

# Quarterly

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## From the Director's Desk

This is a special number of the Quarterly as the CPPG celebrates its tenth year. It combines two years of seminars, research and presentations that primarily focus on the theme of 'The Middle East and Greater South Asia: Internal Conflicts and Regional Dynamics' as a step towards building our expertise in Peace Building and Conflict Resolution. It gives me pleasure to report that our M.Phil Program is also beginning to bear fruit as in 2017, six M.Phil students completed their theses, fulfilling all their degree requirements. Congratulations to them and their faculty supervisors. In 2017, the CPPG also achieved another landmark. Its PhD program in Public Policy has been approved by all the concerned academic bodies of the FCC and is now submitted to the HEC for formal approval. Come fall 2018, the CPPG plans to launch its doctoral program and that means blossoming of CPPG's Think Tank functions, so wish us luck!

The CPPG has been striving to develop courses and its expertise in Peace...

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CENTRE FOR PUBLIC POLICY  
AND GOVERNANCE

Building and Conflict Resolution and in that spirit during 2015-16, we organized a series of talks center staging conflicts in the Middle East and the Greater South Asia region. Eminent scholars and policy makers assessed how intractable conflicts impact the socioeconomic development and in what ways domestic and international response is transforming the political dynamics of the region?

Beginning with an overview of the region, Dr. Laurent Bonnefoy examined the making of the conflict in Yemen, while Dr. Chad Haines discussed why economic and spatial elements of urbanity in the South needed to be included in understanding the Arab Spring. Dr. Galloway's research provided insight into the propaganda strategies of non-state actors such as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS/Daesh) and drew attention to how terrorist organizations function. Mr. Ahmed Rashid discussed the changing dynamics of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations in the light of possible US withdrawal and the potential of reaching peaceful cooperation in tackling militant factions in both countries. Mr. Imran Ahmed Siddiqui, an officer of the Foreign Service of Pakistan, explored the concept of the 'New Middle East' with respect to Pakistan's deep involvement in the socio-economic and political affairs of the Gulf and attempted to articulate possible policy choices to best achieve Pakistan's strategic goals. Mr. Asim Iftikhar Ahmad, another officer of the Foreign Office discussed the dynamics of decision making in the United Nations and possibilities of reform.

The second part of this issue concentrates on the relationship between terrorist strategies and social progress, and how narratives are critical in stemming violent extremism, projecting a particular world view, and in defining "established history". Dr. Ummad Mazhar explored the question of why terrorists targeted educational institutions. Dr. Charles Ramsey assessed the phenomenon of religious extremism and its relation to China in the context of the New Silk Web. Dr. Madeline Clement's presentation provided a meaningful discussion on how Western audiences form opinions of Islamic ideology through the lens of South Asian fiction writers. While Dr. Yasmin Saika discussed the role of history writing in South Asia and the possibility of moving beyond state narratives which are highly political.

Thus, this Special Issue is inter-disciplinary in content and substance. A detailed summary of each of these seminars is provided in this issue of the Quarterly.

I also want to acknowledge the hard work of our interns: Aqsa Malik (FC College), Mahnoor Hasnain (Lahore School of Economics), Hamza Munir, Purva Iqbal and Syeda Rida Zainab (LGS Defence International Degree Programme) for transcribing the seminars, making the job of our editorial team much easier.

:Dr. Laurent Bonnefoy, CNRS Research Fellow at the Centre de Recherché Internationals (CERI/Sciences PO), Paris and author of the forthcoming book *Yemen and the World Beyond Insecurity* was invited by the CPPG to deliver a talk on “Yemen at War: A Political and Strategic Assessment” on November 23, 2015.



Bonnefoy commenced by stating that the objective of his presentation was to present a clearer picture of Yemen as it had been neglected by researchers, diplomats and experts as compared to countries like Palestine and Syria which had gained a lot more attention. He identified three reasons for this: one, a lack of cohesive understanding of the country; two, an international focus on the security dimension and themes of anti-terrorism, and three, the control of information by the government.

He argued that the international community's obsession with anti-terrorism and organizations such as Al-Qaida had led them to lose track of a number of central dynamics affecting the current conflict. One of these was the Sa'ada Conflict (2004–2010) between the rebel group Houthis and the Central Government of Yemen, which led to over 10,000 casualties. The other dynamic was the north-south issue, based on the difficult unification of the South (a socialist state) and the North in 1990. The South comprising 25% of the population was supported by the USSR but became weaker and inferior to the North, which was supported by the US, when the USSR collapsed in 1990. Though compelled to accept its unification with the North, the South claimed its independence in 1994 and this movement reemerged in 2007–08.

He considered it problematic that Saudi Arabia had monopolized the control of the Yemeni issue and was acting like Yemen's conflict manager backed by many countries in the world. This included building a military

coalition with other countries such as Senegal, Sudan and Jordan after the refusal of Oman, Pakistan and Turkey to send their military troops. However, the international community had not turned a blind-eye and a number of international agencies including the UN Secretary General and international NGOs were doing their best to mitigate problems that were emerging from the conflict. Yet, these efforts did not seem to make any substantial impact due to the control of the Saudi coalition.

Continuing his argument, Bonnefoy discussed the root causes of the current conflict and the rationale behind Saudi intervention. A foremost motivation behind forming the ten-country strong coalition was to bring back President Al-Hadi to power, as the Houthis ousted him. Al-Hadi had flown to Aden from Sa'ana after refusing to resign and had asked for Saudi help, which was considered a legitimate request by the Saudi government. Thus, it became obligatory for the Saudis to intervene. Another motivation was geopolitical, encompassing a fight not only with Houthis but also with the Iranian encroachments in Yemen as Houthis were often seen as puppets of Iran. The people of Yemen were divided as many in the South supported the Saudi military intervention while many others supported the Houthis.

He then discussed the Yemeni Spring stating that it carried a lot of enthusiasm for change. It was specific and peaceful, yet the power of the demand for change was so great that it brought everyone together and led to the negotiating phase relatively fast as compared to Egypt and Tunisia, where it took more than a year to throw the presidents out of power. But, while the President Ali Abdullah Saleh lost power, he still continued to interfere in the country. During the transition phase, a National Dialogue Conference (NDC) took place in Sana'a which lasted for almost a year with 565 representatives elected by the political parties. The Conference was quite inclusive with a significant ratio of youth and women participants. The international community such as the United Nations was also present, particularly Jamal Benomar, a UN representative who worked towards building a consensus. The transition was also promising because the new president Al-Hadi acted wisely.

A federalist project was a potential outcome of the NDC, meant to reconcile groups who wanted a unitary govern-

ment (mostly from North) and those who wanted succession (mostly from South), as a mid-way consensus. But it was not perfect as various geographical and political factors were difficult to overcome, and regardless of the constructive activities, the process collapsed. There were a number of reasons: poor economy as nothing was done to bring down the toxic corruption prevailing in the economy, lack of electricity, no social services for the locals, an immense level of insecurity, and the unmet demands of the nationals who had participated in the revolutionary process leading to frustration and demotivation.

Bonnefoy then highlighted the actors who had contributed to the collapse of the reconciliation process. One of these were the Houthis led by Abdul Malik al Houthi representing the Zaidi Shia minority of Yemen, who considered themselves to be marginalized through economic and geographical means since the 1960s. On the other hand, there was a Yemeni state that represented the Sunni majority. But, most of the decision makers were 'Zaidis' who had not declared themselves to be. Another issue was that the southerners who were only 25% of the population made up half of the representatives of the NDC including the President, the Prime Minister, and the Defense Minister. Thus, most of the power was given to the southerners, even though they still believed that they had been sidelined. The southerners damaged the system by opposing rules perceived as dictated and by being uncompromising, despite their over representation and leverage in the NDC. This led to a lot of resentment among people who previously had these positions. As a reaction people rediscovered their Zaidi origin and in doing so aligned themselves with the Houthis.

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The two main actors in the conflict, the Houthis and Ali Abdullah Saleh, the former president shared common enemies and formed an alliance against President Hadi and the Muslim Brotherhood Islah party. Saleh headed the main political party and began using his network and

financial strength to gain supporters. The Islah party had been projected as the "hijackers of the revolution", so it made sense for there to be an alliance against them. This compromised the transition process. Further, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula worsened the situation but gained popularity through guerilla attacks against the military and security forces. By increasing threat and insecurity in Yemen, it evoked nostalgia for the previous regime as people began to think that change was only leading to further problems. Adding to this, US drone policy against Al-Qaeda resulted in a number of civilian casualties and caused a sense of extreme distrust amongst local tribes as these unmanned planes terrorized people, in particular affecting the mental health of children.

