided by female kin, particularly daughter-in-laws and unmarried daughters. For emotional support concerning personal problems, elderly women turned to their daughters and daughters-in-law, whilst elderly men turned to their wives.

Cultural norms in Pind affirmed an ideal of supporting elderly via the ‘joint family’, where aged fathers and mothers live with their married sons, daughters-in-law and grandchildren, and unmarried sons and daughters. In principle the joint family is a system of mutual interdependence, in which all members are cared for according to expectations about duty (farz) which are based on gender, generation and position in the household structure. David Collard (2000) and Naila Kabeer (2000) describe this as an ‘inter-generational bargain’. Parents consider it their duty to care for their children until they are established and married, which includes giving them a job or livelihood, and arranging their children’s marriages. In return, grown-up sons were supposed to manage the property and act as breadwinner, and their wives should carry out the work of caring for children, the sick and the elderly. In Pind, these ideas were legitimated with reference to Islam, as expressed in sayings such as if a parent died without arranging a child’s marriage, that they would be in eternal torment.

It was common for the work of khidmat to be shared between sons. Sons that moved out and established their own households usually did so within the compound or nearby, producing clusters of agnatically-related families. Cousin-marriage and endogamy within the biraderi ensured that daughters also often married within the village, which meant that they lived nearby and were able to make frequent visits to their natal home for companionship and emotional sustenance. People remained committed to the united family, if not to the single household. This local kinship facilitates flows of work and resources between sons and elderly parents. In Pind the roles of economic support and practical care for elderly parents were sometimes split so that the co-resident son cooks and budgets with the parents on an everyday basis, whilst...
Another son paid for additional expenses such as health care. It was also common for elders, particularly widows, to move between their sons’ houses for extended periods of time. Elders said that this was their will, and that they ‘go when they please and where they please’. However, such moves are usually prompted by changes going on in their sons’ lives, and it also has the result of spreading the *khidmat* between the various sons and daughter-in-laws.

**Variation in entitlements to family care**

The vast majority of elderly people live in joint families (60%), and only 23% live in nuclear families. The elderly are more likely to be living in extended families than younger people (Hashmi 2003). Interestingly, the SHLCEP shows no statistically significant differences in the proportion of elderly people living in nuclear families between urban or rural areas, or between elderly men and women (Pakistan Medical Research Council 2005). According to the 1998 census, only 3% of elderly people in Pakistan live alone (Hashmi 2003), although some surveys, such as that of Grace Clark (2002) and colleagues, have given estimates as high as 10%.

In the SHLCEP, 6% of elderly were living alone. The most commonly cited reason given for living alone was the death of a spouse (32%), followed by never having married (13%), not having any relatives (13%), the separation of children (13%) and children being away due to employment (8%). Gender differences in reasons for living alone were apparent. Women were more likely to report living alone because their spouses had died or because their children were away due to unemployment. Men were more likely to state that they were alone because they had never married or because their children had separated (Pakistan Medical Research Council 2005).

Variation in the receipt of family care thus seems to be connected with: (1) the availability of kin and (2) the socio-economic circumstances of the family.

**The availability of kin**

The structural foundations of family care may break down in circumstances of widowhood, separation or divorce, polygamy or family conflict, or childlessness, where there are no de facto family members available. The consequences of a lack of available kin are gendered, as are the strategies for managing them.

According to the SHLCEP, 43% of elderly women are widows compared with 17% of men, whilst 80% of elderly men are married compared with only 55% of women (Pakistan Medical Research Council 2005). The relative commonness of widowhood in women relates to female longevity, but also reflects a social bias against widow remarriage in Pakistan. Marital status is a critical dimension of welfare for the elderly, and widowhood is closely associated with poverty and mortality in South Asia, especially for women (Dreze and Srinivasan 1997; Bhat and Dhruvarajan 2001).

“The ‘missing’ elderly women are an embodiment of the manifold ways in which gender relations prevent women’s potential for longevity from being realized.”

The anticipation of old age incapacity without any social welfare institutions other than the *khidmat* provided by children appears to be, amongst other factors, an important prop to marriage and high fertility in South Asia (Cain 1986; Vlassoff 1990; Cain 1991c; Sathar and Kazi 1997; Sathar and Casterline 1998). The elderly people interviewed in Pind had an average completed family size of 5.1 living children, of whom 2.9 were sons and 2.2 were daughters. None of the elderly couples in Pind had only daughters, although four had only sons. Couples are not generally satisfied with only daughters, and keep having children until the arrival of a son. Two sons remains the childbearing preference in Pakistan (Sathar and Casterline 1998). Intriguingly, in rural Bangladesh, Omar Rahman (1999) showed that having one son does not significantly improve parental survival, but having two does.

Despite almost universal rates of marriage, childlessness is relatively common, and becomes a major cause of marital instability. In cases of childlessness, widowhood or marital break-down, there is an expectation that the extended family should take on responsibilities for vulnerable relatives. The logic of who steps in to provide support broadly follows the principles of patrilineal-
ity (Shaw 2004). In Pind, other male kin usually took on this responsibility, so childless or single women may be expected to be looked after by their fathers, brothers or brother’s children. To receive support from daughters and sisters was considered somewhat shameful.

Elderly people who are living in nuclear families have 1.45 times the odds of heart disease of those who are living in any kind of joint family...

The normative framework guiding the receipt of *khidmat* is thus also highly gendered, and reflects ideologies about the relative claims of different family members. Elders are due respect, but in practice, not all elders are entitled to equal *khidmat*. For example, Saira Bibi, an elderly woman in Pind who never married at all, lived in a mud house that she built for herself in her brother’s compound. She cooked for herself and was not supposed to have any access to the milk from their cow. As Lawrence Cohen’s (1998) North Indian ethnography suggests, spinster or widowed aunts are considered quite different from venerable and cared-for mothers, and are weaker and more likely to be neglected. The entitlement to *khidmat* from the next generation is predicated on having achieved parenthood.

Social class and claims to *Khidmat*

Whilst it is considered a blessing to be able to provide *khidmat* for elders, in conditions of poverty, the additional presence of elderly people in the household can be an economic stress. PSES2 data reveal that elderly nuclear families tend to be poorer than elderly extended families (Mubashir Ali and Kiani 2003). Applying the methods used by Sarmistha Pal and Robert Palacios to the PSES2 (Pal and Palacios 2006), it is possible to assess the economic status of households containing elderly. The poverty indicator used was average per capita consumption expenditure (APCE), which was calculated from the PSES2 based on household expenditure on a range of basic goods. The poverty line was calculated to be 725 Rs per month.

The data are shown in Table 3. As in the Indian data, Pakistani households containing elderly people appear to be slightly better off than households without. Amongst the households with elderly people, those containing more than one elderly person are slightly more affluent. However, after adjusting for household composition, the benefit of having elderly people in the household may be removed and sometimes reversed. As the data show, the presence of dependent children (aged 0–15 years) is more strongly associated with poverty than the presence of elderly, but the added presence of elderly is additionally associated with poverty. The poorest households are those with old people and children. For households without children, the additional presence of an elderly person is associated with poverty.

### Table 3: Average per capital consumption expenditure by household composition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of household</th>
<th>Percentage of households</th>
<th>Average per capital consumption expenditure (Rs/m)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>With old person</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>1236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Without old person</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>1146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With old person and child(ren)</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>1032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With old person but no child(ren)</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>1878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Without old person but with child(ren)</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>1049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With more than one old person</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>1286</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: PSES2, 2001  N= 4080 households

Thus, although elderly people benefit in welfare from living with their children, the economic benefit of having elderly people may disappear at the household level when there are dependent children present. This is reflected in the qualitative data, which revealed a tendency for the *khidmat* from sons in poorer elderly households to decline, and for tensions in the joint family to emerge in response to poverty.

Makbool’s situation exemplifies the tensions that can
emerge in the joint family in response to poverty, and elderly people’s commonly expressed anxieties about dependency on children. Makbool is a widower whose wife died of fever 13 years ago. He himself was very thin and frail. He had no land and despite his infirmities and advanced old age he continued to work as a watchman at the health centre. He had four sons, but he and his wife had always lived with his divorcee daughter, and her two children, instead. His sons were married and living elsewhere in Pind and none of them provided for him materially. He said that his sons were only just managing to get by themselves, and all their earnings went to their wives and children:

‘My sons aren’t looking after me, they aren’t giving me respect. My daughters-in-law are the ones making the decision. They say their money is already short, so they can’t afford to give anything to me. But it doesn’t look good for sons not to look after their parents (log achhe nay samajde). People don’t give you respect’

Whether poor families break up depends on how sons negotiate their loyalties towards their natal and conjugal families. The break-up of joint families tends to be blamed on the behaviour of daughters-in-law (Parry 1979). In Pind, daughters-in-laws were often described as greedy (lalchi) or argumentative (larhako) by the elder generation. This is another important way in which the honour of a family is critically bound up in the conduct of its women (Shaw 2000). Thus, as Penny Vera-Sanso argues in her work on South India, inter-generational relations are mediated by socio-economic location and by the conjugal relationship (Vera-Sanso 2001).

Inter-generational flows of resources
In circumstances of poverty, there may be little in the way of inter-generational support within the household. A survey of the elderly in Punjab reported that 38% of elderly men and women received no financial support from their adult sons, and that 23% of elderly rarely or never received help from their children when they were sick (Clark, Zaman et al. 2002). Tensions in inter-generational relationships within households may be expressed through the medium of resource consumption. In Pakistan, as in Amartya Sen’s formulation of the entitlement approach, intra-household entitlements to food and other inputs to health appear to be related to an individual’s labour power. For example, econometric analysis of the 1987–88 Household Income and Expenditure Survey of Pakistan showed that men have a larger impact on the household food share than women, and that male workers command more of the household food budget than male dependents. However, patterns of resource allocation towards the elderly are complex, and depend on which resource is under consideration. Biases in food allocation towards the elderly have not been identified in Pakistan. The same survey revealed no consumption biases against the elderly, regardless of whether the elderly were working or not. Rather, the authors found that young adults who are not working consume less than the elderly (Bhalotra and Attfield 1998). Rather, significant anti-elderly biases have been identified in relation to medical expenditures. Using panel data from the International Food Policy Research Institute (1986–89) and the World Bank’s Pakistan Living Standards Measurement Survey (1991–92), Anjini Kochar (1999) confirmed that old people have different health entitlements in Pakistani households. Although more money is spent on medical expenditures for the elderly than for other household members, this is still less than, as would be required to meet the needs of their poorer health status. According to the LSMS data, medical expenditures peak for males in their early 30s and decline with age. Furthermore, the extent of this bias depends on the elderly person’s economic contributions to the household.

For emotional support concerning personal problems, elderly women turned to their daughters and daughters-in-law, whilst elderly men turned to their wives.

In poor households in Pind, the entitlements to resources amongst the elderly are partially shaped by perceptions about their economic productivity, particularly for elderly women. Muktaree, an elderly Christian lady who used to work as a dai, had a tumour in her stomach the size of a football. Her son, a road cleaner, took her to an allopathic doctor in Lahore, who said that she needed an operation to remove it. However, the family has no money to pay for the procedure, and Muktaree is taking no medicine at all.
Zohra, a dai from the health centre, translated:

‘They haven’t got any money, what can she do? If the family are very poor like this, they don’t give medicines to the old people. They’re old, what’s the point? She needs an operation but she won’t get it. She herself says that what’s the point, I’m old, give it to the young people because they are jawaan and they need their health. So that’s why they only give her tea and not roti.’

None of the elderly couples in Pind had only daughters, although four had only sons. Couples are not generally satisfied with only daughters, and keep having children until the arrival of a son. In poor families, scarce resources are directed towards children, who are seen to have their lives ahead of them and need their health so they can work for the good of the whole family. Muktaree herself says that she’s old and reaching the end of her life, so she’s tacitly being allowed to die. Thus, elderly people justify these painful biases in the allocation of scarce resources by saying that their lives are nearly finished (khatam), that the young have their lives ahead of them, and that the young are more necessary to the household than they themselves. Nasreen also acquiesced with her family against claiming what she needs for her health. Nasreen suffered from debilitating joint pains which made her stop working, as a domestic worker, four years ago. At the time of the interview she was unable to haul herself off the bed without calling for the help of her granddaughter. Nasreen didn’t tell her son that she was ill, so that he didn’t have to face the question of what to do about it:

‘Mashallah, my sons bring me medicines. But it is difficult to ask them when they are so short of money themselves. I don’t like to beg. So sometimes I don’t tell him I’m ill.’

In communities khidmat is demonstrated through co-residence between parents and their sons, and not by actual resource flows within households. The need to do khidmat as a means of securing social approval can make the care relationship somewhat prescriptive. This can be a tacit, unspoken agreement, allowing a family to maintain a semblance of togetherness; elders may not even tell their sons about their needs, so that the sons do not have to face the difficulty of meeting them.

Conclusions

Gender and social class are extremely important factors differentiating the health of the elderly in Pakistan, and the management and care for ill-health amongst the elderly. Patriarchal gender relations impinge on women’s health throughout the life-course. Pakistani women have no advantage in survival over men, unlike in most other countries in the world. They have higher rates of disability, communicable and non-communicable disease, and report a lower quality of life. Elderly people’s entitlements to care are gendered and depend on kinship position. Women’s entitlements to care can be particularly negotiable, depending on the availability of kin and the socio-economic circumstances of the family, and whether produced a large family, nurtured a net of close relationships with her children, and succeeded in securing the respect of her daughters-in-law.

Socio-economic class is central to the provision of care, and nuclear family living may be a privilege of the affluent. Thus, gender relations are worked out in relation to other dimensions of social structure, such as socio-economic class. In conditions of poverty, inputs to health may be directed away from the elderly towards the young, who are perceived to be more economically productive, and in greater need.

References


i The quality of life variable they derived was a composite variable consisting of health status, measured by the proxy 'was (name) sick during the last two weeks?'; educational status; per capita income; the availability of a suitable place for rest; role in decision-making; satisfaction with present living conditions; disability status; self-perceived nutritional level; status of present life as compared to life when in middle-age; a feeling of satisfaction with life; confidence of well-being in the future; presence of drinking water, electricity, gas and telephone in the house; household crowding; being gainfully employed and owning the house (Mubashir Ali and Kiani 2003).
Re-Imagining Identity and Nation in South Asian Diaspora Fiction

: Jordan Nelson*
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As the machinations of globalization lead to an increasingly interconnected world, individuals begin to inhabit multiple spheres—cultural, linguistic, national, economic, etc. As individuals find themselves split between multiple levels, they also gain the enhanced perspective that accompanies the blending together of these different perspectives. "The truest eye may now belong to the migrant’s double vision", explains Homi K. Bhabha in the introduction to The Location of Culture. In this way, the split individual constitutes, in reality, the doubled individual. Specifically, this essay will explore the ways in which migration—and the accompanying sense of place or placelessness—influences sentiments of national identity and belonging in the works of three writers. I will accomplish this by first outlining the identity crises faced by both the nation of Pakistan and the citizens of that nation and subsequently consider the ways in which migrant writers from South Asia reconfigure the history and reality of Pakistan as well as their own identities as migrant writers through fiction. The writers Mohsin Hamid, Mohammed Hanif, and Salman Rushdie employ fiction as a mechanism of the imagination to dis-member the narrative imposed on it by the global hegemonic center and re-member (by re-imagining) a personal narrative of Pakistan.

Friedman predicates this geographic and religious-cultural binary opposition, interestingly enough, on singularity and multiplicity: the holy singularity of Catholic (European) Christians who are enemies of all idolatry and heresy and the multiple peoples, territories, and countries of India. In the world narrated by Columbus and the Catholics, who collectively act as agents of a hegemonic center, the Catholics depict themselves as the bearers of the holy faith, thus situating themselves in a position removed from the rest of the world who is either "indoctrinated" by Mahomet or who practices idolatry.

Columbus situates his projected conversion of the Indians upon a decidedly essentialist stratagem, implying that an entire peoples’ (of different countries and territories) disposition can be singularly comprehended and subsequently manipulated in such a way as to appropriate them into the discourse of the hegemonic center. Perhaps there
exists no symbol for this center’s virulent narrative projections onto the peripheries than the fact that Columbus’ incorrect labeling of the aboriginal peoples living in the Americas as “Indians” not only threatens to reduce all peripheries to a singular category of Other, but also endures into the present day.