“ ... France, UK and US with their stance, continued to support the Saudi government irrespective of the humanitarian cost. ”


Continuing his explanation of the actors involved in derailment of the reconciliation process, Bonnefoy described two less obvious spoilers. The first, Jamal Benomar who represented the international community on behalf of the UN, stayed for too long making Yemenis uncomfortable that a non-Yemeni was interfering in major geopolitical matters. However, the less obvious spoiler was President Hadi, who was initially thought to have played a constructive role. But later many Yemenis felt that he had reacted too late and his initial soft and flexible stance had let Ali Abdullah Saleh and the Houthis take control over territory. Further, he resigned when confronted with the advancing Houthi, and then at the worst possible moment wanted to move back to Aden, withdraw his resignation and recapture his seat. This had very strong implications because it meant that Aden and the South became legitimate targets for the Houthis as before Hadi's move, there had been no confrontation between the northern Houthis and the southern secessionists. Hadi's actions led to sectarian implications between the North where Zaidis were dominant and the South with Salafi Sunnis.

This was the situation before March 25, 2015 when the Saudi military intervention began against the Houthis. He argued that one could justify the Saudi operation initially, however there was no question that it ended in failure. He

articulated three reasons behind the intervention's failure. First, strategically and militarily, the Houthis had great capacity to resist the offensive. The coalition was not able to make significant territorial gains against them. Worse,

“ Even worse was the increased north-south polarization and surfacing of sectarianism which made Yemeni unification very difficult even though the military offensive claimed to support national unity. ”

it took more than five months to recapture Aden even though the locals were against Houthi presence there, and Taiz, the third city of Yemen had yet to fall to Saudi, Emiratis and Sudanese ground troops. Instead, the Houthis had managed to carry out attacks on Saudi territory, making the military intervention even more questionable. Second, politically, while President Hadi returned to Aden to indicate the intervention's success, he was widely considered a traitor and blamed for not investing enough in the peace process. Even worse was the increased north-south polarization and surfacing of sectarianism which made Yemeni unification very difficult even though the military offensive claimed to support national unity. Third, the legitimacy of the youngest Saudi Minister of Defense, Muhammad Bin Salman whose elevation had created a lot of tension within the royal family was in tatters further weakening the position of Saudi Arabia.



Bonnefoy stressed that the current situation was not good for the Yemeni civilians irrespective of which part of the

country they belonged to as well as for the Saudis. The humanitarian implications were indeed severe. Since the start of war, the UN and international NGOs had stated that Yemen was on the verge of famine, and aid was insufficient to combat serious health problems and the economic crises. Additionally, several heritage sites had been damaged. The capital city, Sana'a considered one of the most wonderful in the world had been deeply affected by the conflict and would take years to revive. Similarly, Aden had been brutally destroyed. He argued that this destruction needed to be leveraged to bring about international pressure.

“ ...one could justify the Saudi operation initially, however there was no question that it ended in failure. ”

In concluding his talk, Bonnefoy stated that it was difficult to see a clear winner emerge in the Yemen conflict. Currently, the Jihadists seemed to be gaining ground. Their attack in Paris in January 2015 showed their capacity. Conversely, all other parties were losing legitimacy: the Houthis, Hadi and Saleh. Yet Saudi Arabia was continuing with its plan. He argued that it was time Western powers realized that the situation was counterproductive and current policies were not paving a way out. Western powers must intervene. Though Pakistan had done its job but France, UK and US with their stance, continued to support the Saudi government irrespective of the humanitarian cost. The conflict needs to be managed in a way that deals with the Houthis, who act both as victims as well as “good classmates” willing to negotiate and talk. The Saudis on the other hand were unwilling to engage with them until the Houthis disarmed and receded. But this was unlikely as the Houthis knew that they would be attacked and repressed. Thus, in attempting to reach a peace deal, one had to be more practical and offer guarantees to both sides.

The talk was followed by a Q&A session. Responding to a question regarding the future prospects of Yemen, Bonnefoy said that foremost, the economy needed attention. Without taking into consideration the welfare of the people, it would be difficult for the country to move

forward. The transition phase needed a lot of funding and financial aid to get the reconstruction and rehabilitation process going, something that had been inadequate so far.

Answering a question pertaining to the role of Iran, Bonnefoy suggested that the Iranian role in Yemen had always been overinflated by Saudi Arabia. The Iranians were not actively pursuing a major agenda and never really fully supported the Houthis. But, they might take advantage of this situation.

“...it was difficult to see a clear winner emerge in the Yemen conflict.”

:Dr. Chad Haines, Assistant Professor at the School of Historical, Philosophical and Religious Studies, Arizona State University was invited to deliver a talk on “Being Muslim, Being Modern, Informality and Transgression on the Streets of Cairo, Dubai and Islamabad” on October 8, 2015.



Haines began by sharing his interest in aspects of modernity in Muslim cities particularly in how public space within these cities was structured and how people lived in and used these spaces. Expanding on the category Muslim, he stated that rather than being regarded as homogenous, they are quite diverse which was evident in how they articulate their own identities, which could be quite different from radical Islamic thinking.

Discussing Cairo where he was teaching at the time of the Arab Spring, he stressed that the typical analysis of the Arab Spring as being shaped by American style ‘democracy’, an over-throwing of the dictator and the rise of a new political regime, needed to be re-thought. Being touched by the power of the revolution, especially the events at Tahrir Square, he argued that these events were not only about electoral democracy but also about the city itself. Tahrir Square was as much about reclaiming a city that had been fragmented, privatized, and corporatized over the past several decades as it was an attack on the neo-liberal global regime.

He underscored the tension between the modern and traditional as an important aspect of the cityscape where former replaced the latter. For example the erasing of history from the city of Mecca over the last few decades such that the home of Khadija is now a set of public bathrooms and historical parts of the mosque have been torn

down for expansion. This has happened with planning, which helps justify the destruction of the past. Extending his analysis to whole cities, he compared Islamabad, originally planned as a brand new city by the Capital Authority Commission headed by Ayub Khan in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and the old city of Lahore. He argued that Lahore was characterized by congestion and disorder whereas Islamabad had a planned design, was organized and had a certain class structure that was easy to identify. For example in the lower part of the G sector, there are smaller houses compared to the F sector which is more elite.

**“ Tahrir Square was as much about reclaiming a city that had been fragmented, privatized, and corporatized over the past several decades as it was an attack on the neo-liberal global regime. ”**

Class is an important part of the urban experience. As cities decay or change, there is a constant shifting of class. However, this is different in the case of Islamabad because of the way it is structured as gentrification in not possible in some of the poorer areas. Haines argued that this reflected a particular ideology of modernity with an attempt to move away from being post colonial to becoming a modern country. Hence, Islamabad not only lacks dynamism for change but also represents absolutism and the dictatorial nature of Ayub Khan's state.

Modernity can also be imagined apart from postcolonial nationalist ideas as can be found in Dubai, a city characterized by its corporate nature, where every neighborhood is controlled or owned by a real estate development company. The city is defined by discriminatory policies that determine social class, employment, and level of income. Life in Dubai is predicated by one's passport and salary is based on origin rather than skills-set. Thus, a form of corporate neo-liberal absolutism comes to define certain neighborhoods.

Shifting his focus from the city to street level, Haines argued that a variety of forces shaped the streets, one being historical ideas. For instance, orientalist ideas of the Islamic city revolve around the mosque or the bazaar as

seen in fiction writing, paintings or movies. These ideas have also been internalized by westerners and reproduced onto the landscape of Islamic cities. For example, Old Dubai (built around 2007) and the Ibn-e-Batuta Mall serve as examples that ideas rather than just representations have become a physical reality of the city.

Haines felt that another significant aspect of the city today is the way in which security has become part of its character, as portrayed by Paris in the 1800s and by Islamabad currently. Check posts, blast walls and more are changing the streets and transforming the entire experience of the urban.

He then discussed the idea of fragmented cities. Back in 2007, the elite area of Marina in Dubai symbolized luxury and was mostly filled with foreigners and a few wealthy Arabs. But it's character began to change a couple of years after the Dubai metro was opened with a stop near Marina, as laborers and store clerks could be seen walking around enjoying the area on evenings and weekends. Thus, as a result of the Marina becoming more accessible, the absolutist fragmentation that had defined the neighborhood was disrupted. Similarly, New Cairo is very absolutist. It has gated communities and access to them is controlled. One drawback being that during the Arab Spring, these gated neighborhoods which largely lacked a sense of community, were unable to come together and protect each other.

**“ ... events of Tahrir Square witnessed for the first time, people from different classes and religious sects coming together to transgress neo-liberalism of their city. ”**

In conclusion, Haines shared the idea of informal cities. With commercialization and neo-liberalization of agriculture, millions were displaced because of their inability to buy new seeds, insecticides etc. and moved to the cities, creating informal cities. In Cairo, millions lived in an informal city with no government regulation. The events of Tahrir Square witnessed for the first time, people from different classes and religious sects coming together to transgress neo-liberalism of their city. One powerful image of the time was when Christians encircled the Mus-

lims offering their prayers, to protect them from potential attack by the military.

The talk was followed by a vibrant Q&A session. In response to a question whether the world was becoming more accepting of new ideas or was rejecting diversity, Haines said that there was a sense of acceptance of the benefits of diversity globally.

With respect to a question on class mobility, he said that social class transformations took place across cities through gentrification, yet in cities like Dubai or Islamabad, people earning more were more likely to move to richer areas rather than transform the current ones and thus here class structures seemed more constant across neighborhoods. He argued that the more urban planners try to plan communities, the more they tend to destroy them.

“...security has become part of the city’s character, as portrayed by Paris in the 1800s and by Islamabad currently.”

:Dr. Chris Galloway, Communication Discipline Leader at Massey University, Auckland, New Zealand gave a talk on “Media Jihad: Lessons from Islamic State’s Public Relations Masterclass” at the CPPG on December 4, 2015.



Galloway began with an overview of the main findings of his research on “media jihad”, the way non-state actors such as ISIS use various media tools for propaganda and advocacy. He suggested that while many people exposed to Daesh’s media output see it as horrifying and a theatre of cruelty, in fact, it was very effective in reaching its target audience of young Muslim men and women. Its effectiveness could be judged through social media responses or the level of migration to Islamic State controlled territory.

Galloway’s main argument was that ISIS media should be seen as a form of outreach designed to advance the cause of an extremist religious ideology that was framed as being Islamic but in reality was not authentically Islamic. The media campaigns deliberately publicize ISIS brutalities and victories but also consciously convey a sense of structure and governance. ISIS wants the world to know that it is capable of operating the infrastructure of a state including the provision of social services such as health and education. Consequently, he argued that there was a breadth to Daesh’s media outputs that was often not recognized. An example of this could be seen through ISIS’ online magazine *Dabiq*. For example, the 9th issue had an article on the sin of adultery, a picture with the caption “blessed raid on the twin towers of New York” alongside a column on the achievements of its healthcare system with data on the number of operations, scans and births con-

ducted in one month in two of its hospitals. This suggested that ISIS was not only winning against the “crusaders” but also successfully setting up a functional state.

“... ISIS media should be seen as a form of outreach designed to advance the cause of an extremist religious ideology that was framed as being Islamic but in reality was not authentically Islamic.”

He went on to explain that it was important to realize that the audience of ISIS media was quite varied and thus the organization had multiple media departments with specific goals. For example, the Ministry of Media operated through four divisions, each of which had a different brief. This was possible through the volume of funding they had acquired as ISIS after all had been described as the wealthiest terrorist group in history. They had huge resources not only from the sale of oil but also from heavy taxation on the population that they controlled. Additionally, they also made money from kidnappings or from selling ancient artifacts in international black-markets.

Another aspect is their ability to consistently engage across a variety of online and offline platforms ranging from YouTube and Twitter to local billboards, radio stations and even big screens in public parks. Further, the material is produced in a variety of languages including Arabic though English in particular is used to engage Western audiences. The goals included intimidating the enemy and publicizing their victories to indicate that their brutality was justified for their particular cause. In essence, ISIS media outputs were “extremely strategic, highly symbolic and carefully synchronized” such that its media jihad complemented the battlefield jihad. Through this, ISIS has built a perception that makes it seem invincible to the world while also conveying that it is a legitimate authority.

Galloway said that though it was difficult to apply a particular methodology to research Daesh’s communication strategy, still a point of analysis was understanding its ideology and purpose. ISIS is a Jihadist-Salafi movement based on rigorous theological justifications of its

agenda. It uses Western-style propaganda to advocate its cause including campaigns that encourage people to join and work for the organization while sustaining a comfortable lifestyle. In other words, ISIS ensures its recruits that they will continue to enjoy certain luxuries like particular brands of food, but it also makes sure that their cause is projected as a moral duty. Further, ISIS uses complex audio-visual technologies to make the content relatable to a young audience, while the speed of production and technology adoption is also quite significant. For example, within a month ISIS was able to move from eight page reports to a forty page English language online magazine. Similarly, a ‘multiplier effect’ could be observed where for instance, ISIS “disseminators” were able to tweet and re-tweet news through various accounts, despite Twitter’s monitoring and shutting down of certain accounts. The scale of ISIS activity could be understood from the fact that around 90,000 different Twitter accounts had been found to be associated with ISIS, something that was very difficult for intelligence agencies to monitor because of their limited resources.

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In conclusion, Galloway quoted a US Major General in charge of counter-terrorism, “the power of Islamic State media to motivate its audiences makes it the most effective, most inspirational and most powerful manifestation of violent extremism we have ever seen.” He stated that the intangible power of Daesh was apparent in its ability to persuade and convince a variety of young individuals, which was quite alarming as people tended to view terrorist organizations as outcasts with little contact with mainstream technological innovation. But on the contrary, ISIS used a range of information and communication technologies to engage a wide audience that was receptive to the content being delivered to them. As a result, it would be imprudent to underestimate the marketing or public relations strategies of the Islamic State.

The talk was followed by a Question & Answer session.

Regarding a question of how to make sense of an organization that contradicts Islamic teachings and is unmistakably diabolical in nature, Galloway responded that it was widely accepted that ISIS had nothing to do with the teachings of Islam, but in fact hid its appetite for power, money or control within a cloak of "religious teachings". The UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon has often said that Daesh should be called the "un-Islamic non-state."

“ The scale of ISIS activity could be understood from the fact that around 90,000 different Twitter accounts had been found to be associated with ISIS... ”

In answering a question whether ISIS could be successful in achieving its goals, Galloway stated that Daesh took advantage of the instability that resulted because of the Arab Spring, had a clear agenda on expanding territorially and used media for political reasons. The best chances of containing it was for people, who realized that this Salafi-Jihadi movement was contrary to the true teachings of Islam, to be brave and bold, and stand up to this ideology. Furthermore it would be beneficial for Muslim nations to support a counter-narrative at an international level.

:Mr. Ahmed Rashid, an investigative journalist and author of *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia* was invited by the CPPG on April 8, 2015 to speak about "US Withdrawal or Not from Afghanistan: Implications for Pakistan and the Region."



Rashid began his talk with an overview of the geopolitical situation of Afghanistan. He explained that the Afghan situation had recently witnessed a shift, simply because of a much-needed U-turn taken by the Pakistan Army. Pakistan had been hosting the entire Taliban leadership since 9/11 and had been intimately responsible for its comeback in 2003. After the Musharraf period under General Kayani, there was no clear policy of what to do with the Taliban and how to engage with Afghanistan. Now that this period is over, there is a clear premise for both Afghan and Pakistan to have better relations, encourage each other to manage their territorial terrorism issues and for Pakistan to help bring the Afghan Taliban to the table. This should hopefully help end the civil war in Afghanistan and impact the Pakistani Taliban to shrink as there will then be little justification for them to fight the Pakistan Army.

He linked the improvement in Pak-Afghan relations with General Raheel Sharif's announcement that Pakistan would be pressuring the Taliban towards negotiations. However, the Afghan President Ashraf Ghani had been frustrated by the lack of Taliban representation during talks. He had entered the political scene in Afghanistan in trying times. After a year in office, the cabinet had not been approved, the economic situation was poor and

corruption was widespread. Additionally, there were major problems in the military with 40,000 soldiers leaving the army within a year, and Afghanistan's security force declining from 350,000 forces to 300,000. The fact that the Afghan army is inadequately equipped and its professionalism is evolving, overpowering Taliban who are hardened in insurgency operations is a challenge. Afghan army's failure to curb Taliban combined with lack of vision of the government has led to mass disillusionment.

During President Karzai's tenure, Afghanistan provided sanctuaries to the Pakistani Taliban. This was to tell Pakistan that Afghanistan could also play a double game. But now things have changed. There is greater cooperation between the two states which can be assessed by the fact that Ashraf Ghani has sent Afghan troops against Mullah Fazlullah.