Despite the fact that he experiences this televised event in person, Ali’s own words do not suffice in describing this moment; instead, he must channel a TV clip, and his personal, localized becomes the (inter)national spectacle—extended to whomever the “you” is who reads his lines.

The Western hegemonic center also persists into the present day as Friedman’s comparison of his and Columbus’s voyages illustrates. The contemporary West, projects onto Pakistan its perception of the state as not-yet democratic, oppressively militaristic, and fundamentally Islamic. Edward W. Said explains how in the mid-1970s, with Washington’s realization of Pakistan’s sudden ability to hassle the United States, ushered a shift of Pakistan’s position in the US consciousness from barely acknowledged to news-worthy. What is more, Said explains how this spontaneous transition implicates not only the media in “unrestrained” and “immediate” knee-jerk portrayals of Islam and the states associated with it, but also liberal intellectual publications:

There was no real transition from one to the other. Neither was there any significant segment of the population ready to explain or identify what appeared to be a new phenomenon [...] As a result the image of Islam today, in every place that one encounters it, is an unrestrained and immediate one. [...] More disturbingly, however, it is regularly apparent in higher forms of general cultural argument, most often as a subject reflected on with gravity and seriousness in important liberal journals. In this respect, because of the changes in intellectual-geopolitical thinking that I have described, there is little difference between them and the mass media.

Hence, Philip Oldenburg, as a more recent example, portrays Pakistan as a juvenile democracy lagging behind India’s democracy because of religious, cultural, and military factors—in short, as he believes it was fated to do from its inception. Edward W. Said corroborates this popular Western perception of Pakistan as an oppressive dictatorship.

Of course, part of the West’s hegemonic narrative of Pakistan is shaped by global events of the time, particularly the Cold War. During this time, the West exerted its hegemonic power of narrative over the margins by describing the world in a series of stark demarcations in the Three Worlds Theory. This theory describes the First World as the capitalist US and its allies, the Second World as the communist Soviet Union and its allies, and the Third World as the non-aligned states in limbo between the First and Second Worlds. Said explains the relationship between the Western minds’ perceptions of Islamic states within the context of a Cold-War compartmentalization of the world: “What there is of value in Islam is principally its anticommunism, with the additional irony that almost invariably anticommunism in the Islamic world has been synonymous with repressive pro-American regimes. Pakistan’s Zia al-Haq is a perfect case in point.” After all, as Youssef Yahmad reminds us in “Edward Said, Eqbal Ahmad, and Salman Rushdie: Resisting the Ambivalence of Postcolonial Theory,” “Past and present forms of colonialism have always masked their true objectives behind statements or gestures of benevolence and respect for the other.” The East-West opposition constructed by Columbus has thus shifted subtly from a territorial imperialism to an economic and cultural imperialism.

With an understanding of the strikingly imperialist stakes raised by globalization in tandem with the hegemonic center’s descriptions of the peripheries in general—and Pakistan in particular—we can begin interrogating the novels of Mohammed Hanif, Mohsin Hamid, and Salman Rushdie. It is worth noting straight away that my own linguistic limitations imperil the present study by trembling behind the boundaries of the ethnocentric. That is, I am only able to read and consider texts written in English. While deconstructing the Three Worlds Theory in his essay “Jameson’s Rhetoric of Otherness in the ‘National Allegory’” Aijaz Ahmad explains the implications of such an
ethnocentric literary view of the world:

*Major literary traditions—such as those of Bengali, Hindi, Tamil, Telegu and half a dozen others in India alone—remain [...] virtually unknown to the American literary theorist. Consequently, the few writers who happen to write in English are valorized beyond measure. Witness, for example, the characterization of Salman Rushdie’s *Midnight’s Children* in the New York Times as “a Continent finding its voice”—as if one has no voice if one does not speak in English.”

To be sure, I am missing out on whole swathes of texts written in languages beyond my grasp, but the upshot is that these writers have lived in the hubs of the West—New York and London—and write in English to include these audiences in their discourses. In this way, their writings, accessible to the Anglicized spheres, constitute “counterviews,” which Youssef Yacoubi affirms, “Oppos[e] the domination and duration of totalizing narratives.”

Looking at novels is perhaps not the most intuitive way to gain insight into how Pakistan re-imagines itself in a global setting through such counterviews, but Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak reminds us how closely intertwined nationalism and the imagination are: “Nationalism is the product of a collective imagination constructed through rememoration. It is the comparativist imagination that undoes that possessive spell.”

The three texts I am primarily concerned with—Mohsin Hamid’s *The Reluctant Fundamentalist*, Mohammed Hanif’s *A Case of Exploding Mangoes*, and Salman Rushdie’s *Shame*—all confront the fragmentation of identity in an increasingly globalized world. Mohammed Hanif’s *A Case of Exploding Mangoes* raises the issue of a Pakistan that is not only fragmented along lines of military and civilian, but also of the media, both domestic and foreign. In the novel’s Prologue, Ali Shigri, Junior Under Officer of Pakistan Air Force, casually mentions the TV clip of General Zia walking towards the plane that would crash, ending his life: “You might have seen me on TV after the crash. The clip is short and everything in it is sun-bleached and slightly faded. It was pulled after the first two bulletins because it seemed to be having an adverse impact on the morale of the armed forces.” Despite the fact that he experiences this televised event in person, Ali’s own words do not suffice in describing this moment; instead, he must channel a TV clip, and his personal, localized becomes the (inter)national spectacle—extended to whomever the “you” is who reads his lines. Additionally, the very opening of the novel establishes that Hanif imagines a Pakistan whose perception of itself is governed by the media. It also paints a portrait of a Pakistan fractured between civilians and military; the government does not censor the clip because of its adverse effects on the civilians, but because of how it affects the military’s morale. The rest of the Prologue further complicates the fragmentation engendered by the media by considering different interpretations and reactions to the clip. In these descriptions, Hanif exhibits an acute awareness of Pakistan’s precarious positioning between the so-called First and Second Worlds: “[General Akhtar’s] obituary in the next day’s newspapers will describe him as ‘the Silent Soldier’ and ‘one of the ten men standing between the Free World and the Red Army.’”

...undermines the Three Worlds Theory’s stark boundary-drawing of the world, hinting instead at a world in which the mingling of remains—or excess—results in a fragmented, hybridized world.”

Ali soon, however, deconstructs the Three Worlds Theory’s compartmentalization of the world:

*What they found in the wreckage of the plane were not bodies [...] Remains. They found remains. Bits of flesh splattered on the broken aero plane parts, charred bones sticking to mangled metal, severed limbs and faces melted into blobs of pink meat. Nobody can ever say that the coffin that was buried in Arlington Cemetery didn’t carry bits of General Zia’s remains and that what lies buried in Shah Faisal Mosque in Islamabad are not some of the remains of the State Department’s brightest star.*

Ali problematizes the neat demarcations between First, Second, and Third Worlds by questioning the discreteness of the bodies found in the crash, hinting at a mingling of “First” and “Third” Worlds. This mingling—wherein bits of
the First World are present and implicated in the Third World while bits of the Third World are similarly present and implicated in the First World—undermines the Three Worlds Theory’s stark boundary-drawing of the world, hinting instead at a world in which the mingling of remains—or excess—results in a fragmented, hybridized world.

**How Media Constructs Reality**

Hanif also demonstrates in *A Case of Exploding Mangoes*, how the media may be imagined—revised and removed from reality—in such a way as to engineer public opinion (i.e., through propaganda). In a brief but telling passage, Hanif illustrates how the American media has garnered public support for the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan:

The news anchor had started using Pakistan’s flag as the backdrop for her show [...] The crème de la crème of the East Texas community and would-be supporters of the jihad against the Soviets were sent invitation cards [to a charity ball] carrying a picture of a dead Afghan child (caption: Better dead than red). Others showed a nameless Afghan mujahid in an old shawl with a rocket launcher on his shoulder (caption: your ten dollars can help him bring down a Russian Hind helicopter).17

...the hyperreality of media and reality in Hanif’s re-imagining of Pakistan and US in conjunction with their similar expressions of nationalism in Hamid’s novel demonstrate that—much like the shared remains in the coffins in Hanif’s novel—both worlds mingle significantly, inhabiting shared spaces.

The US government and media cultivate support for their war against the “Second World” by manipulating images and perceptions of the so-called “Third World.” The morbid ambivalence with which they treat the citizens of Afghanistan marginalizes these citizens between the First and Second Worlds and highlights the Western hegemony’s narrative power over them, casting them as pawns in an ideological war. Pakistan’s media is also complicit in such propaganda and imaginative fragmentation of reality, such as when General Zia organizes a donation event for widows (hand-picked by the military for increased effect) and decides to film and broadcast it. At one point, an activist dressed as a widow unfurls her dupatta to reveal a large sign calling for the release of a blind female prisoner accused of adultery. General Zia, at a loss, looks to the information minister: “General Zia glanced back and his right eyebrow asked the information minister where the hell he had got this widow. The information minister stood his ground; imagining the camera was taking a close-up of him, his mouth broke into a grin. He shook his head, and composed a picture caption for tomorrow’s papers: The president sharing a light moment with the information minister.”18 This scene exemplifies the potency of media for imaginative revisionist re-presentations of reality; in this case, the information minister actually revises the present as it occurs for future headlines. Noam Chomsky corroborates the media’s fragmentation of re-presentation and reality: “The picture of the world that’s presented to the public has only the remotest relation to reality. The truth of the matter is buried under edifice after edifice of lies upon lies.”19 Of course, Chomsky also suggests that such propaganda inhabits an interesting sphere of excess democracy, because it “Deter[s] the threat of democracy, [...] under the conditions of freedom. [...] It’s not like a totalitarian state, where its done by force. These achievements are under conditions of freedom.”20 Thus, Hanif imagines a concerted effort on the part of Pakistan’s (and the United States’) governments and media to depict a nationalism that is hedged between reality and imagination to create a fragmented re-presentation of a multiplicitous Pakistan; as it is based in hyperreality, the superseding of reality by images of reality, this nationalism is also based in postmodern culture.

**Identity: Torn between New York and Lahore**

This fragmented, multiplicitous identity—that engenders the double vision described by Bhabha—results from the deconstruction of a binary oppositional way of viewing the spaces here and there. Changez, the protagonist of Mohsin Hamid’s *The Reluctant Fundamentalist*, travels from Pakistan to the United States to attend university and eventually work for a successful consulting firm.
Towards the beginning of his time in the United States, Changez views Pakistan and the United States as binary opposites:

In the stories we tell of ourselves we were not the crazed and destitute radicals you see on your television channels but rather saints and poets and—yes—conquering kings. We built the Royal Mosque and the Shalimar Gardens in this city, and we built the Lahore Fort with its mighty walls and wide ramp for our battle-elephants. And we did these things when your country was still a collection of thirteen small colonies, gnawing away at the edge of a continent.21

In this formulation, the United States and Pakistan perform a delicate dance of reversal wherein they always diametrically oppose one another. Moreover, Changez describes how Pakistan re-imagines itself through storytelling; these stories provide counterpoints, to borrow a familiar term from Yacoubi, that combat US media portrayal of Pakistan (echoing Said’s warnings of media portrayals of Islam) as violently radical and underscore the storytellers’ (and Changez’s and Hamid’s) endeavors to re-imagine their own nationalisms. In Changez’s case, this involves remembering ancient glory in order to recuperate it in the present position. Ironically, these ancient glories and empires—of both Pakistan and the US—occurred at a time before either nation existed, when they were themselves colonial holdings (of the Mughals in the case of Pakistan and of the British in the case of the US).

By invoking such ancient glory, Changez conforms to the framework of nationalism set forth by Spivak:

Nationalism was tied to the circumstances of one’s birth, its recoding in terms of migration, marriage and history disappearing into claims to ancient birth. Its ingredients are to be found in the very assumptions of what I later learned to call reproductive heteronormativity. [...] And the important question was: are you natural or naturalized? [...] When I look at Todor Zhivkov’s arguments that Bulgarians had an organized state before the Russians, they were Christians before the Russians, I think of this: ancient claims to things becoming nationalism by virtue of a shared ancestry.22

In fact, not only do Changez’s claims to realizing civilization before the Americans constitute such a nationalism of heteronormative (ancient) origin, but they (paradoxically) also unify the two states; that is, just as the organized state and Christianity comprise a shared ancestry of the Bulgarians and Russians, so too does the creation of planned and sanitary, civilized and glorious cities embody a shared goal and ancestry of Pakistan and the United States. On this note of shared—but-opposite nationalisms, Ahmad writes of Frederic Jameson’s haste, in advocating for the canonization of so-called “Third-World literature,” of essentializing global historicity in such a way as to preclude different “worlds” from overlapping; specifically, Jameson establishes “third-world nationalisms” and “American postmodernism” as binary opposites: “The only choice for the ‘third world’ is said to be between its ‘nationalisms’ and a ‘global American postmodernist culture.”23 But the hyperreality of media and reality in HaniF’s re-imagining of Pakistan and US in conjunction with their similar expressions of nationalism in Hamid’s novel demonstrate that—much like the shared remains in the coffins in HaniF’s novel—both worlds mingle significantly, inhabiting shared spaces.

Still, the Three Worlds Theory strives tirelessly to site the so-called “Third World” in a liminal space between the “First” and “Second” Worlds. Changez submits to this hegemonic narrative of the Third World, initially reacting to his perceived binary opposition of Pakistan and the United States by expressing belonging not to either nation, but instead to entities in the margins between nations, companies and cities: “I did not think of myself as a Pakistani, but as an Underwood Samson trainee, and my firm’s impressive offices made me proud.”24 Ironically, the very institution in which Changez takes refuge from this national binary opposition is itself a farcical, mythological liminal space; as Ahmad, a self-described Marxist, explains,

The most powerful capitalist firms, originating in particular imperialist countries but commanding global investments and networks of transport and communication, proclaim themselves nevertheless as being multi-nationals and trans-nationals, as if their origins in the United states or the Federal German Republic was a mere myth and as if their ability to accumulate surplus-value from a dozen countries or more was none other than an excess of be-
Capitalist firms originating in the imperialist countries, tout themselves as multi-national or trans-national due to a perceived excess of belonging, or belonging due to non-belonging. In this way, these firms endeavor to illustrate themselves as multi-/trans-national through the same mechanisms that make the migrant multi-/trans-national. The irony of their self-portrayal, of course, is that the very sphere of power that enables these firms to portray themselves as multi-/trans-national is that power discourse to which the migrant does not have access and consequently casts him or her within the excess of belonging.

Not only does Changez, perceiving himself to be trapped in the limbo between hegemonic center and marginalized periphery, lose sense of his belonging to Pakistan, but he also does not feel attached to the United States: “In a subway car, my skin would typically fall in the middle of the color spectrum. On street corners, tourists would ask me for directions. Was, in four and a half years, never an American; I was immediately a New Yorker.”26 Instead of feeling a belonging to the nation, Changez associates with the metropolis. Even Changez’s diction when describing his position in the middle of the color spectrum in the subway car sites him in the middle of two absolutes; this spectrum is familiar to Changez, for as he asserts in the book’s opening, “We have a range of complexions in this country, and yours occurs often among the people of our northwest frontier.”27 (The sentiments of belonging engendered by the spectrum—an image of fragmented multiplicity—also extends to the American in Lahore.) New York instills a sense of belonging in Changez because of the familiar, homey comforts it offers: taxi drivers who speak Urdu, a Punjab deli that sits a mere two blocks from his apartment, and a float that plays a song he remembers from his cousin’s wedding. Changez reconfigures his sense of belonging by translating his past into his present, the culture, food, language, and space of Pakistan into New York.