**“ Chinese effort to invest in Pakistan was the last bailout that the country could have and if security concerns were not resolved, the investment could go elsewhere. ”**

He suggested that Pakistan's U-turn was part of new counter terrorism strategy to clear away the Taliban and its affiliates from all parts of Pakistan. It was disappointing however, that the new counterterrorism strategy did not have full support of the parliament or the people as compared to the Swat operation when around 1 million internally displaced people (IDPs) were taken care of. A similar type of mobilization was lacking and so was a clear vision on how to deal with the IDPs of North and South Waziristan. He argued that a lack of sufficient transparency and clarity posed a problem in dealing with terrorism.

Rashid clarified that an important part of this jigsaw puzzle was the regional situation. For example, no effort has been made to stop the Sunni Irani Baloch who launched an attack from Pakistan killing eight Irani border guards; we have the Taliban issue on the Afghan front; Kashmir issue with India and have also witnessed straining of relations with China with respect to the Uighurs. The Chinese have made it clear that Uighurs fighting with

the Taliban pose a national security threat to them, a terminology that has not been used over the past 30 to 40 years, which is worrisome given that China is Pakistan's major ally. However, the fact that China sees eye to eye with Pakistan with respect to issues in Afghanistan, it is good news that the Chinese would probably replace Americans in terms of influence in the region and Pakistan could benefit from their investments in Afghanistan.

**“ Afghan army's failure to curb Taliban combined with lack of vision of the government has led to mass disillusionment. ”**

He thus argued that the security paradigm demanded greater scrutiny, especially in the context of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor, which has opened up a variety of economic and social development opportunities for the country. Chinese effort to invest in Pakistan is the last bailout that the country could have and if security concerns were not resolved, the investment could go elsewhere. He said that Pakistan was at a crossroads; the last time such an opportunity arose was at the time of 9/11, when a lot of money came in. However, this aid was not effectively used for development purposes. Thus, Pakistan would have to take advantage of its current strategic position and make peace with some of the terrorists as it couldn't kill its way through the extremist movements due to the scale and technological prowess of many of these groups. The end of the Cold War was a good time to get rid of the jihadi apparatus, but the situation was different now. With the rise of ISIS, the map of the region has been redrawn as it filled a void left by the states of Syria and Iraq. ISIS was not just conquering territory but also wanted to build a state—a very different kind of organization as compared to Al Qaeda. But its relative disinterest in Pakistan and Afghanistan has been influenced by the fact that the region did not have the same kind of void that Syria or Iraq had. Pakistan does not offer virgin territory for the ISIS to easily enter, as factions such as the Taliban or the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba had been operating since the 1980s. Therefore, ISIS is not an immediate threat to Pakistan, which should instead concentrate on dealing with more chronic issues.

Rashid concluded his talk with a note of hope for a Pakistan that had the right strategic vision, was able to help make peace in Afghanistan and also deal with extremist uprisings at home. The talk was followed by a dynamic question and answer session.

Answering a question, why FATA had become a sanctuary for militants, and whether it was difficulty in governance or Pakistani military's cultivation of certain groups, Rashid responded that a number of different groups sponsored by the intelligence agencies had come to FATA over a long period of time. The Iranian groups for example, had been brought in by Musharraf after 9/11, as a strategy of the Americans and Gulf nations to keep the Iranians in check. The sectarian conflict including the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi was again the product of military policies going back to the Zia period. However, all of these groups had gradually lost state support, but it was critical how we dealt with them as they had made us geo-politically weak. He labeled the policy as absurd that these militants would help us against India.

“ ... a lack of sufficient transparency and clarity posed a problem in dealing with terrorism. ”

Regarding the question, why the new counter-terrorism policy initiated by Pakistan Army did not seem to have the support of the civilian government, Rashid stated multiple reasons: one being that if the army was taking most security decisions, then it might as well deal with the rest; another assumption being that the PML-N and PPP at some time had links with militant groups and thus mobilizing against them would cut these links; also civilians had been concerned with irrelevant debates such as infrastructure development in areas of Lahore which was not as pressing as Pakistan's security situation. Further, the situation was made more complex with the awareness that Punjab had been a harbor for extremists that had attacked communities in Baluchistan, or Khyber Pakhtunkhwa or even Karachi, creating a culture of distrust among provinces. The civilian leadership had not adequately addressed such contradictions and this raised questions over the helpfulness of civilian leadership.

Another question was about the continuing interest of the US in Afghanistan and how India supported Washington. Rashid responded that hardly mentioning Americans in his talk suggested that they were distancing themselves from the issue. They might not leave the region, but they were pulling out. He felt that the US could not play a substantive role in the peace-process of Afghanistan. With respect to India, he felt that Pakistan had to seek accommodation with its neighbor with regards to Afghanistan rather than fighting a proxy war with India in a changed Afghanistan, which would not be tolerated. He explained that the first demand of the Quetta Shura to President Ghani at the peace table would be to expel all Americans which President Ghani would not agree to. There was an element in the Afghan Taliban that believed that once the Americans leave, it would not be their Jihad anymore. Further that they would not be in a position to rule Afghanistan being aware of their economic incompetence and lack of infrastructure to support running the state. This contrasted with the ISIS leadership which had brought in professionals, technocrats and administrators to support the proper functioning of the state. So in reality, some Taliban believed that power sharing would be better as it would ensure that the flow of money from the West won't stop and they could continue to thrive as an organization.



When asked why was Afghanistan invaded? Was it Al-Qaeda or the Taliban? And how did Pakistan benefit from its engagement in the conflict? Rashid responded that had Pakistan pursued the war with sincerity, taken a U-turn in dealing with the Taliban back in 9/11 and stood up against extremist groups, the result would have been much different. However, Musharraf did the opposite and

felt that we could manage to get Kashmir with the same policies. Rashid explained that there was almost a threat of war with India in 2002, but since then the situation had cooled down. Reinforcing his earlier point, he argued that the almost \$20 billion that had come from the US after 9/11, including debt right-offs, was not utilized properly. Thus, this was a lost economic and social opportunity for Pakistan. However, the military benefitted greatly. But it did not spend the money on counter-terrorism and instead on tanks and ships, and over the past ten years Pakistan had been paying the price of those imprudent strategies.

“...Pakistan had to seek accommodation with its neighbor with regards to Afghanistan rather than fighting a proxy war with India in a changed Afghanistan...”

Answering a question regarding the capacity of Afghan army in dealing with mass desertion of soldiers, Rashid explained that the Taliban had in fact created a new kind of warfare of “inside killing” where recruits joined the police or the army and then killed their comrades. This scenario was very demoralizing, and illustrated what the forces really had to deal with.

In conclusion, he said that our politicians have been unable to manage major crises such as Kargil, or the killing of Osama bin Laden effectively, and rather than accepting responsibility, they have shifted responsibility on external actors. Rashid continued that the civil government is not very well organized and the civil-military tension is distracting, but the military should keep the civil leadership in the loop regardless of its flaws. State-to-state relations and international diplomacy could not be managed without the input of civilian professionals.

:Mr. Imran Ahmed Siddiqui, a career diplomat who has been the Deputy Consul General at Jeddah, Director Human Rights and Security Council, Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the UN, and the Deputy Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) was invited by the CPPG on 18th May 2015 to give a talk on “The New Middle East and Strategic Priorities for Pakistan.”



Siddique began his presentation by providing an overview of the post-colonial history of the Arab state system, which, according to him was jolted by the Arab Spring in 2011. Further, he drew attention to a paradigm shift, whereby Arab nationalism has been replaced by religious fundamentalism, which in the past three decades has degenerated into Shia - Sunni sectarianism.

Siddiqui narrated that in the early twentieth century as the Ottoman Empire fell apart and the Arab revolt gained momentum, the British and French seized the opportunity and divided the region into countries under their respective rule: Palestine and Iraq went to Great Britain whereas Syria and Lebanon came under French control. While Russia was promised the lower part of Turkey, however, the communists took power in Russia in 1917 and exposed the British-French machinations of splitting the Arabs. Furthermore, the Jewish immigration to Palestine was expedited and ultimately the state of Israel was established in 1948.

Within this historical context, Siddiqui explained that Arab nationalism could be understood as Arab solidarity on the basis of cultural uniformity and political unity with

the aim of achieving a clearly demarcated territory. These sentiments were driven by factors such as the need to have Arab rule over areas juggled between and dominated by foreign rulers including the Turks, French, British and Italians in the 19th and early 20th centuries and later the Zionist occupation of Palestine. Arab nationalist leaders promised an end to colonial domination and successfully fought wars against Italy and Britain in Iraq, Jordan and Syria. However, the main driver of Arab nationalism as an ideology was freedom of Palestine from Zionist occupation, which has miserably failed despite three wars and a number of low intensity conflicts. To prolong their rule, Arab nationalists externalized their internal problems by diverting people's attention towards freeing Palestine, an issue close to the people's hearts. However, Israel's withdrawal from occupied territories, its accountability and provision of equal rights to the Palestinians was unlikely in the foreseeable future because of its stronger position. It is equally important to recognize that most of the major Arab countries either collaborate with Israel or turn a blind eye towards its actions. For example, despite Israel's brutality in the 2014 Gaza War, Egypt did not condemn Israel or explicitly support the Palestinians.

“...conflict in the New Middle East is characterized by sectarian tensions and seen more as an Iran-Arab sectarian war theater...”

Siddiqui also discussed the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. After the revolution, Iranian leaders were not only abrasive in their condemnation of other Muslim states and their ways of governance, but also tried to export revolutions to the Gulf States creating insecurity among the Monarchies. Iranian attempts to mobilize Shia communities led to containment policies by the Gulf states. These tensions escalated into an eight year Iran-Iraq war with consequences such as the funding of extremist Sunni organizations in countries like Pakistan and Afghanistan as an official policy to contain Iranian influence.

Discussing recent history, Siddiqui raised the term, the 'New Middle East' coined by Condoleezza Rice, former US Secretary of State, as opposed to the 'Old Middle East',

which was dominated by the West from 1940 onwards. In the New Middle East, while the US is unlikely to withdraw from the region, it is also unwilling to play its old role such as direct military intervention like in Iraq. Thus, one sees US-Iran cooperation against ISIS, and US-GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) cooperation against the Houthis in Yemen, as proxies of regional powers fill the vacuum created by the US. This has left the Arab state system weaker than before and the Arab-Shia statehood, a reality. Yet the Gulf states have a problem understanding that Shias are a majority in parts of the region and have a legitimate right to vote, participate and make their own government. Instead they see it as a plot to destabilize Sunni governments in the Gulf. Thus, conflict in the New Middle East is characterized by sectarian tensions and seen more as an Iran-Arab sectarian war theater rather than US or Israeli intervention. Main sectarian war theaters include Iraq, Syria, Bahrain, Yemen, and now the eastern provinces of Saudi Arabia.

“To prolong their rule, Arab nationalists externalized their internal problems by diverting people's attention towards freeing Palestine...”

Siddiqui argued that it was worthwhile to assess sectarianism in Pakistan in congruence with Middle Eastern politics, and devise policies to curb it. Making a critical appraisal of Iranian Revolution and Arab containment policies, he cautioned that Pakistani state's policies had led to our land becoming a theater of proxy war between Shias and Sunnis. Similarly, Pakistani state was again in a state of denial regarding Daesh's involvement even though in October 2014, the Home and Travel Affairs department of the Government of Baluchistan had drawn a connection between Daesh and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi in targeting military officials, government installations and Shia community in Pakistan. The sectarian organizations are hatcheries where terrorists are recruited and could eventually graduate to transnational organization such as Al-Qaeda, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan or ISIS. Thus, dealing with terrorists at the beginning of the supply chain is vital.

He then articulated the economic stakes that linked Pakistan to the Middle East as around 3.5 million Pakistani

nationals were living in Gulf countries. Of the \$14 billion in foreign remittances to Pakistan in 2013, 60% came from six countries including Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, Qatar and Oman. This money was important both for poverty eradication as well as for balance of payment and thus demanded that Pakistan maintain strategic relations and cooperative synergies with the Arab world.

“...in international relations, neutrality implied being a party to some state. Pakistan's neutrality was perceived as being supportive of Iran and perceptions had serious implications.”

Siddiqui presented a few scenarios that could impact Pakistan if the Middle East were to remain in turmoil. First, if ISIS maintains or expands its control of Iraq and Syria encouraging sectarian elements inside Saudi Arabia and Gulf states, this will threaten internal stability and provoke anti-government sentiment, threatening regional economies, which could trigger the flight of Pakistani labor from the Gulf; Second, a resurgent Iranian posture would encourage Gulf states to revive the policies of containment of Iran leading to support of sectarian elements within Pakistan, which could destabilize Pakistan. Third, the US's Gulf policy of containment of Iran by supporting Sunni insurgents in Iranian Baluchistan may also involve Pakistan in a low intensity dispute with Iran.

Policymakers in Pakistan thus face a variety of challenges in practicing effective diplomacy with respect to the Middle East. These challenges range from being seen as a stabilizing factor rather than a party to the conflict, managing the adverse implications of India's influence in the neighborhood, safeguarding Pakistani labor force and improving their capacity to expand remittances being sent back home. Thus, Pakistan's deep involvement in the region comes with both opportunities and risks. The opportunities include investments in infrastructure, primary energy sources development and agriculture; political influence in multilateral fora; trade openings to Central Asia and China through its sea ports and the capacity to assist regional states in addressing the security situation. While the threats include nexus between the Middle East,

non-governmental groups and our local terrorist outfits; fragility of relations between non-Arab states i.e. Iran and Israel; deeper involvement in sectarian politics of the region; and the vulnerability to conflicts with India and Afghanistan including India's involvement in the country with respect to Iran.

“The sectarian organizations are hatcheries where terrorists are recruited and could eventually graduate to transnational organizations...”

Summing up his presentation, Siddiqui recommended a few revisions to Pakistan's foreign policy in light of the 'New Middle East'. He argued that if Pakistan's involvement was principle-based flowing from international law-UN Charter Articles 1 and 2, which advocated non-interference, independence and territorial integrity of regional states, it would have space to maneuver between Iran and the Gulf countries. If Iran does not assure that it will not serve as a factor of instability in other states closer to Pakistan, then Pakistan will have to help Gulf states, given a large segment of Pakistani population resides there as well as the leverage Pakistan receives from these states. Similarly, Pakistan should make it clear that it will not allow any international interference with respect to sectarian issues. He advocated a broad based partnership with the GCC and the implementation of existing regional agreements. He further listed forging high level bilateral contacts, creating close cooperation at multilateral fora, enforcing strong monitoring mechanisms and periodic stock taking through conferences of envoys of regional states as key enablers for Pakistan's geostrategic strength. Pakistan had not kept pace with the changing leadership dynamics in the Middle East. As older monarchs age and younger successors, who are not as closely tied to Pakistan take over, Pakistani strategists must keep in touch with their policy priorities and aim to create symbiotic relationships with them.

In conclusion, Siddiqui stated that “the pattern of foreign intervention and occupation has legitimized violence and eroded credibility of the current Arab state system. Pakistan has an interest in the stability of the Gulf region for various reasons. Its engagement in the region should be

based on a recognized principle. This approach will enable the country to follow its interests without embroiling it in an avoidable contest with ambitious regional players.”

The talk was followed by a question and answer session. In response to a comment on the increasing trend of classifying regions according to religion and sects, Siddiqui suggested that sectarianism become more pronounced since World War II. The segments of population that were repressed has become more vocal, so the Shia-Sunni divide was more frequently used as an indicator of description.

“...the pattern of foreign intervention and occupation has legitimized violence and eroded credibility of the current Arab state system.”

Answering a question regarding the optimal policy choice that would allow Pakistan to please both Iran and Saudi Arabia, he said that this was a major challenge as in international relations, neutrality implied being a party to some state. Pakistan's neutrality was perceived as being supportive of Iran and perceptions had serious implications. Ultimately Pakistan will have to take sides and it should support countries that it can benefit most from.

On the topic of the CPEC, Siddiqui explained that Pakistan's importance was increasing as a result of this corridor. However, Pakistan's interest with the Gulf remains independent of China. There are several factors such as the location of Islamic holy sites that contribute to our relations with the Middle East beyond the expat community living there.

:Mr. Asim Iftikhar Ahmad, a career diplomat who has worked as Pakistan's representative to the United Nations (UN) was invited by the CPPG to deliver a talk on “Managing International Peace and Security: Reforming the United Nations” on February 9, 2015.



Ahmad began his talk by discussing the relevance of the UN in contemporary times; he pointed out that while some argue that the UN has lost its utility, the others contend that UN needs reform to manage global challenges. The significance and changing dynamics of the UN should be understood in the context of present day chaos, disorder and global conflicts, which continue to overwhelm the smooth functioning of the UN Security Council (SC). Intractable and prolonged conflicts take precedence over economic, educational and global welfare functions of the UN.