Spivak, though, questions when the love of one’s culture becomes the nation thing (her terminology for nationalism because nations in the sense of people bound by collective birth have been in existence before nationalism): “When and how does the love of mother tongue, the love of my little corner of ground, become the nation thing? Pared down, this love or attachment is more like comfort. It is not really the declared love of country, full-blown nationalism.”28 Despite the fact that his belonging to the cosmopolitan space of New York over the national space of the US revolves around a translation of past familiarity into his present, Changez’s affiliation with the localized setting over the nation proper also extends to Pakistan. In the novel’s opening, Changez describes himself not as a native of Pakistan, but rather as a native of Lahore: “Since I am both a native of this city and a speaker of your language, I thought I might offer my services to you.”29 However, such cosmopolitan intimacy and belonging (based in heteronormative origin) is not enough for Changez to be of service; it must be hybridized with his experience of the second-person American’s space and language. Changez does curtail his belonging to either sphere, however, through his articles: he describes English not as his but your language, and Lahore not as his but this city.

The storyteller affirms that the solution to recuperating a national historical past is through the imaginative rememoration of it to craft a new reality that doffs the dominant narratives.

Here we see the double-vision that results from Changez’s being split across continents, nations, and metropolises. His doubleness derives from both a split and symmetry: “I felt I was entering in New York the very same social class that my family was falling out of in Lahore. Perhaps this accounted for a good part of the comfort and satisfaction I found in my new environment.”30 His symmetrical/split doubleness paradoxically stems from an inverse—that is to say, oppositional—relationship between his class-habitus of Lahore and New York—but an inverse that is only possible because of a shared trait. This doubleness enables him to inhabit and feel a personal belonging to both spheres: to experience a love of nation/state and family, and to treat his American guest to the most perfect cup of tea Lahore has to offer; to associate with New York instantaneously and embark on a high-prestige, high-salary career.
Confronting such questions of belonging, Changez attempts to recuperate a sense of concrete—and discrete—national identity through his (partially fulfilled) romantic relationship with the American girl Erica. To Changez’s chagrin, however, Erica remains in love with her previous boyfriend, who passed away before she met Changez, making it difficult for Changez to enter into a real relationship with her. Changez compares her lingering love for her dead boyfriend to the imagined memories that constitute Pakistan’s and the US’s unbending nostalgias: “Perhaps theirs was a past all the more potent for its being imaginary. I did not know whether I believed in the truth of their love; it was, after all, a religion that would not accept me as a convert. But I knew that she believed in it, and I felt small for being able to offer her nothing of comparable splendor instead.”34 Just as such imagined memories of past greatness preclude Changez from realizing a (con-/dis-)crete national identity, so too does Erica’s nostalgic fervor for the past prevent him from assimilating (not integrating, for the word “convert” has very ideologically appropriative undertones) into her present. Moreover, so intense is Erica’s nostalgia that it provides no space for equivalence, defined by Spivak as “Learning to acknowledge that other things can occupy the unique space of the example of my first language.”35 Erica’s re-imagining of the past is so singular that it discounts the possibility of multiplicity.

Faced with Erica’s closing off—both emotionally and physically, for Changez and Erica’s first attempt at making love ends abortively—Changez attempts to enter Erica (and the US analogically) by assuming the guise of an imposter. When Erica, mourning Chris, retreats away from Changez and into her inner thoughts, Changez attempts to recuperate his connection with (and entrance into) Erica by telling her to pretend that he is Chris. She acquiesces, and Changez is “Transported to a world where I was Chris and she was with Chris, and we made love with a physical intimacy that Erica and I had never enjoyed. Her body denied mine no longer; I watched her shut eyes, and her shut eyes watched him.”36 Such an invocation of mimicry is reminiscent of Naipaul’s mimic men (as described by Bhabha), and Changez’s open eyes watching Erica’s closed eyes situates him in the position of voyeur, of the outsider trying to gain a glimpse of the inside. Changez obliterates his past identity in order to gain Erica’s acceptance;
however, this act of pretending leaves Changez feeling shame: “I felt at once both satiated and ashamed. My satiation was understandable to me; my shame was more confusing. Perhaps, by taking on the persona of another, I had diminished myself in my own eyes.”37 When Changez directs his eyes away from Erica’s closed-off inside, he sees himself as fractured. But this fracturing also illuminates the fragmentation that endows him with Bhabha’s double vision.

By belonging to both and neither, by inhabiting both spheres, Changez is able to extend shared loves and criticisms to both—in short; he can provide a counter-view that challenges static, singular boundaries and narratives of the nations."

Salman Rushdie, in his novel Shame, also depicts the ways in which migration and imagination influence the fragmented sense of spatial and national belonging. The opening of Shame centers around the Shakil family and finds Old Mr. Shakil on his deathbed surrounded by his three daughters with rhyming names and identical appearances. Immediately after this death, the narrator provides an expository description of the three sisters’ captivity within their father’s mansion and the camaraderie that it inspired in them:

The three girls had been kept inside that labyrinthine mansion until his dying day; virtually uneducated, they were imprisoned in the zenana wing where they amused each other by inventing private languages and fantasizing about what a man might look like when undressed, imagining, during their pre-pubertal years, bizarre genitalia such as holes in the chest into which their own nipples might snugly fit, ‘because for all we knew in those days,’ they would remind each other amazedly in later life, ‘fertilization might have been supposed to happen through the breast.’38

Confined to the interior of their home, unable to interact with the external world, the three sisters constructed their own space and imagined ways of perpetuating this space. While the narrator explains that “This interminable captivity forged between the three sisters a bond of intimacy that would never be completely broken,”39 the sisters’ misconceptions about conception demonstrate that an interior shut off completely from the outside cannot sustain itself. Thus, only when the three sisters invite their neighbors from the town of Q. into their home for a party can they conceive a child. Of course, because the sisters all dress identically in such a manner as to make themselves all appear pregnant, and because the identity of their child’s father is unknown, their son’s origin is unknown.

Because of this lost origin, perhaps, their child, Omar Khayyam Shakil, is not burdened by the same immobility as his mothers; on the contrary, Omar Khayyam demonstrates a desire for the outside. For his twelfth birthday present, the only gift he requests from his mothers is to strike out into the external world. Furthermore, not only does Omar Khayyam lust for the exterior, but he fears the boundaries that enclose his town of Q.:

Omar Khayyam Shakil was afflicted, from his earliest days, by a sense of inversion, of a world turned-upside-down. And by something worse: the fear that he was living at the edge of the world, so close that he might fall off at any moment. Through an old telescope, from the upper-storey windows of the house, the child Omar Khayyam surveyed the emptiness of the landscape around Q., which convinced him that he must be near the very Rim of Things, and that beyond the Impossible Mountains on the horizons must lie the great nothing into which, in his nightmares, he had begun to tumble with monotonous regularity. The most alarming aspect of these dreams was the sleep-sense that his plunges into the void were somehow appropriate, that he deserved no better.40

Thus, despite a desire to experience the outside world, Omar Khayyam, like his three mothers, suffers from a claustrophobic fear of entrapment. Just as Omar Khayyam’s three mothers hermit themselves within the mansion, so too does Omar Khayyam trap himself within Q. to avoid crossing the frontiers. Contrary to Changez’s globe trotting in The Reluctant Fundamentalist, the characters of Shame paint a very different picture of Pakistan, that of a cage: “The sense that Pakistan is a cage is already there,
in the opening episodes, where the Shakil sisters—the three mothers of the ‘peripheral hero,’ Omar Khayyam—are cloistered twice over: first by their father [...] and then by themselves [...] And this sense of being trapped permeates the whole book, right up to the final denouement where we find that even dictators cannot cross the ‘frontier’ and escape their cage.”41 Omar Khayyam’s wanderlust, then, becomes tempered by his own agoraphobic perceptions of the frontier.

When Omar Khayyam does leave the shelter of his home to enter the city of Q., he inhabits the space of the peripheral outsider. On the school playground, he enjoyed his “near-invisibility,”42 taking a kind of vicarious pleasure from the activities of those around him:

As he grew older, and was permitted to stay out later, he became skilled in his chosen pursuit; the town yielded up its secrets to his omnipresent eyes. Through inefficient chick-blinds he spied on the couplings of the postman Ibadalla with the widow Balloch, and also, in another place, with her best friend Zeenat Kabuli, so that the notorious occasion on which the postman, the leather-goods merchant and the loud-mouthed Bilal went at one another with knives in a gully and ended up stone dead, all three of them, was no mystery to him.43

Omar Khayyam inhabits the space of marginalized outsider, invisible to the population at large of even his own town. Omar Khayyam is displaced in his own town by his own peripheral nature; as he himself describes himself, “You see before you [...] a fellow who is not even the hero of his own life; a man born and raised in the condition of being out of things. Heredity counts, don’t you think so?”44 Indeed, Omar Khayyam seems to occupy that space between belonging and not-belonging. Said, in “Reflections on Exile,” meditates on this liminal space: “And just beyond the frontier between “us” and the “outsiders” is the perilous territory of not-belonging: this is to where in a primitive time peoples were banished, and where in the modern era immense aggregates of humanity loiter as refugees and displaced persons.”45 Of course, Martin Heidegger sees such frontiers, or boundaries, as open spaces: “A boundary is not that at which something stops but, as the Greeks recognized, the boundary is that from which something begins its presencing [...] Accordingly, spaces receive their being from locations and not from space.”46

As far as exile and migration are concerned in the writings of Mohsin Hamid, Mohammed Hanif, and Salman Rushdie, these boundaries occur not only on a national level, but also on the personal level of the temporal and the personal history.

“It is certainly arrogant for America (or perhaps any singly-acting agent, for that matter) to essentialize a discrete identity for India or Pakistan, for even the citizens of these countries are constantly performing and improvising new national identities.”

All three novels deal not just with fragmented national identities, but also with the reclamation of personal and national histories. Their unique narrative structures testify to this rememorial and restorative goal. All three novels are told by first-person narrators. In Hamid’s The Reluctant Fundamentalist the narrative is transmitted through Changez’s first-person dialogue with an American man sitting in a restaurant. This story and exchange is made even more uncanny by the fact that while the reader progresses through the tale, Changez addresses the American man in the second-person, making it feel as though Changez puts words into the reader’s mouth; in this way, Changez challenges the notion of a Western hegemonic center narrating the periphery by reversing the roles, literally writing the reader—and his/her thoughts and words—into the story. Hanif’s A Case of Exploding Mangoes vacillates between Ali Shigri’s first-person recounting of his own story in the present tense and a third-person telling of General Zia’s story. In this way, there is a clear boundary between the personal, localized present and the national, mythic past.

Similarly, Rushdie’s Shame is told in the storytelling mode by a storyteller who often reflects on his own life chat-tily. The storyteller is hyper cognizant of the question of owning and telling history. At one point, the storyteller, much like Changez, puts words into his accusers’ mouths: “Outsider! Trespasser! You have no right to this subject!"
Poacher! Pirate! We reject your authority. We know you, with your foreign language wrapped around you like a flag: speaking about us in your forked tongue, what can you tell but lies?” In “Imaginary Homelands,” Rushdie writes, “The broken mirror may actually be as valuable as the one which is supposedly unflawed. [...] Fragmentation makes trivial things seem like symbols, and the mundane acquired numinous qualities.” In Shame, the storyteller responds to such policing of historical boundaries by blending reality and representation, much like the media in A Case of Exploding Mangoes: “The country in this story is not Pakistan, or not quite. There are two countries, real and fictional, occupying the same space, or almost the same space. My story, my fictional country exist [sic], like myself, at a slight angle to reality. I have found this off-centering to be necessary.” The storyteller affirms that the solution to recuperating a national historical past is through the imaginative remembrance of it to craft a new reality that doffs the dominant narratives.

These texts by migrant writers illuminate how their attempts to remember and re-imagine a personal and national past results in a nationalism characterized by multiplicity. In doing so, these writers also demonstrate the failure and essentialism of the Three Worlds Theory.

However, to return to the question of exile, migration, displacement, and boundary (as raised above by Said and Heidegger), where Rushdie’s storyteller displays anxiety when talking about Pakistan, he assumes an overtly authoritative voice when discussing migration:

All migrants leave their pasts behind, although some try to pack it into bundles and boxes—but on the journey something seeps out of the treasured mementoes and old photographs, until even their owners fail to recognize them, because it is the fate of migrants to be stripped of history, to stand naked amidst the scorn of strangers upon whom they see rich clothing, the brocades of continuity and the eyebrows of belonging.

The storyteller contrasts the continuity and belonging of the strangers with the fragmentation and non-belonging of the migrant. In fact, even the storyteller himself is sometimes displaced within the narrative. On several occasions, the storyteller places himself in a position external and subordinate to the narrative; on these occasions, he must take his cue from the fictional characters he has created, such as when he omits a sex scene: “(Taking a leaf out of Bariamma’s book, I have turned a blind eye and snored loudly while Raza Hyder visited the dormitory of the forty women and made this miracle [of childbirth] possible.)” Placing his mimicry of the fictional characters within parentheses further accentuates the peripheral implications of this narrative gesture.

Rushdie later blends reality and fiction within the context of migrancy and exile further by quoting Milan Kundera: ‘The exiled Czech writer Kundera once wrote: ’A name means continuity with the past and people without a past are people without a name.’ But I am dealing with a past that refuses to be suppressed.” Said also notes the intersections of past and exile, using it to observe the intersections between exile and nationalism. Said sees nationalism and exile as two sides of the same coin, two binaries that define and enclose one another: “[The question of exile's and nationalism’s intrinsic values] assumes that exile and nationalism can be discussed neutrally, without reference to each other. They cannot be. Because both terms include everything from the most collective of collective sentiments to the most private of private emotions, there is hardly language adequate for both.” We thus return to Changez, and the changes he undergoes.

After living in the United States and seeing the way US perceives and treats South Asia (largely a result of the Three Worlds Theory), Changez experiences a newfound nationalism and decides to return for good. Upon his arrival, he realizes that things are not as he remembered: “But as I reacclimatized and my surroundings once again became familiar, it occurred to me that the house had not changed in my absence. I had changed; I was looking about me with the eyes of a foreigner, and not just any foreigner, but that particular type of entitled and unsympathetic American who so annoyed me when I encountered him in the classrooms and workplaces of your country’s elite.” Changez’s migrancy makes him a foreigner.
in his own home; thus we see the connection between nationalism, exile, and migrancy. Changez prophetically and poetically describes the migrant’s encounter with being knocked around by boundaries when he notices “A firefly bumping repeatedly against the window of a house, unable to comprehend the glass that barred its way.”55 Changez, too, bumps repeatedly into barriers on a national level as he attempts to re-imagine and reconfigure his own nationalisms; unlike the firefly, though, Changez seems hyperaware of the barriers in his way.

Changez’s journey into and around boundaries, as Rushdie foretells in Shame, empties him of his personal history (much like Changez empties himself of his own personal history in order to enter Erica), and Changez worries that he is caught in limbo between the two: “I lacked a stable core. I was not certain where I belonged—in New York, in Lahore, in both, in neither.”56 Changez experiences the discontinuity that Rushdie speaks of, worrying that he has no discrete belonging. We have discussed earlier how Changez’s attempts to integrate himself into the US gravitated around his relationship with Erica, but the reverse is also true; his relationship with Erica impacts his re-integration into Pakistan:

I had been telling you earlier, sir, of how I left America. The truth of my experience complicates that seemingly simple assertion; I had returned to Pakistan, but my inhabitation of your country had not entirely ceased. I remained emotionally entwined with Erica, and I brought something of her with me to Lahore—or perhaps it would be more accurate to say that I lost something of myself to her that I was unable to relocate in the city of my birth.57

Erica is inextricably tied to Changez’s belonging in both Pakistan and the US. Upon arriving in the US, Changez finds himself stripped of his past and struggles to find ways to glimpse vestiges of Lahore in New York; in Lahore, Changez similarly finds himself stripped of something of his past self. Changez loses something of his past not only in his immigration to the US, but also in his emigration from the US, after he has inhabited it and hybridized his identity with it. Of course, though, he benefits from belonging to both (and neither) simultaneously: his fragmentation bestows upon him the broken mirror that Rushdie valorizes so highly. Indeed, the parts of Lahore that Changez notes are those buildings that “function geographically and architecturally as a link between the ancient and contemporary parts of our city.”58 Changez, much like the architectural synchronism that he respects in Lahore, also serves as a link of sorts, exhibiting the double-vision and double-belonging that Bhabha speaks of in The Location of Culture. Upon realizing his double-vision and fragmented, multiple national belongings, Changez observes that he has “Issued a firefly’s glow bright enough to transcend the boundaries of continents and civilizations.”59 Once recognized, the very barriers that once stood in Changez’s—and the firefly’s—way (fragmented, split identities) give way to mechanisms for ascending to a more enlightened existence of double-belonging through excess belonging. By belonging to both and neither, by inhabiting both spheres, Changez is able to extend shared loves and criticisms to both—in short; he can provide a counterview that challenges static, singular boundaries and narratives of the nations.