He referred to the New York Times article written by the former UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan and former Prime Minister of Norway, Gro Harlem Brundtland, articulating a four point design for reforming the UN. One, expanding the members of the SC; by creating a new category of members for the SC that are elected in a democratic way and can help expand the scope of the Council; two, the need to curb the impact of permanent members' veto powers, suggesting that the five permanent members should prioritize world needs over their own domestic interests; three, the need for SC to consult those that are impacted by its decisions, thus encouraging participatory decision making; and finally, the need to democratically elect the UN Secretary General.

Continuing on the theme of reforming the UN and making it effective; Ahmad drew attention towards the three pil-

lars of the UN power structure. First, the General Assembly (GA) consisting of all member states, each with one vote has discussions and makes recommendations on relevant issues. Second, the Secretary General (SG) is a civil servant who heads the organization and rather than being termed the "top diplomat" actually heads the UN Secretariat according to the UN Charter. Three, the Security Council (SC) usually termed the "jewel of the United Nations," is a council of 15 members: 5 permanent and 10 non-permanent. It has the authority to issue binding decisions which member states are obliged to comply with according to Article 25 of the Charter. Further, it can also utilize Chapters VI & VII of the UN Charter.

Ahmad stated that the mandate of the GA was wide-ranging, encompassing all the principle organs of the UN. However, conditions outlined in Article 12 state that the GA cannot make recommendations to the SC unless the SC asks for it in cases of international peace and security that it is deliberating upon. Still, GA does deal with peace-keeping and conflict prevention, including issues such as Palestine and Afghanistan. Additionally, some intractable conflicts also continue to appear on its agenda, including the conflicts in Azerbaijan, Cyprus, and the Falklands etc. The GA also has the mechanism of "Uniting for Peace" which came into being as a result of Resolution 377 in 1950, which has since been used 12 times, the last being in 1977 with respect to Palestine. Furthermore on occasions, the GA also comes into action when the SC fails to fulfill its responsibility, such as taking measures in the case of Gaza, Syria and Ukraine.


Security Council Region Wise Agenda 2014



Discussing the Security Council, Ahmad specified that

there are around 80 agenda items on the list of the SC, of which 50 are active. The thirty inactive issues are ones, which have not been discussed by the SC for over three years including the India-Pakistan conflict. Taking the year 2014 as an example, he explained that the SC considered 49 agenda items and for these it held 430 meetings: 263 formal and 167 informal consultations. The informal consultations are basically "closed door", where the most important discussions take place. Additionally, the SC has 23 subsidiary bodies, which includes the sanctions committees and working groups of different nature, which held 167 meetings in 2014. These figures indicate that the SC is quite efficient, as through these meeting, it was able to adopt 63 resolutions and 28 presidential statements in a year. However, its effectiveness in being able to achieve tangible results in terms of progress on ground is another matter. In terms of subject matter, 30% of the Council's active agenda comprised of thematic issues such as counter-terrorism, non-proliferation, protection of civilians, women and children in armed conflict etc. Whereas country-specific and regional issues such as related to Afghanistan, the Middle East, Central Africa etc. comprised the rest with Africa constituting 55% of the agenda. Normally Africa would be around 70%, but in 2014, the crises in Ukraine, Syria and Yemen needed more emphasis.


Meetings vs. Outcomes 2014



Further comparing meetings, outcomes and voting patterns, Ahmad explained that in 2014, 21 meetings of the SC were held related to the Middle East and the outcome was 10 resolutions. On Sudan/South Sudan 21 meetings led to 9 outcomes, while on Ukraine, 17 meetings led to an outcome, but it was vetoed by Russia. Similarly 16 meetings were held on Palestine but the single outcome

was vetoed by America. Thus, while various meetings were held and several resolutions drawn, still the impact on the ground was not very clear, and nothing had changed significantly in Syria, Sudan or South Sudan. In terms of voting patterns, most of the resolutions are adopted by consensus and only rarely one would see a lack of consensus or an application of veto. While resolutions are voted upon, presidential statements, which are the next lower level of council decisions, are always adopted by consensus.

### Voting Patterns in the Security Council



Since the end of the Cold War, the major powers have tended to agree on taking collective action where there is no direct conflict of interest or no specific national interests to pursue. This has increased the Council's workload, specifically in dealing with internal crises of countries, may they be issues of peace and security or of development, humanitarianism and human rights. The Council has dealt with these issues with relative success including of Sierra Leone, Liberia, East Timor and Burundi, while the cases of South Sudan, Darfur and the Democratic Republic of Congo have been strategic failures and not stabilized effectively. However issues related to inter-state conflicts have been more challenging, and the UN and the Security Council's record quite "pathetic." The Pakistan-India conflict inclusive of Kashmir; the Arab-Israeli conflict including Palestine, Syria and Lebanon; Western Sahara, Cyprus, Sudan and South Sudan; Ethiopia and Eritrea are examples where despite having resolutions, the Council

was not able to enforce them and in some cases even the peacekeeping mission had to be withdrawn. An interesting aspect is that with respect to intrastate crises, the Council is very willing to go ahead and use the authority in Chapter VII, but in terms of inter-state conflicts, which are of more serious nature, the Council has been reluctant. He further explained it as an outcome of positions held by the Permanent-5 because there is very little chance of an issue initially getting onto the agenda, or of substantive action where Permanent-5 is a party to the situation.

Ahmad then proceeded to discuss agenda setting in the SC explaining the power dynamics and working methods in play. The agenda is chosen selectively, and its implementation is also selective. Some issues are pushed by certain members while on others issues; the Council might be in limbo resulting in deadly delays. A stark example is how the Council reacted, obviously pushed by the US, after the events of 9/11. In comparison, three 9/11-type events were taking place every day for 100 days continuously in Rwanda, but the Council remained in a state of abeyance. In fact in the second week of the genocide, the Council withdrew its peacekeepers and it took the UN weeks before it recognized that genocide was taking place. Furthermore, the agenda is not uniformly distributed amongst regions. He pointed out that while Africa dominated most of the Council's work, the Council's members tended to be least concerned with the results. What they are bothered about more are situations in Syria, Afghanistan or Ukraine. However, even with these cases not much is being achieved due to the positions of the Permanent 5, who drive the agenda of the SC. But in reality, it is the Permanent 3, namely USA, UK and France who have the most influence, are agenda setter and the "penholders" of the majority of issues in the SC. In other words, they mostly draft the resolutions and thus have their priorities and positions reflected in the draft while China and Russia have been less proactive. While the US was a penholder for issues regarding Liberia, Iraq and Afghanistan and the UK for Sierra Leone, China has not been a pen holder for a single issue while Russia has been a penholder jointly on 2-3 issues, such as Kosovo.

Ahmad then spoke about the different tools used by the UN to maintain or manage international peace ranging from the underutilized Chapter VI and the over utilized

Chapter VII. These include Peacekeeping, Special Political Missions, Good Offices of the Secretary General, SC Missions that are meant to meet parties and provide feedback to the Council; Sanctions are coercive measures and lastly Regional Arrangements under Chapter VIII such as the African mission in Somalia. Further, a general view among analysts is that some key issues such as the Israeli-Arab conflict, Iranian nuclear concerns, Syria, Ukraine etc. would be resolved outside and brought to the SC only for endorsement.

“...the SC is quite efficient, as through these meeting, it was able to adopt 63 resolutions and 28 presidential statements in a year. However, its effectiveness in being able to achieve tangible results in terms of progress on ground is another matter.”

In conclusion, Ahmad asserted that reforms in the UN are an ongoing process and not limited to the SC only. UN does need reform to enable it to deal more effectively with the old and new threats to international peace and security but these reforms must correspond to the agreed objectives. Further, it should lead to a strengthened United Nations. There is a strong case for SC reforms to make the UN more effective and a results-based organization. But, while a broad consensus exists on the reform objectives: more representative, democratic, efficient and effective, open, transparent, and accountable to the general membership. But there is no agreement on the modalities and the nature of the reform model while deep differences exist on the issues of SC membership, veto, regional representation, size, and working methods. It is important to prevent new permanent members in the Council to block India (G-4: Brazil, Germany, Japan, India) while enhancing chances of Pakistan's representation in the Council, which it has the distinction of serving seven times.

:Dr. Ummad Mazhar, Associate Professor of Economics at Forman Christian College was invited by the CPPG to deliver a talk on “Terrorism, Education and Development” on Nov 3, 2016.



Mazhar began his talk by posing the question “why do terrorists target educational institutions?” He said that this was a relatively unexplored area in existing literature, and argued that targeting of educational institutes was meant to achieve the long term goals of terrorists. Some of these goals included destabilizing national efforts of development and creating an environment of chaos that affected factors like investment climate or trade.

He stated that in recent times, the critical nature of conflict has changed, and rather than between two states, it was between state and non-state actors. To understand this nature of modern conflict, there is thus a need to understand how terrorist organizations actually operate. Both the evidence in social psychology and economics claims that terrorists and terrorist organizations are strategic and rational players who pursue strategies to achieve short-term and long-term goals, thus balancing costs and benefits associated with their actions. Reading Osama Bin Laden's addresses for instance, one finds him using strategic arguments related to public finance, economics, development economics and political science to justify his actions. The very success of terrorist organizations tells us that terrorists are systematically pursuing some sort of logical strategies. While a long-term objective of terrorists may be to attain control over society, to achieve this, they may want to halt social progress or use violence. For example, as a result of fear of terrorist non-state actors, the government mandated imposition of

security restrictions on schools which instead led schools to raise tuition fees resulting in civil society protests.



Mazhar then articulated his main argument that the attack on educational facilities was the most effective method of hampering social progress because education was a key input in the human capital formation of a country. Hampering the process of human capital formation meant stopping the assimilation of new ideas, slowing the process of knowledge creation, innovation and invention, and paralyzing the adoption of new technologies, which has long-lasting effects in terms of economic and human development. Further, psychological implications of attacks may also result in the rise of sentiments of fear and insecurity leading to deterioration of the quality of education. Similarly, persistent attacks on educational facilities may raise the long-term cost of acquiring a decent level of education for students and their families. In the end, society may end up with a less than average duration of schooling for its citizens increasing the likelihood that it is more receptive to terrorists' twisted ideologies and narrow worldviews. This also benefits terrorists by keeping the opportunity cost of being a terrorist, low, thus helping their recruitment process. Terrorists are in fact trying to scare away future agents of social change. This motive is particularly strong because terrorists initially targeted girl schools in Pakistan. Not to mention, the direct attack on Malala Yousafzai, who was very vocal about female education.

Mazhar said that he had used the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) for his research, and defined an incident as a

'terrorist incident' if it satisfied three criteria: one, it had a political objective; two, it was not a criminal incident and three, there was no doubt about the motive behind the act. In other words, the incident was not used if the objective was not clear about instigating terrorism. In Pakistan, the first record of a terrorist incident against an educational facility was in 1990 in Peshawar. From 1990-2001, there were only 22 attacks against educational institutes and from 2002-2012, there were 579 terrorist incidents. Historically, the percentage of attacks against educational facilities out of the total attacks followed a cyclical pattern, and the incidents further increased in 2013-2014.

“...evidence in social psychology and economics claims that terrorists and terrorist organizations are strategic and rational players who pursue strategies to achieve short-term and long-term goals...”

While his study claimed that terrorists attacked educational facilities for long-term objectives, there was also a possibility of attaining short-term goals. To test this, he compared the rate of citizen casualties in terrorist targeted educational facilities to all other types of attacks. His analysis revealed that 0.21 citizens died per attack against an educational facility as compared to 2.27 for all other types of attacks. So citizen casualty rate in a school-related attack was significantly less than other than school attacks. He also tested the hypothesis that terrorists may attack educational facilities because their own casualty numbers were lower in these types of attacks and found that only 0.02 terrorists die if the target was a school as compared to 0.15 terrorists in attacks other than schools. The economic argument of 'negative income effect' can be another motivation behind attacking educational facilities, as it suggests that attacks on inferior targets such as schools have lower cost because the government has taken defensive measures for other targets. However, Mazhar found no support for this theory as the share of suicide attacks was 6% for non-educational targets compared to less than 1% for educational institutes.

He also tested the 'extra vulnerability hypothesis', also

called the 'soft target hypothesis' which states that terrorists target educational institutes because they are 'soft targets', and found support for it such that the 97% success rate of attacks against educational institutes was higher than the 93% against all other target types. Taking into account what many analysts have argued that those targeting educational facilities actually come from other side of the border, Mazhar tested the theory that rather than long-term gains, attacks on educational facilities were one off incidents by international players. He instead found that educational attacks were much more likely to be domestic as only 5% of total terrorist attacks were international while less than 1% of international attacks specifically targeted educational institutes.

“...attack on educational facilities was the most effective method of hampering social progress because education was a key input in the human capital formation of a country.”

Another interesting fact was that most terrorist attacks remain unclaimed, which was puzzling because the rational choice model implied that terrorists should take responsibility for their actions for publicity and influence if they were pursuing a logically thought out strategy. Assessing this pattern for educational facilities, Mazhar explained that a 6% claim for attack on educational facilities versus a much higher 12% for all other facilities did not support the hypothesis that terrorists targeted educational facilities just for short-term publicity.

Thus according to the preceding discussion, the short-term motives of terrorists behind targeting educational facilities showed mixed results. While in terms of casualty rate of terrorists or chances of success of an attack, the preference for an educational facility appeared to be in terrorists' favor partially supporting the claim that terrorists may target educational facilities to gain some short term objectives. But all other aspects: property damage, casualty rate of citizens, publicity, and suitability of suicide attacks, educational attacks do not prove superior over other attack types.

Exploring further, Mazhar tested the hypothesis that ter-

rorists deliberately deployed a random mix of short-term targets to achieve their long-term objectives. For this he gathered data for around 20 countries from the Global Terrorism Database, which were ranked in the top 30 countries for the past three rankings. Other than Turkey and Israel, all these 20 countries were non-OECD meaning that their level of socio-economic development was more or less similar to Pakistan. Evaluating the impact of attacks against educational facilities on the Human Capital Index (HCI), his results showed a robust, significant and negative influence. If the share of educational attacks in total attacks increased by one standard deviation, it reduced the value of HCI by 3 percentage points. For example, Pakistan's HCI had decreased from 0.42 (2003) to 0.36 (2012). Thus if Pakistan reduced terrorist attacks against educational facilities by 10 percentage points, its HCI would become at least 0.39 instead of 0.36, as this did not include other positive spillovers. He further checked the impact of terrorist attacks on the prospects of human capital formation in Pakistan by looking at their impact on new private sector investment in the education sector. His results revealed that a 1% increase in the share of attacks against educational facilities reduced private sector educational expenditure by 4-5%.



Mazhar concluded that terrorists attacked educational facilities because this helped them to hinder social progress as a long-term objective while he found little evidence that it achieved short-term gains.

The talk was followed by an active Q&A session. In

response to a question, whether terrorists' attack could backfire instead of gaining them popularity, he said that terrorists did rely on public support but the extent to which their own actions impacted public support was an area less explored. Things might not come out as planned by terrorists but even if there was a backlash, terrorists might be happy in provoking the government into action. He stated that the impact of attacks on girl schools on fertility rate and population growth, or the impact of attacks against education sector on the quality of education in comparison with international standards, were areas for further research.

“ From 1990-2001, there were only 22 attacks against educational institutes and from 2002-2012, there were 579 terrorist incidents. ”

Another question challenged the premise that if terrorists were indeed rational agents, weren't they also affecting their ability to recruit skilled personnel to their cause by adversely impacting a nation's long-term development including human capital formation? Mazhar answered that while this was indeed a trade-off, terrorists were rational thinkers and acted based on cost-benefit analysis as data indicated that targeting educational facilities in the end was beneficial for them.

Discussing rationality and the possibility that terrorists could be killing simply out of revenge, Mazhar explained that he had tried to control for various short-term and long-term effects separately. His conclusion was that attacks on educational facilities were a part of a calculated and thought out long-term strategy of terrorists.

:Dr. Charles Ramsey, Assistant Professor of Public Policy and Religious Studies at the Forman Christian College delivered a talk on “Confronting Religious Extremism in China's New Silk Web” on October 6, 2016.



Ramsey began by stating that regional connectivity and security were of utmost importance to the Chinese development agenda, as President Xi Jinping specifically articulated the growing challenge of confronting religious extremism through government cooperation in Central and Southwest Asia at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Tajikistan in 2014. He explained that the “New Silk Road” could be seen as a “New Silk Web”, a term coined by Dr. Adam Webb. This web is central to China's development plan and extremism is one of the major elements that threaten its success. Given the history of bilateral relations between Pakistan and China and current Chinese ambitions, it is only natural that this relationship will grow with an increasing number of Chinese coming to Pakistan.