In The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, Karl Marx writes,

Man makes his own history, but he does not make it out of the whole cloth; he does not make it out of conditions chosen by himself, but out of such as he finds close at hand. The tradition of all past generations weights like an
alp upon the brain of the living. At the very time when men appear engaged in revolutionizing things and themselves, in bringing about what never was before, at such very epochs of revolutionary crisis do they anxiously conjure up into their service the spirits of the past.60

Hanif imagines a concerted effort on the part of Pakistan’s (and the United States’) governments and medias to depict a nationalism that is hedged between reality and imagination to create a fragment-ed re-presentation of a multiplicity-ous Pakistan. “

To be sure, Changez makes his own history, and he does so under the pressures and constraints of America’s and Pakistan’s pasts, both real and imagined. The imagining and structuring of new nationalisms and national identities, on the parts of Changez and the writers examined, does entail a bricolage of the sort described by Marx; they all conjure and combine the spirits of the multiple spaces, times, and nationalisms available to them. And while it is true that Changez cannot select the circumstances imposed on him by both nations (which forges his fragmented, multiple identity), he does have some agency insofar as he chooses his travels (here we begin to see the disparity between migrant and exile). While it may be problematic to conclude a paper examining Pakistan with a meditation on Indianness, I believe that Spivak’s response to a “multicultural” fair in Los Angeles in which some Indian girls performed “some sort of Indian classical dance” merits consideration: “We felt, some Indians, that on the Indian subcontinent we have not yet been able to work out what it is to be ‘Indian’ and as a result at this point the country is drowning in blood. But America knows. America knows: that is the Indian sector in the multicultural festival.”61 These texts by migrant writers illuminate how their attempts to remember and re-imagine a personal and national past results in a nationalism characterized by multiplicity. In doing so, these writers also demonstrate the failure and essentialism of the Three Worlds Theory; after all, how can such a totalizing theory of compartmentalization and delineation be applied to writers of such fragmented and multiple identities?

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Conclusion

The imaginative re-memorations of Pakistan in Mohammed Hanif’s A Case of Exploding Mangoes, Salman Rushdie’s Shame, and Mohsin Hamid’s The Reluctant Fundamentalist dis-member the center’s hegemonic projections of narrative onto the periphery through their fragmentation, in which a split individual becomes a double individual. Aijaz Ahmad explains this phenomenon as the excess of belonging: “The truth of being, to the extent that truth is at all possible, resides now in multiplicity of subject positions and an excess of belonging; the writer not only has all cultures available to him as resource, for consumption, but he actually belongs in all of them, because he belongs in none.”62 These texts by migrant writers illuminate how their attempts to remember and re-imagine a personal and national past results in a nationalism characterized by multiplicity. In doing so, these writers also demonstrate the failure and essentialism of the Three Worlds Theory; after all, how can such a totalizing theory of compartmentalization and delineation be applied to writers of such fragmented and multiple identities?
End Notes

3. Ibid., 3.
4. Ibid., 4.
15. Ibid., 4.
16. Ibid., 5-6.
17. Ibid., 106.
18. Ibid., 135.
20. Ibid.
22. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Nationalism and the Imagination, 12.
26. Ibid., 33.
27. Ibid., 1.
29. Ibid., 1.
31. Ibid., 99.
32. Ibid., 71.
33. Ibid., 115.
34. Ibid., 114.
37. Ibid., 106.
39. Ibid.
42. Salman Rushdie, Shame, 45.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid., 24.
50. Ibid., 63-4.
51. Ibid., 77.
52. Ibid., 80.
55. Ibid., 63.
56. Ibid., 148.
57. Ibid., 172.
58. Ibid., 170.
59. Ibid., 183.
Mr. Suleman Ghani, former Chairman Planning & Development Board, Punjab and currently Senior Policy Advisor on USAID FIRMS Project was invited by the CPPG to deliver a talk on “Reforming Regulatory Framework for Economic Growth: A Case Study of Agriculture Marketing” on March 10, 2011.

Ghani began by making a case for the importance of regulatory reforms. He argued that economic growth was not possible without improving the ease of doing business index which required serious reforms. These reforms were essential for sustainable growth, to create internationally competitive enterprises and market, given the world was fast becoming a single market. Unless there was a competitive domestic market, we couldn’t compete with the world. Though various policies had been enunciated over the years and other policies had shifted gear, for example the existing trade policy framework talked about competitiveness at length at both the firm and market level. But the regulatory framework was still rooted in the past and not in sync with changed policies. We had yet to explore what kind of regulatory framework worked, what kind of compliance regimes it unleashed, what kind of business processes worked and how good was the environment for the private sector to step in.

Over the years, he had understood the State’s policy formulation process as an exercise in good intention. But while the State continued to provide a great number of services under various policies, it paid little attention to the reform process especially the associated regulatory framework. During his time at the Planning & Development Board, it was transformed from a money allocating department to a reform oriented institution which allocated money only after a certain reform matrix was agreed upon with the concerned department. However, it still never got down to exploring the regulatory frameworks which was the main concern of his current job with the USAID FIRMS program.

Further elaborating, he gave two examples of regulatory frameworks which were out of sync with the existing economic paradigm. Ginning was over regulated by 7 laws – the oldest promulgated in 1925 and the latest in 2004, some provincial, some federal and others ownerless. One functional law was the Cotton Transport Act of 1958 which made it a crime to transport a bale from point A to point B by Pakistan Railways without a particular stamp. It was promulgated probably to ensure area protection from varieties traveling across regions. But now, railways only transported 5% of the cotton as compared to 80% at the time while the nuisance value of the law still existed. Additionally, Ginneries were required to register with two different departments every year including Agriculture (originally to cross check cotton production with actually cotton reaching Ginning factories) and Excise & Taxation, which rather than improving regulation only ensured the continuation of renting behavior.

...the fanciest of policies and work at the value chain level (firm competitiveness and technology improvement) was not going to achieve the full economic potential without reforming the regulatory regimes."

The Boiler Regime, which required a yearly boiler inspection, was created for public safety reasons in the 1930s/40s. Comparing with today’s reality, the technology had improved leading to an increased safety of boilers; an exploding boiler would lead to stoppage of work and worker injury which was not in the factory owner’s own interest; and lastly the safety burden could be shifted to insurance companies by requiring boiler insurance. But in
We had yet to explore what kind of regulatory framework worked, what kind of compliance regimes it unleashed, what kind of business processes worked and how good was the environment for the private sector to step in.

Currently only fruits and vegetables were within the purview of this law while grains and cash crops had over time dropped out because of vested interests. The problem with this framework was that there was a single market channel leaving no space for the private sector or of setting up a new market. Thus when Metro and Macro were allowed in Pakistan, the cabinet had to approve a special dispensation to allow them to act as a market with an understanding that it would lead to backward linkages, niche farming, corporate & cooperative farming and thus improve products. But two to three years down the road, nothing had changed as Metro also bought 99% of its goods from the public markets (mandies) and arthis while there was still no mechanism to get graded products by paying a premium.

Having provided the broad outline, Ghani then focused on the Agriculture Marketing Law of 1939 calling it the classic example of law creating market distortions. This law was a response to the 1930s famine when the colonial administration sought to make the agriculture market more predictable, thus working within the food security paradigm rather than of efficient markets. According to this restrictive legislative framework, trade in agriculture products was only allowed by licensed dealers in notified area. The country was divided into zones with a publicly appointed market committee and a notified list of produce that could or could not be traded. These market committees (of mandies) controlled trade in notified areas, levied charges without providing any services such as quality control, grading etc. Thus the whole system was controlled by the arthis and a subsidiary market could not be created because a farmer could not legally sign a contract with a buyer.
single market channel also hampered mango growth.

Ghani shared that a goal of the USAID FIRMS project was to provide technical assistance to the Governments of Punjab and Sindh to draft a policy framework and a draft law backed by detailed analysis. The project had provided a detailed three pillar matrix of reforms along with a roadmap to the two provinces. In terms of the status of reforms, all provinces with the recent exception of Sindh had variations of the 1939 Act’s restrictive framework. Sindh had instituted reforms which did away with a single market channel through corporatization of mandies so that private sector mandies could become independent and financially self sustaining. But as a compromise, it had retained the employees and workers of the market committee. It was now in the process of carrying these reforms further through a subsidiary legislation. Back in 2005, the Punjab Government had also taken a serious look at market reforms and drafted a law but it was half baked as it involved no empirical evidence. Additionally it included comprises with the assumption that market committees were politically powerful which they were not. He appreciated the Punjab Government’s Star Farm initiative but had reservations of its long term success till the law and regime were right. He thought that the political climate was now right for reforms as there was a buy in for these reforms in all provincial Agriculture Departments while the Punjab Government had in effect suspended the market committees two year ago.

Concluding his talk, he re-articulated the three pillars of reforms: one, system reform; two, corporatization of existing mandies and creating the right regulatory regimes and institutional setup; and three, creation of an even playing field for all mandies whether public or private. The essence of proposed reforms was to redefine the role of the public sector, do away with arbitrary management system, create space for private sector to enter on its own or through partnership with government and lastly to lay down a criteria for transparent, accountable, professionally managed and demand driven market operations. This required that the government instead of running mandies concentrated on promoting best practices, standardization, quality control, transparency, information provision and public private partnership through incentive and hand holding regimes. His took a position that there should be no notified area to sell the product, no market committee or district based market committee. For example if a market in Bahawalpur worked better, then the produce from Multan or anywhere else should be allowed to go there. While one could not do away with mandies immediately, he suggested a three year transition period hoping that this time was sufficient for private sector markets to compete with the existing inefficient markets.

The expected gains of these reforms would be earned by the farmer and the consumer. However the middle man, the Arthi may not lose either because according to the analysis and normal corporate behavior, a 1-2% charge of the total volume of business was enough to operate a fully functional sustainable market. The reforms would allow alternative markets to come up leading to greater linkages in the value chain (Eg. farmers & niche markets), proper grading, packaging, adherence to sanitary regulations and thus differential prices for higher-value produce. A next step would be niche markets such as organic food which required full tracing, certification system and insurance which was not possible without an institutional regime, followed by enterprises for high value products, and futures and options trading.

The talk was followed by a vibrant Question & Answers session. Answering a question of why only 5% of the mangoes were exported and if this had any relationship with infrastructure and market constraints, or with non-competitive domestic market, Ghani suggested that there were huge supply side constraints as Pakistan could not meet the international supermarket standards. These included how the mangoes were grown, plucked and packaged. To make Pakistani mangoes competitive in the international market, they had to be shipped by sea thus requiring a longer shelf life which entailed hot water
a lack of information for farmers, argued that only with improvement of markets and regulatory framework can the full potential be attained. Additionally, he argued that markets that provided a premium for value would instead lead to improvements in the value chain (rather than vice versa) as farmers would invest with an eye on market gains.

Lastly, answering a question regarding the scale of research effort required to properly assess the regulatory regime and institutional frameworks, Ghani suggested that a lot of work had already been done. For example, the Agriculture Support Program I & II of the Asian Development Bank and Ferguson had done work on agriculture markets. Similarly data was available for a number of sectors but analysis was scanty. However, he submitted that very little work had been done on regulatory frameworks and while an assessment of existing laws was possible, but to design a new law, extensive research and analysis were required.

Answering a question regarding why the state had a multitude of institutions with little or no service to the sector, Ghani pointed to the self perception of state machinery. He suggested that the government perceiving itself to have a monopoly on public good and the option of last resort tried doing too much while its institutions developed their own territoriality leading to competing cross purposes. Instead, the government needed to develop linkages with the private sector to provide demand driven services while corporatizing and restructuring research. He stated that his own approach would be to let the market work, bring in the private sector instead of the Agriculture Extension for services provision, remove distorting subsidies (other than irrigation) amounting to Rs. 62 Billion and instead support the farmer through direct R&D cash grants which were also WTO friendly (green block subsidy).

Answering a question comparing the importance of value chain improvements with regulatory framework for maximum gains, he while accepting the importance of value chain improvements including the serious deficiencies in farm practices, harvesting, grading, packaging and

“To make Pakistani mangoes competitive in the international market, they had to be shipped by sea thus requiring a longer shelf life which entailed hot water treatment, chilling treatment and the right packaging.”
Mr. Mohammad Jehanzeb Khan, Secretary Livestock & Dairy Development, Punjab was invited by the CPPG to deliver a talk on “Livestock Development: A New Public Management Approach – Application and Challenges” on April 13, 2011.

Secretary Khan opened his remarks with an introduction to New Public Management (NPM) and its relation to the livestock sector. NPM emerged from the very idea of government’s response to citizen demands and needs. The governments in the developed world having levied high direct taxes were pressurized by the citizens to reciprocate with better quality services and thus had to improve the efficiency of government departments. However, a somewhat different reason of low revenue generation led developing countries like Pakistan to undergo a series of reforms to provide the required public services.

Further exploring the terms ‘reform’ and ‘public service’; he stated that generally the word ‘public service’ meant the provision of services by the government and the kinds of services depended on societies’ own evolution through democratic processes. He opined that there was some consensus on what formed the core services; such as maintenance of law and order, clean drinking water, healthcare, education, pollution free environment etc. These were public goods and were expected to be provided by the state. This risk of market failure had led governments to sometimes create natural monopolies for the provision of public goods. But under the NPM approach, the governments of today were more concerned with outcomes rather than processes. Thus it was immaterial whether the government provided education services, built and managed schools itself or instead used other service providers for the same task as long as outcomes of education provision were fulfilled. He argued that if the government managed these services, then it had to delegate it to managers with the right technical and professional capacity without hindering their work through tedious processes and procedures. Discussing ‘reform’, he suggested that given the inherent complexity of public departments, and an evolutionary process of organizational change and poor service quality, there was a need for a continuous process of reforms. He added that today’s governments were more sensitive to outcomes.

Khan then specifically delved into the NPM approach used in the Livestock Department. He emphasized the separation of policy from operations. Citing examples from the private sector whereby the board of directors, the policy arm evaluated the management’s performance based on set implementation targets. A performance management system helped both in terms of empirical analysis as well as in providing the right controls for people to do their job. The NPM approach was also about creating linkages and new partnerships to achieve desired outcomes as it looked at the society in totality as one system.

...the customers included 35 million subsistence farmers who could be helped if they were better organized and given control over their needs which included extension services, access to credit, technology and various required products.

Historically, the Livestock Department had been an animal health department. Though animal health continued to be an important part of livestock but livestock development involved a lot more. Thus given the historical development of departmental policy and with no one in the government specifically looking at the policy domain, it was perceived...
that a right policy alone would be a contribution comparable to the fleet of operations run by the department because of its sheer impact. For example, the ‘price cap’ policy on meat created far-reaching disincentives for meat production as the prevailing policy did not cover farmers’ operational costs leading to a potential decline in investment as farmers were less inclined to keep animals for the purpose of meat production on prevailing prices. Similarly, exploring the regulatory framework was a new area and the department was ill-equipped to analyze it. For example, when confronted with the question to allow exports of live animals, it had to be analyzed whether it helped the farmer and the sector or had negative consequences. Although the decision had to be taken at the federal level, the Punjab as a key stake holder would have liked to provide a rationale for policy choice based on detailed analysis. But Punjab was not able to give policy advice because the department did not have the capacity to conduct the needed analysis.

Other than the day to day operations, the department also made public investments in the livestock sector courtesy of the annual development program. The main question in this regard was whether these investments were helping the livestock sector and if they were smart investment, that they gave the biggest bang for the buck given the department’s scarce resources. Thus out of a 100 things that needed to be done, few public good initiatives were selected. But even public goods could be divided into core or semi public goods given the ideological nature of assessment. Thus investments were made in core public goods while ensuring that semi public goods would be catered for after government’s withdrawal through facilitation and help of the private sector. Historically, there had been a tendency to continue doing things even if they were done better by the private sector, for example, the department had been involved in the processing of milk and production of feed. This approach was changed.

Presenting the livestock resource of the country, he stated that the Punjab Government had more of a focused responsibility to work in this sector because of its existing resource base and the opportunities it presented. Mr. Khan outlined the core objectives of the department as alleviation of poverty, food security and exports for revenue generation. In terms of poverty alleviation, the customers included 35 million subsistence farmers who could be helped if they were better organized and given control over their needs which included extension services, access to credit, technology and various required products. The second key area was productivity enhancement which comprised of improved genetics for better yield, the right nutrition, and proper housing and health care for longevity of productive life.

"This risk of market failure had led governments to sometimes create natural monopolies for the provision of public goods."

Even if the products were taken care of, the markets had to function properly because a lack of efficient markets would lead to an unfair price for the producer decreasing production. Markets needed to determine price based on measureable criteria, such as weight if the animal was for meat or milk production if for dairy, but instead the existing market prices were on hearsay. This led to increased distressed sales for the producer hampering future investments in the sector. Additionally, the department was also cognizant of the fact that the overall growth of the livestock sector was linked to the growth of private enterprise as enterprise development could lead a transition from subsistence to profit oriented activity. The department needed to facilitate private enterprise to speed up this transition.

Discussing the focus and priority areas for the department, Khan showed how work in the sector was distributed among the public, private and the non-profit sectors with the public sector mostly dominating. While the policy & regulatory work, disease surveillance & control, both public goods and funding for research & development had to be managed by the government, genetic up gradation, commercial live stock farming, technology, marketing and processing value addition should be picked up by the private sector. In this context, the department had a big debate on whether or not to build a huge slaughter house outside of Lahore? However, after due deliberation it
was resolved that since it was a public and food safety issue, citizens were not getting quality meat and a lot of slaughtering by product was being wasted; therefore the department went ahead with the project wanting to bring in intricate change to this sector while exploring how to eventually withdraw from it. Simultaneously, the department chose to ignore the new private sector slaughter houses which were not allowed under the law. The rationale for this policy choice was that the quality of product from the private slaughter houses was much better than what existed in the public sector. Poultry feed production had been taken over by the private sector and thus deliberations are in process to close the feed section and instead concentrate on monitoring feed quality.

"The NPM approach was also about creating linkages and new partnerships to achieve desired outcomes as it looked at the society in totality as one system."

Similarly other areas in the sector such as human resource development (HRD - veterinary doctors, paramedic and livestock workers) and extension services were government dominated purely on the account of history and required private sector capacity building and collaboration to improve both quality and reach. Given the high priority of HRD and an understanding that veterinary education required huge investments while students normally came from rural and humble backgrounds, government setup numerous teaching and research institutions. Additionally, the government extension services while having a good reach were questionable in terms of quality and could gain tremendously in partnering with private sector players such as farmer associations, Nestle, Engro and others. But public sector involvement could also disincentivize private players by creating market distortions. Thus, to ensure quality service provision, the government could either buy services from the private sector or subsidize them to fill the affordability gap for farmers.

Emphasizing the importance of government’s role in disease surveillance and control as an insurance against epidemic outbreak, Khan shared the details of the revamped departmental function. The traditional system of a network of small animal health centres across Punjab providing service from 8am - 4pm was curative in nature. It did not work in the case of emergencies and off peak hours while also requiring farmers to take their ill animals to the centre. This system had been revamped to a preventive door to door public sector service provision system and though farmers bore part of the treatment fee because of the government’s resource crunch, they were still happy to get the service at their door steps at all hours. However a draft of the Animal Disease Act obliging the farmer to disclose the disease for the government to step in to destroy animal population was pending before the cabinet. He argued that even if the government closed down this segment of the department, the services would continue in the private sector but the epidemic risk factor would increase as disease surveillance being a public good would not be owned by the private sector. He further credited the department’s revamping for controlling the outbreak of bird flu as well as an epidemic during the recent floods. Further elaborating, he stated that the department had an established expertise in vaccine production and was both the biggest producer as well as consumer of the product, thus the vaccine was not independently verified or at par with international standards. Additionally, the vaccine factory was run like a government department. It ran out of money during floods, exhausting its budget and quota, and could not produce a vaccine there after for three months because of a lack of inputs required for production. He also stressed on the need for legislation.

Khan also spoke about the need for re-defining the department’s policy domain to re-cast the operational scope and to prioritize functions. He claimed that all major stakeholders including academia, industry and farmer associations were consulted during a 15 month period and a detailed deliberation process took place within the department outlining existing functions against management capacity. Operationalizing the NPM framework, the department offered autonomy to the Poultry Research Institute. The department introduced a simple internally created performance management system conducting performance evaluations of personnel in the districts every quarter based on indicators such as vaccination
coverage, artificial insemination targets etc. The department initially penalized the lowest 5 performers. But in the next cycle, the district team sat down to discuss how their performance could be improved and were surprised by the issues raised. The issues were resolved while the top five performers were sent to Thailand for a training course. New regulatory initiatives included a Milk & Meat Safety Agency to define and implement standards, and provide traceability from farm to food so consumers could know what they were consuming, and the Semen Quality Control Act. Government very recently was the only breed improvement agency in Punjab with 4 production units making 2 million dosages while the private sector had now established 16 units producing 1.2 million dosages. But there was a dire need to regulate and establish standards to support the private sector and to ensure farmer security. He asserted that the department had started a help line and a short messaging service to inform and get feedback from its customers; which in turn had improved the department’s ability to monitor its staff and improve productivity.

Khan concluded his talk by identifying the major challenges to reform; first, an absolute resistance to change within the department, other departments and the wider society as the most important as incomprehensible reasons were often provided to scuttle new initiatives. Second, the Civil Services did not have the temperament or training to engage other societal stakeholders. Third, any drive for further autonomy was unwelcomed autonomy because it led to tougher work conditions and accountability impacting the existing comfortable job routine (Poultry Research Institute, a case in point). Fourth, administration and financial systems were very rigid. Fifth, inter-govern-mental challenges rose from the Planning and Development Department, the Finance Department and the public representatives. The media often overlooked the details of reforms while a citizen could get a court stay order to de-lay or halt the entire reform process. Lastly, he stated that leadership was required at every tier within the department as a critical mass of people who became champions of reform were needed while engagement and explanation were keys to bringing people onboard. But lasting change required behavioral change.

The talk was followed by a Question & Answer session. In regards to a question linking tenure with institutional reform and productivity, he agreed that the crises of management were because of a lack of continuity. He had been at the helm of the department for 2 years and 7 months now while the tenure was usually 3 years which had a lot of wisdom.

Answering a question regarding regulation for vaccines, he stated that no government produced vaccine currently abided by the regulatory standards of the Ministry of Health. Punjab had three options: one, invest in own veterinary institute to upgrade it where it could be registered which was only possible when certain short comings are removed but he was skeptical that the public sector could achieve this; two, privatize it which would raise the price of vaccine; three, the department was currently in discus-sion for a public private partnership (PPP) rehabilitate, operate and transfer contract which could achieve the objective.

“...government extension services while having a good reach were questionable in terms of qual-ity and could gain tremendously in partnering with private sector players...”
Mr. Jahangir Tareen, a progressive corporate farmer, former Chairman Punjab Task Force on Agriculture, and former Minister of Industries, Production and Special Initiatives was invited by the CPPG to deliver a talk on “Managing Successful Farming in Pakistan: Experimentation and Innovation” on November 23, 2010.

Jahangir Tareen began his talk by providing a background and overview of his businesses. His father had been a farmer in Southern Punjab from whom he inherited some 430 acres. Following his educational training in Business Administration from the US, he started working in a bank. However in 1979, he decided to venture into farming while applying the management techniques he had learnt as part of his education and profession. He was now managing 3,000 acres of mango and cotton farms in Lodhran, 30,000 acres of sugarcane, 700 acres of hay and a 1,000 acre dairy farm. His company employed a total of 72 agriculture graduates and many diploma holders. This journey had been hard and it began with the challenging task of applying the Management Information Systems (MIS) technique to the farm.

Describing the essentials of his business strategy for envisioning, creating and managing a successful business which had generated remarkable results for his farming business, he listed three major tools. First, efficient supervision and exercise of control; Second, creating a competitive edge by exploring the unexplored and the third most pivotal concept, interaction and communication with supervisors. For the first two, MIS was instrumental and he considered it necessary for the success of any commercial enterprise. He used MIS to understand the farm and to make it more efficient by plotting and numbering the land, by exercising control over where and how the inputs were being used and by systemizing the farming process. He started a Master Khaata (Master Register) recording activities of every plot ranging from irrigation of land, to use of inputs and supervision, which helped in comparing the inputs used against crop yield. He was emphatic in pointing out that direct interaction with the managers supervising farms at the grassroots level has proven to be a very fruitful tool for farm management.

...foreign consultancy services helped to completely revamp and revitalize farms as many common Pakistani agricultural practices were done away with including over fertilization and over irrigation.

Tareen then delved into the details of his enterprise building process. He suggested that although his farms had a high cotton yield and he had come to be known as a progressive farmer early on, he still had many unanswered questions about crops and farming but felt hampered by the agriculture establishment of Pakistan. He was not successful in obtaining the required information from local research institutes and was dissatisfied by the agricultural knowledge of local experts and universities. Convinced of the dearth of local agricultural knowledge, and lagging research institutions an obstacle in business expansion, he decided to get international help. He hired an Australian agronomist and partnered with an international pesticide control company for a three year Rs. 5 million agronomy project. He specifically chose Australia because her farming was competitive, profitable and did not rely on government subsidies. The foreign consultancy services helped to completely revamp and revitalize farms as many common Pakistani agricultural practices were done away with including over fertilization and over irrigation. Continued assistance immensely improved farm productivity.
while applying the concept of sustainable farming. He stated that the main breakthrough was to fill the 20 year research gap between Pakistan and the rest of the world by hiring expertise from abroad.

Following this initial success, he expanded into sugarcane farming and set up his first sugarcane mill in Rahim Yar Khan. But sugarcane farming was more challenging than both cotton and mango as it was more water and labor intensive and thus he found it difficult to expand from the initial farm size of 1,000 acres. But given that constant growth and upgrading was imperative for an enterprise and he wanted to expand his sugarcane business, he decided to develop a ten year vision with the target of 10,000 acres, which was then considered an unachievable task. His first step was to hire a software company to develop special software to manage his farms. It involved a two year process of putting all of Master Khaata information into the computer and became operational in 2004 making it possible to control and manage a large piece of land. The cost and yield of every plot of land in 30,000 acres was meticulously recorded and cross checked. Additionally, capable and well-trained farm supervisors and managers were pivotal in the success of the enterprise. A total of seven divisional managers managed 5,000 acres while each supervisor was responsible for managing 150-200 acres. The human resource was primarily Pakistani apart from a few consultants and an effort was made to continuously upgrade the management ability of the leaders through international trainings.

Lastly, discussing his largest operation of 30,000 acre sugarcane farm, Tareen articulated the innovative and progressive agricultural practices his enterprise followed. The farms used 30% less water than average while sugarcane was planted at a 6 feet distance to allow mechanical operations. Plans for further improvements included: one, to improve water efficiency in all farms; two, reduce diesel costs by 30% in the coming 2-3 years as it was the single largest cost item and three, develop a plant breeding centre as it was the most essential and pressing need for business sustainability. The sugarcane in his farms was of one variety resulting in an extremely narrow genetic base and thus had a high risk exposure to disease. He had thus made a large investment to set up a $3 million state of the art breeding center which would produce the first result in 10-12 years. He suggested that though it was a long-term investment, the results were guaranteed and would be immensely beneficial not only for his enterprise but for the entire sugarcane business as new varieties would be available to Pakistani farmers.

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The talk was followed by a question and answer session. When asked if he used powered irrigation and what steps he had planned to reduce diesel costs by 30% in the next 3 years, he suggested that there are numerous agronomic techniques to save water and improve efficiency. Diesel was mainly used in pumping water for irrigation and tractors. Thus reduction in water usage also reduced diesel consumption making water-use efficiency doubly important while his company had conducted a study on ways to reduce the cost of pumping. Regard efficiency of tractors, minimum cultivation and import of larger, more fuel efficient tractors was a viable option.

Responding to a question about human resources, the general perception that foreign consultants were insensitive to local breeds and that there existed a knowledge gap in terms of their understanding of local agriculture, he explained that foreign consultants brought with them a basic knowledge of agriculture and crops but needed to be assisted in developing an understanding of local agriculture. Thus it was important to create an efficient receiving vehicle for adapting foreign technology to Pakistani conditions through well trained and educated Pakistani individuals who interacted with the consultants to evolve suitable solutions over time, which was not possible through the traditional munshi system. Further elaborating on the importance of human resources, he suggested that its selection at the inception of an enterprise was...
most challenging. Though he was lucky to get a core team of productive and efficient people, still, to harness their potential, more than financial rewards it was important to support them and to keep them mentally motivated and involved.

Answering a question regarding the sugar crises, food price hike and the responsibility of the elite, Tareen attributed the sugar crisis to unwise government policy and involvement of mafias in hoarding and speculation while clarifying that his company sold sugar evenly throughout the year and did not indulge in speculation. He put the blame of unnatural rise in food prices on the increase in wheat support price from Rs. 625 to Rs. 950 arguing that research showed that price of wheat signaled the price of other food commodities. However, he accepted that although it was in the self interest of the elite to improve governance, instead the Pakistani elite had a myopic outlook and were more interested in short-term rather than long-term gains, which also translated into politics. He gave an example of how a good cotton breeding institution would have evolved varieties suitable for the country and solved most cotton related issues. But public research centres were not up to the mark and the textile industry was not willing to invest in setting up a cotton research centre.

In response to related questions if he considered agriculture a cultural exercise in Pakistan, how he viewed the displacement of tenants as an outcome of his farming business and if corporate agriculture could be scaled and implemented throughout the country, he stated that agriculture was part of the culture all over the world but it could no longer be practiced at subsistence levels. As part of the industrialization process, agriculture had eventually come to be treated like an enterprise producing surplus value and Pakistan’s agriculture policy should facilitate its progress from subsistence to corporate farming. Regarding displacements, he said that most of the land acquired by his company did not have tenants but farmers as direct operators. However, some farms in Sindh did displace tenants, which was a cost. However, this cost was more than compensated by a number of positive externalities including on time payment, payment of minimum wage and the generation of economic activity for the overall benefit of the area. He further suggested that popularizing and implementing corporate farming among the majority subsistence farms entailed provision of three basic facilities: knowledge, capital and marketing. For a subsistence farmer, traditional knowledge needed to be tempered by research, marketing skills needed to be developed and capital needed to be provided. In conclusion, he emphasized the importance of adopting technologies that reduced costs and increased productivity, suggesting that ultimately the solution lay in increasing productivity.

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Reed opened by setting out the public service operating environment as the context of his talk. In most countries it included the political dimension, professional managerial dimension and civic dimension but in the Pakistani context, it was also necessary to consider the military dimension. These four groups of leaders were the main stakeholders in the policy formulation process and needed to collaborate for effective public administration and innovation, introduction and implementation of reforms, and continuous performance improvement in service delivery with a comprehensive approach that could lead to policy outcomes for people. He articulated that ideally the policy outcome framework should be clearly defined by the political leadership but if not, then it could be reverse engineered through a combination of stakeholder inputs and interventions, given impartial expert facilitation of the necessary participatory process.

He argued that business as usual in any one of the leadership dimension or mix of them was not enough. Innovation was essential for better policy making, strategy mapping, and responsiveness to stakeholder needs; for balancing priorities, continuous improvement and value for money. But the opportunities for innovation must come in the overlaps and interaction of the four groups while the stimulus for innovation could be led by any one of them. Given that these groups held different degrees of influence and power, they also held varying ability to create this stimulus, though there was a greater potential that it would come from the professional managerial leadership (the civil services). According to Reed, each group had a respective contribution towards the innovation stimulus. The politicians should lead on ensuring outcomes for the people – the policy choices and priorities for the people’s desired ‘end state’. The civil service should lead on economic forecasting, strategy planning, budgeting and continuous performance improvement, and service delivery – the means to achieve this end state. The civil society should lead (if allowed to) on democratic institutions, commissions, rights, rule of law, justice and find ways to inform the policy debate. Lastly, the military should lead on security, stability, and policy advocacy because there would be serious impediments to all other if the security situation was fragile. Additionally, all groups should take a pragmatic view of what constitutes ‘good enough governance?’ because things will never become perfect overnight. There would always be challenges, but one needed to aim for a clear and achievable end state.

Reed then introduced John Adair’s leadership model which challenged a leader to balance three goals: one, achieve the assigned task; two, manage and maintain the cohesion of the team; three, have an awareness and respect for individual needs. For a leader, achieving the task would always be necessary – he or she is, by definition, in the position to achieve something. But it was paramount to pay attention to the individual needs of team members, their idiosyncrasies, psychology, style and capabilities as...
Civil society had a huge potential to influence policy given their high levels of education and keen interest but were currently a lowly player, and civil servants did not consider it their responsibility to engage civil society as it was not a requirement in their job descriptions. Democratic institutions like Human Rights Commissions, Anti-Corruption Commissions and Ombudsman Offices frequently had no teeth. Similarly, academia was not significantly influential in policymaking. Thus despite civil society’s high respect for the rule of law, it seemed disillusioned with governance and with its ability to influence it.

The military on the other hand was usually task-oriented, had clearly defined goals and a tradition of needing an articulated end state. It was team-oriented (within its own team) and placed high importance on team-spirit, morale and loyalty. However, out of its own environment, it was not so good in understanding the psyche or language of civilians, in perpetuating its ethos and consequently tended to see itself as elite. Moreover, the military also had high respect for individual needs & trained their people at all levels to a high degree. So by and large it was quite good at balancing the three leadership aspects.

Reed then referred to Tuckman’s model of situational leadership stressing that to maximize productivity in a particular situation or project, a leader must adapt his/her leadership style according to the needs of the team and the project as different styles of leadership were appropriate for different stages on the critical path. The correct sequencing of tasks was equally important as all tasks could not be done at the same time thus devising a sound strategy became imperative. He suggested that policy analysis was often mistaken for strategy while actually policy was the ‘what and why’ whereas strategy was the ‘how’.

The political leadership did initially set out to be strategic in the short-term and long-term but had a tendency to revert to opportunist and even arbitrary ways of leadership. The goal, if understood as a clearly defined end-state and objective was often not clearly articulated or communicated, and the task of achieving policy outcomes for people was often subordinated to partisan political interests. There was often an unwillingness to engage stakeholders, especially opponents in policy dialogue and thus there was often an inability to maintain the whole ‘team’, while the individual needs of players, sectors and citizens were insufficiently accounted for.

The role of civil service should ideally have both management and leadership perspectives. However in most cases, human resource management and training were not given enough importance, leading to no real leadership development or succession planning; promotion being on length of services and good conduct as opposed to merit or achievement. Even where there was a genuine interest in reforms, too many impediments existed due to bureaucracy (rules of business and regulations) making it impossible to incentivize reform. Poor policy frameworks and processes often implied a lack of clear strategic priorities for sectors especially if budget allocations could not be trusted. Thus a lack of results oriented planning and budgeting tended to produce an ad-hoc and incremental approach, leading to fire fighting rather than fire prevention. Additionally, the task of delivering good policy priorities was often compromised by disillusionment of unfulfilled political promises especially budget allocations.

without it, sooner or later, there would be trouble that might easily prejudice achievement of the next team task. Asserting that the task of the leader was to balance the interplay of these three aspects, Reed related the model to the challenges of public leadership in the Pakistan public service and public administration context.

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The political leadership did initially set out to be strategic in the short-term and long-term but had a tendency to revert to opportunist and even arbitrary ways of leadership. The goal, if understood as a clearly defined end-state and objective was often not clearly articulated or communicated, and the task of achieving policy outcomes for people was often subordinated to partisan political interests. There was often an unwillingness to engage stakeholders, especially opponents in policy dialogue and thus there was often an inability to maintain the whole ‘team’, while the individual needs of players, sectors and citizens were insufficiently accounted for.

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Civil society had a huge potential to influence policy given their high levels of education and keen interest but were currently a lowly player, and civil servants did not consider it their responsibility to engage civil society as it was not a requirement in their job descriptions. Democratic institutions like Human Rights Commissions, Anti-Corruption Commissions and Ombudsman Offices frequently had no teeth. Similarly, academia was not significantly influential in policymaking. Thus despite civil society’s high respect for the rule of law, it seemed disillusioned with governance and with its ability to influence it.

The military on the other hand was usually task-oriented, had clearly defined goals and a tradition of needing an articulated end state. It was team-oriented (within its own team) and placed high importance on team-spirit, morale and loyalty. However, out of its own environment, it was not so good in understanding the psyche or language of civilians, in perpetuating its ethos and consequently tended to see itself as elite. Moreover, the military also had high respect for individual needs & trained their people at all levels to a high degree. So by and large it was quite good at balancing the three leadership aspects.

Reed then referred to Tuckman’s model of situational leadership stressing that to maximize productivity in a particular situation or project, a leader must adapt his/her leadership style according to the needs of the team and the project as different styles of leadership were appropriate for different stages on the critical path. The correct sequencing of tasks was equally important as all tasks could not be done at the same time thus devising a sound strategy became imperative. He suggested that policy analysis was often mistaken for strategy while actually policy was the ‘what and why’ whereas strategy was the ‘how’. Analysis was not strategy. Strategy was the ability to visualize the end state and to work backwards from there with a clear understanding of existing present capacities; while definition of priorities was the bridge between policy and strategy. Theoretically, policy making should come first from political leaders but it was often informed or reversed engineered through Strategy Mapping to inform what was actually possible and how much could be managed with inevitably finite resources. When a matrix consisting of four perspectives was developed

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for the various components of Strategy Mapping, it led to a Balanced Score Card (BSC). Perspective Four: the Key Performance Results which needed to be achieved stood on top; Perspective Three: Financial and other Resources (such as partnerships) necessary to achieve these results came next; Perspective Two: Processes and their Improvement, defined the key means and mechanisms to get there; and Perspective One: Capacity Development and Learning – at the base of the model – captured what organizational and human resources capacities needed to be strengthened.

There was logic to this, such that if one got the capacity development right, it would improve processes which would lead to better use of resources and partnerships and therefore increase the likelihood of achieving the key performance results. Thus by listing key strategic objectives against the four perspectives along with the measurable targets and indicators for each, one could build a BSC which was extremely powerful, and an effective way to inform and engage stakeholders concerning where they fit in the scheme of things.

Giving a broad overview of strategy, Reed identified the key challenges for public service leadership as: policymaking, deciding the end state, managing performance to get to this end state, managing uncertainty, managing change, and adding value. He then followed this with suggestions to overcome these challenges. For policy making, a manageable number of outcomes (around 5–6) for each sector should be defined. The civil services should conduct policy planning, development and drafting of contracts, policy analysis and evaluation to inform and moderate the policy making process. While achievability of policy outcomes was constrained or endorsed by the security and economic situation, at least the required structures and mechanisms needed to be in place and functional. Additionally, effective communication of policy choices was pivotal but depended on credible and effective public information campaigns.

For performance management, he suggested that this must be understood and introduced at the systemic, institutional, departmental, organizational and individual levels. It was difficult to begin with but gradually, as people started to understand and accept, it could clarify their goals and objectives, and provide them with a credible plan and a meaningful job description. At an organizational level, periodic benchmarking against an initially assessed baseline could help management to measure continuous improvement. Additionally in Pakistan, the incremental and ad hoc planning and budgeting needed to be replaced and aligned with credible, predictable results-orientated budgets and plans for the medium term (3–5 years). For managing uncertainty, he stated that although it was an important role of a leader to reduce the level of uncertainty for the next subordinate levels, most people resisted assuming responsibility for this, and welcomed leadership of it by somebody else.

“...a lack of results oriented planning and budgeting tended to produce an ad-hoc and incremental approach, leading to fire fighting rather than fire prevention.”

He argued that leadership in the management of change was the collective responsibility of politicians and civil servants as it had to be collaborative. He referred to the work of Professor John Kotter of Harvard who wrote that the essential stages of effective change management were initially to create a sense of urgency, then to form a ‘guiding coalition’, a group of professionals with determination and authority to identify the vision and clear goals. This was followed by communicating the goals within and beyond the institution, programming the process, creating some quick wins and finally broadening and deepening the
process to secure sustainability of the changes.

Concluding his arguments, Reed recommended that politicians needed better coordination of the policymaking process, better stakeholder analysis, a clearer vision for the medium term and more effective communication. The civil service needed political will behind them to support, legislate and remove bureaucratic impediments that were out of date. They required less political interference, evidence based analysis, a credible budget and medium term strategic planning. Most importantly they needed longer tenure to sustain changes, leadership succession planning and appropriate incentives. Civil society (and its representative organizations) needed greater influence, deeper engagement in reform programs, respect and more opportunities to learn from international experience. The military needed to welcome a gradual shift to civilian oversight, be less factional and more trusting of civilian leadership. He pointed out, however, that earning this trust was also dependent on efficient, effective and strong civilian leadership. That demanded a transparent engagement in the policymaking process and clarity about particular situations like Pakistan’s Afghan strategy which was, in itself of course, a subject for another day!

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The talk was followed by an engaging question and answer session. Replying to a question on how to enable consensus building on strategy, train and develop leaders and reform the bureaucracy, Reed argued that it was the responsibility of the political leadership to involve the concerned stakeholders to make good strategy. In the absence of such political leadership, senior civil servants should take the lead on innovation, strategy formulation and mapping. For development of leadership, well developed leadership competency frameworks and their implementation case studies already existed and could be used. But to reform the system, there was no alternative to political will.

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Responding to a question on other factors influencing policy making such as the role of media, policy advocacy of the military and foreign interference, Reed remarked that freedom and professionalism of media varied across countries and thus it was important to differentiate between good investigative journalism and gossip and scandal based journalism. He propounded dialogue and coordination between civil and military experts especially in stabilization of post conflict situations and lastly put the onus on political leadership to minimize foreign interference through pragmatic dialogue by taking a stand so that policies were not donor-driven.
extra-constitutional and egregious acts of the military, and at times, of civilians alike and make them clean and constitutional again. This had been a difficult and complicated task requiring considerable creativity on the part of respective courts. It often required tactful retreats, implicit compromises and deals with military dictators as well as with recalcitrant, democratically elected authoritarian civilian and political leaders.

He then discussed the history of the courts using decisions which had a direct bearing on the constitutional structure or the system, and later shared a model for Pakistan’s judicial experience. During the period between 1954 and 1993, there were two main responses of the court to the various extra-constitutional seizures of power. The first response that accepted the extra-constitutional discretions of the uniformed and un-uniformed politicians was regrettable, disturbing and at times reprehensible but ultimately necessary for the continuous functioning of state institutions by maintaining legality. The Tamizud Din Case was the first in 1954 with respect to Ghulam Muhammad. The Dosso Case accepted Ayub Khan, then the Nusrat Bhutto Case in 1977 and finally the Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto Case validated the Zia ul Haq coup. These four cases clearly followed this first response accepting extra constitutional actions as a matter of necessity.

The second response declared the extra constitutional acts of the executive as such, sometimes quite eloquently and boldly, but made such observations too late to do anything about them. The two important cases were the Asma Jilani Case in 1971 which invalidated the Yahya Khan coup but only after the fact and the Saif Ullah Case, which invalidated Zia ul Haq’s dismissal of Muhammad Khan Junejo only after Zia ul Haq had died.

Dr. Kennedy began his talk with an introduction to Pakistan’s fluid constitutional history stating that Pakistan has had five constitutions in its sixty three year history, of which four were indigenous. It has had fourteen different constitutional patterns formed since 1947 and had been governed under a suspended, modified constitution and restored constitutions. From 1999–2008, the state was governed under various legal devices including two Provisional Constitutional Orders (PCO) and a Legal Framework Order (LFO) while the Constitution was also amended in a significant way through the 17th Amendment. But in 2007, General Musharraf took an ill advised step of suspending the Supreme Court (SC) Chief Justice who was reinstated by the court, while the next step of changing the Courts’ composition through the PCO eventually led Musharraf to leave power in August 2008. The dismissed judges were restored in March 2009 and in April 2010; the parliament passed the 18th Amendment restoring the constitution to a Prime Ministerial form of government.

Kennedy stated that the superior judiciary had been kept quite busy throughout Pakistan’s history sharing a quote from a verdict (that the judiciary was) “keeping the ship of the state afloat”, which had some truth to it. To put it more or less prosaically, the SC’s role had been to longer constitutional acts of the executive as such, sometimes quite eloquently and boldly, but made such observations too late to do anything about them.

The Saif Ullah Case was substantively different as it set...
out a structure that any future president would have to follow in order to satisfy the Court’s defined methods of dismissing a prime minister. Kennedy additionally considered it an important case for the current round of judicial activism because the Court acted as a referee between the president empowered under Article 58 (2) b to dismiss the prime minister and the dismissed deciding whether the dismissal was actually valid, constitutional and reasonable. From the time of the Saif Ullah decision through the Benazir Bhutto Case in 1996, there were several cases but the most noteworthy among them was the Mian Nawaz Sharif Case decided in 1993 which established the independence of the Court. The Chief Justice, Nasim Hasan Shah very creatively used Article 184 (3) which allowed the Court jurisdiction to hear cases of public importance that challenge an aspect of fundamental rights. However, the opinion of the Court was divided in the case on the question, whether the dismissal constituted a violation of fundamental rights. The argument was that it was a basic right to form or be a member of a political party under the Article 17 (2), to contest elections under its banner and to form a government by successfully contesting elections. Thus any abrupt order which resulted in frustrating this activity through removal from office before the normal completion of tenure would therefore be constituted as an infringement of that fundamental right. The Court used this creative argument to make a ruling that it wanted to make, declaring the dismissal by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan extra constitutional while the president was still in office, and restored Nawaz Sharif to the position of Prime Minister. This 1993 decision was clearly monumental but the Court upheld the president’s decision to dissolve the PPP government in 1996 in the Benazir Bhutto Case saying that it was a good idea as opposed to saying that it was extra constitutional.

The Article 58(2) b was dropped in the 13th Constitutional Amendment thus eliminating Court’s position to review the dismissal. As the Prime Minister became all powerful, there was a confrontation between the Pakistan Muslim League and the Supreme Court over the Court’s assessment of the floor crossing 14th Amendment. Later there was a military coup partly because of the inability of the President or any other source to reign in the power of the Prime Minister. General Musharraf changed the composition of the Court by forcing a fresh oath on the Provisional Constitutional Order and the newly constituted Court found that the coup was justified in the Zafar Ali Shah Case of 2000. But in a very creative but perhaps convoluted sense, the Court also declared that the oath of office was extra-constitutional however it was too late to do anything about it. The Court in this period returned to the judicial illness of the earlier 1954-1993 period passively accepting the position of the ruler as in the educational qualification requirement (the graduation requirement) for elected office or the issue of president’s turn in office.

In 2005, President General Pervez Musharraf appointed Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry as the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Chaudhry had become a judge of the Supreme Court as a consequence of taking the fresh oath. He was fairly indistinguishable or an unexceptional judge which could be a reason why he was considered a safe choice to be the Chief Justice. But his actions following his appointment were extraordinary with respect to what was termed as public interest litigation (a human rights type of litigation). The Court began to hear cases on its own through the device of Article 184 (3), which said that any issue of public importance which also challenged citizen’s fundamental rights, however defined, the Court had an original jurisdiction on. As a result, the Court setup the human rights cell and began to undertake research into issues where corruption had occurred. As the Court started taking suo moto action with rigor, Musharraf had enough and suspended the Chief Justice in March 2007. The reaction was unexpected as the Chief Justice contested this decision and got the support of various groups—political groups, lawyers, legal and international community. After the Supreme Court's decision of declaring Chief Justice’s dismissal extra constitutional, Musharraf had to reinstate Chaudhry. Under Chaudhry, the Court continued in its
path of activism while the very continuation of Musharraf’s presidency was also challenged in the Supreme Court. Perceiving the Court to be less favorable to his actions, Musharraf decided to do something which had never been done in Pakistan before. He staged a coup against his own government and issued a second PCO suspending the constitution long enough to put forth another oath.

The Chief Justice and the core of the Supreme Court either did not take the oath or were not allowed to. The majority of High Court judges except for the Balochistan High Court did not take the oath putting the total number at sixty judges who did not take the oath. The reconstituted court under Chief Justice Dogar in many ways reverted back to the policies of a submissive court, but there were notable exceptions as the Court revalidated the PCO and validated the oath of office provision. The Court also took quite an independent decision with respect to the graduation requirements in the Muhammad Nadim Mehmood Case. This judgment overturned the earlier decision upholding the educational requirements for elected office finding it extra constitutional because the educational requirements were profoundly undemocratic excluding a large segment of Pakistani population from actually standing for office. For Kennedy, this meant that even timidity had changed in terms of the Court’s activities over the years.

Following Musharraf’s resignation pending impeachment by the newly elected parliament, Zardari was elected President but even he was reluctant to restore the dismissed judges. This led to country wide demonstrations to restore the judges to their positions eventually forcing Zardari’s acquiescence. The government had planned to expand the size of the Supreme Court but it was unacceptable to the core of the court which had refused to take the oath under PCO 2007 to accept those judges who had taken that oath. Thus the Sindh High Court Bar Association Case 2009 both invalidated the PCO 2007 and also showed no sympathy at all to the judges (some former colleagues of Justice Chaudhry) who had taken the fresh oath. Actually it was a harsh judgment. Kennedy argued that the reason why this decision was so harsh and unrelenting, and why the (fresh oath) judges were so coldly charged with contempt for having violated the decision of the Court issued the day after the PCO 2007 promulgation was to establish a boundary for the independence of the Court. He stated that the device for suspending the constitution and then calling for fresh oath of office had been done four times in Pakistan’s history but would not be done again again.

The Court had since continued on its activist path. It reversed the National Reconciliation Order (NRO) —the Ordinance that was put in place to allow Benazir Bhutto’s return to Pakistan to take part in election, in the Mubashir Hassan Case. It accepted the Dogar Court’s Muhammad Nadim Mehmood Case decision of invalidating the educational requirements for elected office agreeing that it was extra-constitutional. Nonetheless, the Court suggested an examination of Provincial and National Assembly legislatures’ election papers to observe if they had lied on the form that they were graduates as lying constituted an improper act, which was a felony. The Court had continued its extraordinary interest in human rights legislation. Thousands of cases were brought to the Court. Hundreds of cases were decided covering a very wide range from kite flying and murder cases to the issues of corruption such as the Pakistan Steel Mills Case. But this was not enough. The 18th Amendment which eliminated the President’s power to dissolve the assemblies also provided for the establishment of a Parliamentary Committee with some powers to affect the appointment of the Supreme Court judges. The current Court found the provision related to the Parliamentary Committee in violation of the constitution and ordered the Parliament to revise this provision giving more authority to the Court to appoint judges. The parliament complied rapidly with the 19th Amendment. This was truly an extraordinary event as the Court had enough power to pressurize the parliament to
amend the recently passed Amendment.

In conclusion, Kennedy presented a model to analyze the workings of the Pakistani judicial system. He categorized the courts into four: first, a court that showed judicial restraint or a court that was independent yet did not get involved in politics; second, the judicially mute court or the quite court which had low independence and low involvement in politics; third, a court that was politicized, which had high involvement in political decisions yet had low independence; fourth, was the activist court which was both independent and also had involvement in political decisions. According to his analysis, Pakistan seemed to be moving towards greater involvement in political activity as since the 1990s, all major cases fell somewhere in high area of political activity with different levels of judicial independence.

Michael Dawny began the talk by stating that higher education was in a state of crises in Europe as well as globally. For governments and institutions to solve this crisis, they needed to clarify the purpose of higher education by asking: What kind of education training was being provided? What was its purpose? What exactly was the knowledge economy in which governments and institutions invested?

Dawny then shared the Bologna Declaration initiated through a debate about the purpose, objectives and direction of higher education among the higher education ministers of four countries which in a twelve year process extended to the European Higher Education Area (EHEA) covering 57 countries (it also included countries outside the European Union). The key principle of the Bologna Declaration was the absolute vitality of higher education in the European Union. The aim was to make education more comparable and compatible throughout Europe. The declaration made higher education a public good; enhanced role of the state in funding and oversight, and pronounced students as full members of the higher education community. This encouraged the role of student unions in the formulation of education policy. The reasons underlying it were education’s role in developing economic strength, social and human growth, shared values and a common socio-cultural space; the open mobility

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of human resources in Europe which required a uniform education system; and promoting Europe as the hub of education worldwide as its educational standards did not match standards of UK, USA, Australia and Canada which had been major importers of international students generating significant economic benefits for these countries. The growth of universities particularly in the UK had been heavily dependent on the recruitment of international students which other European countries also wanted to attract and thus it was important for all EHEA universities to develop a consistent product which would be equally attractive for students.

The implementation process of the Bologna Declaration was very complex because it involved the higher education policy of more than 27 nations. Over the years the group extended to also include non-Europeans nations as countries realized that the process would help develop their education systems and make it more competitive, provide their students international mobility and increase job opportunities in the global economy. Originally a 10 year process was envisioned with ministerial level meeting every two years to further develop EHEA principles. An approach was adopted to transform, improve and align the education systems through the systemic implementation of rules called the “Action Lines”. Dr. Dawny elaborated the Action Lines in the following manner.

Given the qualifications duration in Europe varied significantly across countries. For instance, undergraduate degree duration ranged from 3 to 7 years hence a need for structural comparability in qualifications for comparability and compatibility of education. All signatories agreed to a system of cycles of learning, a maximum of four year Bachelors being first, 1–2 year Masters second, and 3–4 year Research Degree/Doctorate third. Thus the cycles had particular descriptions, were time limited and also had a fixed number of credits. One academic year was considered equivalent to 60 ECTS, a common system of credits known as the “ECTS” grading scale was put in place. Additionally learning outcomes at each cycle were clearly defined both generically and in subject terms. All members were required to develop and then register their Quality Assurance Agency with the European registered entity and comply with the central principles of quality assurance ensuring that a student’s generic skills were the same regardless of where in Europe he/she undertook the degree.

“...comparable qualification framework, credits, learning outcomes and quality standards maintenance mechanisms had to be in place for any globally recognized education system...”

Although the initial goal of the Bologna process was to increase mobility of workforce within Europe but gradually international mobility became the focus as many counties outside the EU signed up leading to the internationalization of the curriculum. Secondly, the qualifications framework extended beyond the three cycles to include the pre-Bachelors level. Third, important principle enshrined in the process was that learning did not take place only in educational institutions but also in the workplace which accounted for 70% of the learning in post qualification stage. Thus the same framework was also used to measure workplace learning. He further argued against what he called the “fallacy of a clear division between vocational and academic education”, implying that many higher professionals who had gone through extremely torturous academic programs were actually highly vocational such as doctors and lawyers. All learning was learning.

Dawny concluded his presentation by discussing the main lessons that the global knowledge village could draw from the European experience. He argued that comparable qualification framework, credits, learning outcomes and quality standards maintenance mechanisms had to be in place for any globally recognized education system and it was immaterial whether it was done at provincial or national level. Experience of various international capacity building projects suggested that this could not be achieved without institutional reforms, meaning that the system of governance and the system of finance had to change. Though a debate did exist between autonomy of schools/faculties and the centralized control necessary to maintain quality through MIS, it should be an accepted challenge for the universities. He suggested that although
Bilal Ahmad Butt opened his remarks by pointing out the basic dilemma of Pakistan’s higher education sector as a lack of clarity whether education was a public, private or a merit good given Pakistan’s education expenditure to GDP ratio was the lowest in South Asia. He was upfront in stating that, there was a National Education Policy 2009 which provided a strategic vision but lacked an operational plan. Referring to Punjab, Mr. Butt said, there was no provincial education policy but a medium term development framework (MTDF) which set provincial priority areas for higher education. He candidly observed that Pakistan’s higher education sector issues included a poor learning environment, quality of faculty, obsolete curriculum and a high student-teacher ratio. There was a lack of professional higher education managers, no system for evaluating learning outcomes and no connection with the job market as graduates were being produced without demand assessment of the domestic, regional or global markets. The enrollment transition from intermediate to higher education was only 11.9% while political interference was rampant. He also pointed out that there was no institution for the training of college teachers or for the capacity building of education managers in Punjab.

Returning to the education policy, he said the underlying objectives of the national policy were equitable distribution across areas and gender, enhanced access for underrepresented groups, greater compatibility with international standards, faculty development and retention of qualified faculty against the main challenges. These included equitability, increasing the current $18 per student per annum education expenditure, improving infrastructure, updating curriculum, developing faculty and encouraging research. Thus the national policy was merely a strategy vision without an operational plan—while provincial MTDF areas were chosen without proper planning, thus the combined effectiveness was limited. However he was all praise for the Higher Education Commission (HEC), established in 2001 as an independent commission under the Prime Minister with the aim to upgrade universities and to align learning objectives with governmental needs. HEC was well funded and spent Rs. 97 billion during the period 2002–2010 as compared to Rs. 7.5 billion spent by the University Grants Commission during the 24 year period of 1978–2002. It initiated programs to revise the curriculum, conducted faculty development, encouraged research, hired foreign faculty for PhD programs in Pakistan, regularized four year bachelor program in line with international standards, introduced quality assurance methods and provided digital library and videoconferencing facility to all universities. In total it awarded about 5,000 foreign and 3,000 indigenous PhD scholarships. He considered HEC to be a successful government body which was the primary reason why it was not abolished as dictated by the 18th amendment because the academic community resisted and Punjab thought that it lacked the capacity to replace it at the provincial level. He concluded by suggesting that a provincial higher education policy needed to be formulated.

In response to a question regarding the impact on UK’s higher education quality following privatization of education, Dr. Dawny commented that the existing quality assurance frameworks would continue to ensure high educational standards. That the less competitive universities would shrink or close down, however, it would not affect the majority of universities attended by overseas students except that the new immigration law which reduced the duration of work permit after graduation for international students from two years to one year. That may restrict number of overseas students inducted by British universities.
Reforming Pakistani Police
Saeed Shafqat*

Terrorism, De-radicalization and Counter-terrorism:
An examination of four chapters conveys that terrorism/de-radicalization and designing a counter-terrorism strategy looms large for most members of the Independent Commission. This segment is better organized, densely researched and carry some solid analysis and recommendations. Terrorism is identified as the key problem; hence the focus is on developing a counter-terrorism strategy. Thus reforming the police remains elusive, inadequate and the counter-terrorism strategy focus compromises the quality of an otherwise excellent report.

Since the report accepts Police Order 2002 as the regulatory framework for pursuing reform, thus from the outset it limits its scope. As is evident from the Ordinance 2002, its primary thrust is on terrorism. Therefore the strongest point of the report is its perceptive, evidence based and probing analysis of the terrorism issue. The in-depth analysis of terrorism and its many facets lead to pursuit of de-radicalization choices and in that context some meaningful recommendations are made for bolstering counter-terrorism measures and institutions. It is in this context that the case study of National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA), why it is not functional and how to make it operational is instructive. The report adopts a pragmatic posture by seeking partnership with the military in developing counter terrorism institutions and strategies rather than relying only on police or civilian leadership.

The report adopts a pragmatic posture by seeking partnership with the military in developing counter terrorism institutions and strategies rather than relying only on police or civilian leadership.
institutions and policies. While exploring the nature of the threats; legal complications in dealing with terrorism, and identifying short comings of de-radicalization efforts, the Report emphatically argues that absence of a well defined counter terrorism strategy is one of the key missing links of policing in Pakistan and must be addressed immediately.

To this end the report assigns police the key responsibility of maintaining internal security and proposes that the Anti Terrorism Act should be tweaked substantively, supporting handing of more powers to law enforcement agencies and enhancing police as an institution. Taking cognizance of Pakistani ground reality where military continues to play a pivotal role in combating terrorism, insurgency and devising counter terrorism strategy; the report recommends a stronger partnership with the military. For example, the report propounds special training exchanges between police and military, induction of soldiers in police, providing more weapons to police etc. The report also makes a persuasive case for the creation of a special cadre of terrorism investigators with access and ability to trace cell phone data. The report adds global dimension to the role of Pakistani police by articulating developing a liaison with the UN peacekeeping operations and police.

This is all fine but terrorism and developing a counter terrorism strategy and respective institutions is only one dimension of policing. Additionally, the recommendations appear to support adopting a military model rather than developing a civilian run counter-terrorism institutional framework. In fact it is perturbing to note that the senior police official's public posture and entourages of security guards around them remind citizens of military convoys and movement of top military brass rather than citizen friendly police. As opposed to military trained and military owned procedures, civilian intelligence agencies i.e. police and intelligence agencies under police control are by far the more appropriate option for counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations. If any reform is to be made with respect to police's capacity building, then instead of an overt militarization, it only makes more sense to equip police and civilian intelligence agencies of the likes of FIA and IB with proper training and technical assistance, as Christine Fair and Peter Chalk recommended perceptively in an earlier study. This would help both in internal crime control and also in devising counter-terrorism strategy and institutional arrangements. It is only appropriate to recall that in the 1970's Prime Minister Zulifkar Ali Bhutto's rationale to establish a Federal Security Force (FSF) was persuasive and substantial, but its implementation brought bad repute to FSF and also became a key factor in unraveling his government in 1977. This also shows that civilian control of police and policing remains precarious and this demands both revitalizing institutional capacity of police and simultaneously designing regulation that establishes effective civilian control of police.

Policing and Police Reform

It is disconcerting to note that such experienced stalwarts of Pakistan Police Service (PSP) under the pretext of reformist measures are advocating strengthening of military-police liaisons. That too, while the report incisively depicts that there is a huge trust deficit insofar as the relationship of the police and the citizenry is concerned. The soft image of police would be built only if it transcends from a force to a service. Policing by its very nature has to deal with citizens and their security and welfare should be the top priority.

However, reasons and factors contributing to this trust deficit have not received the attention they deserve and a rigorous in depth analysis is totally lacking. Putting it only on political interference, shortage of funds and lack of career prospects for the rank and file is not sufficient. The report conveniently overlooks that Local Government Ordinance 2001 and Police Order 2002 have enormously improved the career prospects of senior police officers (federal cadres) while intensifying politicization and hampering career opportunities for police ranks (provincial cadres). The report concedes that major restructuring, especially of the lower cadres, is immediately needed.

“...terrorism/de-radicalization and designing a counter-terrorism strategy looms large for most members of the Independent Commission.”
However, what the structural and institutional changes should be at that level, the report does not dwell on.

One is hard put to understand why the report does not address law and order as a provincial matter? The point being that it is the provincial police cadres that need training, capacity building and enhancement of career development. The report could have spent more energy and imagination in enhancing the professional skills and career advancement of these subordinate cadres (particularly Assistant Inspector to Deputy Superintendent of Police). There is a broad consensus among the authors of the report that implementation of the Police Order 2002 holds the key to police reform. For example, Shoaib Suddle makes a persuasive case for adopting and implementing Police Order 2002, with ‘minor amendments’ but is reluctant to specify these amendments, and this is a theme that runs through the report. It would have added value to the report had some effort been made to identify specific clauses that must be amended to improve the structure and performance of police.

Police Order 2002

The authors invoke Police Order 2002 to advocate the creation of an independent police complaint authority; setting up of Public Safety Commissions and Citizen Liaison Committee. There is a broad consensus among the authors on creating National Public Safety Commission (NPSC), which is fine. Furthermore, it is advocated that civil society and non-governmental organizations should work closely with police and lobby for protection of human rights. But the critical question of improving ‘trust deficit’ demands that special attention be given to training and capacity building of the provincial police cadres. The report makes broad and ambiguous references to trainings. However, it shies away from suggesting reforms to build capacity, re-design curriculum, refurbish existing training academies, and to create a new citizen friendly and professionally competent provincial police. It grudgingly recognizes that current training does not measure up to the long term goals of Police Order 2002. The report examines interrogation, victimization and treatment of vulnerable groups with care and concern, and identifies deficiencies in the curriculum with respect to these subjects. Some authors do refer to differing training needs of the officer and subordinate cadres. However, concerns are couched in general terms and no precise solution is extended. The recurring theme is that the curricula should be aligned with the competencies and goals / visions of Police Order 2002. In my assessment, any meaningful reform must aim to transform police from a force to a service, the report dithers on that point. This means focusing on the provincial genesis of policing. It also implies effective civilian supervision of police and strengthening of police. Building capacity, character and bringing about changes in attitude of the first respondents (Station House Officer, policeman) is a pre requisite for any meaningful police reform.

“...instead of an overt militarization, it only makes more sense to equip police and civilian intelligence agencies of the likes of FIA and IB with proper training and technical assistance.”

Police Order 2002: What Needs to Change?

It must be taken into cognizance that the Police Ordinance 2002 was the federation’s attempt at bridging the citizen police trust deficit. One of the most celebrated steps that it took was that it abolished the office of the District Magistrate (through amendments to the Cr.PC) and created the offices of Provincial and District Police Officers (PPO and DPO respectively), with the PPO accountable to the Chief Minister. In accordance with Article 33 of the Police Order, the DPO was made responsible to the Zila Nazim with respect to all police functions except administration, investigation and prosecution. In event of a conflict between the Zila Nazim and the government, the decision of the provincial government was to prevail. This particular measure has its own set of advantages as well as flaws.

Theoretically and on paper, it created a three tiered chain of control which distributed powers so as to avoid abuse and introduced an intricate balance of transparency. However, in reality, administrative intricacies of the relationship of DPO and Zila Nazim were never clearly spelled out.
so enamored by the Police Order 2002 should have been bold, imaginative and forthcoming in specifying changes if they want to see the Order implemented; third, one of the most obvious problems yet is the fact that power to prosecute lies entirely with the police itself. In fact departmental loyalties run so deep that the Court in its judgement admitted the fact that “Police… could not be expected to register a case against their own colleagues for any mala fide reasons”. The trouble though is that the police do not register cases against their colleagues even in bona fide cases; the only sanction failing to do so is administrative penalty.

The report could have spent more energy and imagination in enhancing the professional skills and career advancement of these subordinate cadres...

At the moment there is not a single independent body existing in Pakistan which is responsible for lodging disciplinary or criminal charges against police officers. Chapter V of the Police Order establishes ‘The Provincial Public Safety (and Police Complaints) Commission(s)’. These Commissions have the authority to take cognizance on their own or on a complaint received from an aggrieved person for instances of ‘police neglect, abuse of authority and conduct prejudicial to public interest’ at the district and provincial level. However, keeping up with the general tenor of police laws, once again the only mechanism available for redressal is in the form of departmental proceedings i.e. the police have been vested with recommendatory powers only. It is equally troubling to note that the Police Complaint Authority of yesteryears has been merged with the Public Safety Commission; hence there is no independent body which can entertain complaints and deal with them accordingly. Article 80 of the Police Order 2002 was amended to include ‘registration of a criminal case under the relevant provisions of the Penal Code’ against a deviant officer. Reality is that there is currently no mechanism available independent of the police which reviews allegations of police misconduct towards civilians, thereby resulting in the fact that the police can commit
abuses without any compunction and such offences will inevitably go unnoticed. The report of Independent Commission does not address the issue squarely that police needs regulation on policing its own conduct and behavior.

Exceptional Cases:
Motorway Police and National Highway authorities are good examples but the incentives, peculiar nature of job in terms of patrolling highways is different from policing a city or village.

“...there is not a single independent body existing in Pakistan which is responsible for lodging disciplinary or criminal charges against police officers.”

Police Order 2002 and Criminal Justice System
With respect to poor efficiency of the criminal justice system, the report simplistically identifies the ‘feudal mindset’ as the basic problem and center-piecing on that, explains the politician-police nexus for police control through postings, transfers and promotions. This is partly correct but the sources of this nexus are much more complex. On this assumption, the report makes a case for instituting the police commissionerate system. However, the report does little to enumerate the specific benefits of commissionerate system or provide evidence of its efficacy.

The report does a good job in linking terrorist attacks with inadequacies of the criminal justice system. Since 2005, Pakistan has experienced an alarmingly high rate of terrorist attacks which rose exponentially in 2009. This has put enormous pressure and brought its criminal justice system under scrutiny both nationally and globally. Who is responsible for catching terrorists/suicide bombers and then punishing them? Police, other law enforcement agencies (Rangers, various Intelligence agencies) or the courts!

Law enforcement agencies (especially police) have done almost nothing to tackle the problem. Police is ineffective, corrupt, without modern equipment and all this is well documented in the report. This coupled with high acquittal rates in cases of terrorism is an issue of growing concern for government and citizens alike; not only do these acquittals represent denial of justice for the victim’s families, but create security problems for the police as the acquitted terrorists are at large. The report concedes that many cases are registered incorrectly and then removed after investigation. For instance in cases of terrorism the accused are unknown, there is a general lack of eyewitnesses, accused is inevitably not described properly on record, his / her precise role in the proceedings is at best vague and due to lack of expertise, material evidence is abstemious. In addition to these, the primitiveness and lack of reliability of police investigation methods and reports ultimately contribute to low conviction rates in terrorism cases. According to an unpublished Punjab government report, the acquittal rate is 74%. Report notes that between 1990 and 2009 out of 311 cases decided in the Anti-Terrorism Courts (ATC) in Punjab, 231 cases ended up in acquittals. In the light of all this, there is a growing realization that appropriate mechanisms should be devised through which registration of cases may be monitored in an impartial manner by experts so that the police cannot forego registration of any cases for their personal gains and motives. Thus investigation officers need to be trained and groomed; the relevant personnel need to be equipped with the necessary tools of investigation; and most importantly institutional transformations, not simple creation of forensic labs but its effective operation along with medico legal facilities is an absolute necessity.

Defects in the criminal justice system which hamper the police’s work continue right up to the prosecution stage with the result that there is a growing dissatisfaction with the record of lower and higher courts in punishing terrorists. While both police and courts blame each other, the citizens suffer due to terrorism. The coordination between police and courts needs to be improved so that the problem can be tackled more effectively and efficiently.

The Anti-terrorism Act 1997(ATA) lacks concise definition of terrorism which needs work and substantive change. It is a federal law which is applied nationally except in
Reform is a welcome development and must be deliberated upon among policy circles in Pakistan and the donor community globally. This is a critical area of governance reform for Pakistan. The report does make several good points; it recommends evidence based research, data collection for effective and judicious police which need to be institutionalized through academia, police, parliament and civil society linkages as the report propounds. Second it is vigorous in supporting command responsibility i.e. senior police officers should take responsibility for the misdemeanors of the lower police. Third, a constructive recommendation is that police should be audited by the ministry of justice on an annual basis. The Report also makes an interesting suggestion of creating a separate VIP secret service to protect top functionaries and to lessen the burden on police and intelligence agencies. It does not specify the top functionaries—a secret service catering to the President, Prime Minister, Chief Ministers, Chief Justice(CJ) Supreme Court and if one were to include CJs of High Courts, this could be an expensive exercise and needs to be thought through. Finally, the report, somewhat implicitly draws attention for a comprehensive review of the Police Order 2002. This should steer a process of deliberation on Stabilizing Pakistan Through Police Reform and that is a good omen.

For cosmetics or gender symbolism, the report does have a special chapter on policing and women’s rights. The two main reasons identified for women’s plight are 1) they are not a homogenous group, and their conditions and problems are complex and demand better understanding of gender issues, and 2) the legal system has multiple law enforcement agencies and minor legal systems within the larger, which places women and minorities in an even more precarious situation. Violence against women is endemic and manifests through gender negligence. Changes in law and increase in the number of women in police service is an appropriate policy choice. Besides increasing the number of women in police service, it is equally important to train and sensitize the present police men in human rights and respect of women, and structurally overhauling policing.

Simultaneously, it must be taken into cognizance that currently most of the female police officers are deployed in big cities with little or no presence in far flung areas. Therefore, the decision to increase the number of females in the police force should be compounded with a quota for women in remote parts of the country with adequate incentives that would ensure their stay there.

Conclusion
Overall the Independent Commission on Pakistan’s Police

End Notes


*(I acknowledge the assistance of Ms. Rabia Chaudhry, Associate Researcher, CPPG in preparing this review)
Visitors and Activities

October 8, 2011
The Director, CPPG attended an interactive session on the Impact of Crisis and Disaster on Women in Pakistan organized by UN Women.

October 27, 2011
CPPG organized a seminar with Mr. Hassan Jaffar Zaidi, CEO Power Planners International and Mr. Rab Nawaz, Secretary Energy Government of the Punjab on Resolving Electricity Crisis in Pakistan: What Punjab Can Do?

November 1, 2011
CPPG arranged a seminar with Mr. Thomas Morris, Chief Economist USAID on Pakistan: Monitoring Country’s Progress.

November 13, 2011
The Director CPPG attended a luncheon meeting with Ambassador Dennis Kux hosted by the US Consul General Nina Maria Fite at the Avari Hotel.

November 15, 2011
CPPG arranged a seminar with Ambassador Dennis Kux, Senior Scholar Woodrow Wilson Centre titled Changing Dynamics of US-Pakistan Relations: Bad Marriage No Divorce.

November 17, 2011
Mr. Syed Hashim Zadi, UNDP’s Young Professional Officer Democratic Governance Unit and Mr. Farrukh Moriani, Analyst 18 Amendment visited CPPG to discuss Supporting the Implementation of Eighteenth Amendment.

November 21, 2011
The Director, CPPG gave a talk on How a State Functions: A Good Governance Perspective organized by the Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) at the Jamia Naimia, Garishahu, Lahore.

November 22, 2011
The Director, CPPG was invited by the Population Association of Pakistan to chair a session on Youth, Education and Employment and as a panelist to discuss 7 Billion Population Globally, What it means for Pakistan at the 12th Annual Population Association Conference (PAP).

November 29, 2011
CPPG arranged a policy dialogue on The Emerging Security Scenario in FATA in collaboration with Community Appraisal & Motivation Program (CAMP).

December 14, 2011
CPPG arranged a policy dialogue on The State of Migration in Pakistan in collaboration with United Nations Population Fund.

January 12, 2012
CPPG arranged a thesis seminar with Ms. Khalida Ahson, a graduating student titled An Organizational Overview of Planning & Development Department – Government of the Punjab.

February 06, 2012
Senior Research Fellow, CPPG attended the faculty seminar titled Challenges and Opportunities facing Human Development in Pakistan at LUMS, Lahore.

February 09, 2012
CPPG arranged a seminar with Mr. Munawar B. Ahmad, CEO of EMR – Consult, an Energy and Management Resource group on Testing Times for Pakistan’s Energy Sector.

February 09, 2012
Assistant Professor, CPPG gave a talk titled Using Sociological Imagination for Urban Development at the Institute of Social and Cultural Studies, Punjab University.

February 16, 2012
CPPG arranged a seminar with Ambassador James Larocca, Prof. John H. Gill and Mr. Zachary J. Meyer from Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies (NESA) on Middle East in Transition: An American Perceptive.

March 5, 2012
The Director, CPPG was invited by The Dhar India Studies
Program and The Centre for Studies of the Middle East, to deliver a talk on *The End Game in Afghanistan: What are the implications for Pakistan.*

March 09, 2012
CPPG arranged a seminar with Mr. Arif Hasan on *Public Policies for an Urban Pakistan.*

March 15, 2012
CPPG arranged a seminar with Ms. Hajra Zafar, Research Associate CPPG on *Industrial Policy in Punjab – A case study of Sundar Industrial Estate* with Dr. Shujaat Ali, Secretary Industries Punjab as chief guest.

March 20, 2012
The Director, CPPG held a meeting with Dr. Andrew Wilder and Mr. Moeed Yusuf, Directors, Afghanistan/Pakistan and South Asia at *United States Institute for Peace (USIP)* Washington, DC.

March 27, 2012
Research Fellows, CPPG attended a seminar on *Medium Term Fiscal Framework* organized by the Planning and Development Department, Punjab Government.

April 04, 2012
The Director, CPPG was invited by the Center for Diversity and Global Engagement’s (CDGE) at the College of Wooster to deliver a talk on *Problems and Prospects for Peace in South Asia.*

April 12, 2012
The Director, CPPG was invited by the Asia Society, New York to a panel discussion with C. Christine Fair and Vali Reza Nasr on *The US, Afghanistan and Pakistan: Untangling without Unraveling.*

April 26, 2012
CPPG arranged a seminar with Mr. Raza Naeem on *The Arab Spring in Comparison with Past Arab Revolutions.*

May 16, 2012
CPPG arranged a seminar with Dr. Andrew Wilder on *The Prospect for Peace in Afghanistan.*

June 7, 2012
Dr. Mohammad Quddus, Direction Punjab Economic Research Institute (PERI) held a meeting with CPPG faculty to discuss collaborative opportunities.

June 26, 2012
Director & Senior Research Fellow, CPPG were invited as panelists for the book review of *The Rise of State Aristocracy in Pakistan* by the Alternative Solutions Institute at HRCP, Lahore.

June 27, 2012
Mr. Mubbashir Rizvi, a doctoral candidate at the University of Texas, Austin, gave a talk on *Jangal Vichch Mangal (Joy in the Wilderness): Millennial Irrigation and the Colonial Infrastructure as Gift.*

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**Forthcoming Publications**

**Policing, Torture and Human Rights: Developing a Policy Framework for Pakistan**

This study explores the interrelationships of how police uses torture as an investigation tool and what impact does it have both on police performance and human rights conditions in the country.

**Governance of Drinking Water in the Punjab: Policy Choices and Options**

This study examines the demand and supply of drinking water in the Punjab, highlights the increase in shortages and suggests policy options to secure safe and drinkable water for the province.
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Board of Advisors

: Dr. William B. Eimcke is the founding director of the Picker Center for Executive Education of Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs.

: Barrister Shahid Hamid, former Governor of Punjab currently manages his own Law Firm.

: Dr. Salman Humayun, Deputy Chief of Party, Education Sector Reform Assistance Program (ESRA).

: Dr. Akmal Hussain, a development economist specializing in action research. He runs a private manufacturing firm, Sayyed Engineers (Private) Limited.

: Dr. Saba Gul Khattak, former Executive Director SDPI specializes in comparative politics and state theory.

: Dr. Anjum Khurshid (MBBS, MPAFF), Assistant Professor and Director of the Health and Behavioural Risk Research Centre, University of Missouri.

: Khushnood Akhtar Lashari, a DMG officer currently serving as the Federal Secretary of Health.

: Dr. Naushin Mahmood, Senior Researcher at Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE) specializes in demography and population issues.

: Javed Masud, former Managing Director and CEO The Pakistan Credit Rating Agency Limited.

: Dr. Jack Nagel, Professor of Political Science, Business and Public Policy, Wharton, University of Pennsylvania.

: Jean-Luc Racine, Senior CNRS Fellow at the Center for South Asian Studies, School for Advanced Studies in Social Sciences, Paris focuses on geopolitics of South Asia.

: Kamran Rasool, former Chief Secretary Punjab, Federal Defense Secretary and Chairman PIA.

: Babar Sattar, LLM, a Rhodes Scholar who writes on social, political and legal issues and runs a law firm AJURIS.

: Dr. Shafqat Shehzad, Associate Professor Comsat University, Islamabad and former Research Fellow at SDPI specializes in health economics.

: Dr. Ayesha Siddiqua is a security studies expert specializing in defense decision-making and civil-military relations in South Asia.

: Dr. Rukhsana Zia, Director, Directorate of Staff Development (DSD), Punjab specializes in curriculum and management issues in education.