Discussing extremism, he suggested that the “crisis in Islamic civilizations”, and the “clash of civilizations” were a common theme in contemporary literature, and this “clash” was often exploited by those aiming to initiate the formation of a new Islamic regio-political epicenter for the Muslim nation, or as the scholar Faisal Devji articulates, a new kind of “Muslim Zionism.” It is thus imperative that Pakistan strengthens its own institutions such that a parallel institutional system is not formed.

One reason behind religious extremism could be economic as a substantial proportion of the world's Muslim popula-

tion lives in areas that are underdeveloped. This unequal access to resources could be because of prejudice and exclusion, as in the case of the Subcontinent characterized by the colonial policy of "divide and rule" whereby some Muslims' access to education was limited, their agency restricted, and their businesses struggled to participate in the commercial market on a level playing field. Other scholars have argued that economy and income levels are not directly linked to terrorism. For example, Krueger and Maleckova point out that money alone cannot solve the problems associated with religious extremism. Some analysts' indicate yet another path, arguing that political disenfranchisement, feelings of indignity and frustration could contribute towards religious extremism.. Thus accordingly, equitable political systems would curtail extremism; with free and fair elections, the political system would become meritorious over time and such problems would be solved.

“...while economic and political features played a role in religious extremism, ideology was a determining element.”

However, Ramsey argued that while economic and political features played a role in religious extremism, ideology was a determining element. Competing ideologies about what is "Islamic fidelity" and the dissonance it results in, creates an "exploitable space." Ramsey observed that most religious factions describe the 1857 loss of Mughal sovereignty and Muslim political dominance as the focal period of change as Muslim responses to modernity differed. He articulated two contrasting examples for their lasting influence and practicality for discussion. The first is provided by Rashid Ahmad Gangohi (d. 1905) founder of Darul Uloom Deoband, one of the world's largest and most conservative Muslim seminaries. The second is Syed Ahmad Khan (d. 1898), founder of the first modern Muslim college, now Aligarh Muslim University in India. Both were Urdu speaking scholars from India, Sunni, Hanafi and Sufis, who studied under the same teachers. However their vision for Muslim society was starkly different, as was their understanding of Muslim "fidelity."

These scholars drew their inspiration from Shah Waliullah (d. 1762), whose writings also describe a time of crisis for

Islam, the fundamental cause of which was theological which demanded severe reforms in religious education. Waliullah argued that students should be able to apply critical thinking instead of blindly following senior scholars, and thus local language translations of the holy books were encouraged so as to become accessible to the general population. He upheld the traditional view that theoretically the Sunnah was intertwined in the study of the Quran even though he was troubled by the discrepancies in recorded tradition. He also observed how different members of the Muslim society passionately followed certain traditions while readily labeling others they disagreed with as *kafir*.

“This web is central to China's development plan and extremism is one of the major elements that threaten its success.”

Ramsey stated that even today, the differing understandings of the role of Hadith in determining the boundaries of what is right and not, both define competing visions of Islam and can lead to conflict. This spectrum varies by the authority given to the study of the Hadith and its use to interpret the Quran. The differences between Gangohi and Khan also centered on the value each attached to the *Sunnah*.

The other aspect which informs differences in the understanding of "Islamic fidelity" is what the scholar Alawi points out as the beginning of our present-day ideological Islam. He considers the mujahideen movement of 1831 led by Syed Ahmed Barelvi as a shift away from traditional ways of knowledge and authority to a religiously structured view of the future and society. In world literature as well, this is perceived as the birth of a new type of political Islam. While Barelvi was unable to bring the full weight of this vision, his followers have attempted to do so. Their attempt has been to streamline the peripheral, local spiritual saints and to focus on the idea of one God, Tawhid along with its political representation of one centralized leader.

While both Gangohi and Khan supported Barelvi's teachings, their interpretive principles differed, and thus also the nature of their lasting political footprint in the coun-

try. For Khan, the message of Islam is monotheistic faith and reason is the most important element for Quranic interpretation, which expands quietly through human history in the guise of multiple religious expressions. This pluralistic religious view recognizes other faiths as ok in where they try to take their followers, i.e. heaven. Further, the Prophet's example is limited to the subject of religion, rather than also of a statesman.



Gangohi would vehemently disagree with this. While the Deobandi clerics did not play an active role in the foundation of Pakistan as they saw the new government (formed by graduates of Aligarh) no more legitimate than that of the British, this understanding nonetheless changed as political rhetoric in the country became increasingly conservative. Deoband affiliated schools expanded exponentially in South Asia, and the diversity within the tradition became apparent. While their founders had not advocated violence or terrorism, extremist elements from particular branches of the school refuse to condemn violent action. The strategy that binds them together is the idea of 'non-participation', which advocates increased particularism based on stronger boundaries, while a weak government allows for a new ideology to emerge.

Discussing the relevance of above discussion to the "New Silk Web", Ramsey stated that the writings of the past three hundred years that have been the most dynamic and influential in regions including Central Asia and the Arab World, have sprung from what is now Pakistan. Additionally, there are strong ties between religious institutions

here and in Central Asian nations. Thus, Pakistan's political future will have tremendous impact on Central Asia. Therefore, China must look to Pakistan to get a better understanding of religio-political factors.

In conclusion, Ramsey connected the historical narratives to the functioning of modern Muslim nations suggesting that these nations are finding it increasingly difficult to explain the claim that their constitutions represent religion, as portrayed by conservative elements. In Pakistan, there is still a debate between "Jinnah's Pakistan" and a more conservative religious version. Jinnah's street credibility is not as high as it used to be when liberal leaders associated with Khan held great sway in the country's politics and contributed to the constitutional order that reflected those ideals: a basic focus on a monotheistic Islam that allowed for a pluralistic version of religion. Unfortunately today, pluralistic theology and secularist politics in Pakistan are increasingly dismissed as un-Islamic. From Syed Ahmad Khan's point of view, cultural values are being misunderstood as religious doctrine, which stymies the possibility of choice and difference. As Khan would say, Islam is as much a religion of peace, wisdom and balance as any other. But, the Islamization following the Bhutto and Zia eras has led to a steady shift away from this 'universalizing' principle towards a tightening sphere of 'particularization.'

“...the differing understandings of the role of Hadith in determining the boundaries of what is right and not, both define competing visions of Islam and can lead to conflict.”

He thus argued that solely attacking extremism through political or economic means would not work, and military intervention could further exacerbate tensions. To counter religious extremism, its ideological nature needs to be countered and Muslim community leaders need to be supported in providing a counter narrative. However, insecurity inhibits students from taking this as an area of study as it seems daunting to face scholars from *deeni* madrassas who are well versed in the subject. Therefore important discourses do not occur, reinforcing parallel systems of education, ideology, and economy.

The talk was followed by a Q&A session. In answering a question regarding the extent to which the British colonizers, powerful countries like the UK, US and General Zia played a role in promoting a version of violent hegemonic Islam, he argued that while these players were significant factors in the equation, it was important to realize that the polarization of society based on religion was already taking place in both eras. Some analysts even argue that the conflicts occurring today would continue even if the belligerents do not follow Islam but some another faith. But he also suggested that the state holds the strings of many players in the country including religious groups, some of which are identified as terrorists.

“...Pakistan's political future will have tremendous impact on Central Asia. Therefore, China must look to Pakistan to get a better understanding of religio-political factors.”

Answering a question related to the differing roles of state and religion in the delivery of services, Ramsey responded that this relates to the parallel systems of economic and social spheres. For example, we now see a parallel system of education springing from religious institutions seeking integration with the government system such as the Jamia Banoria in Karachi or the Minhaj University in Lahore, which are seeking recognition from the HEC. This is a question for the general public and a great challenge for the current government, which has to decide which system to follow, and how to overcome these parallel systems.

:Dr. Madeline Clements, Research Lecturer in English Studies at Teesside University and a regular reviewer for Dawn's Books and Authors was invited by the CPPG to given a talk on "Writing Islam from a South Asian Muslim Perspective" which is also the title of her new book, on December 11, 2015.




Clements began by describing the process of her book's production, which had stemmed from her PhD. After 9/11 and 7/7 bombings, there was a particular focus on the Muslim perspective and the terrorist mindset. People wanted to know what was going on in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Interestingly, in order to understand this Islamic viewpoint, people looked towards fiction, which was a slippery slope as it could be dangerous to diagnose real life problems from reading works of fiction. Further, there was pressure on Muslim writers of South Asian background to try to explain the Islamic mindset to the West.

Clements' book focused on four novelists: Salman Rushdie, Mohsin Hamid, Nadeem Aslam and Kamila Shamsie, of which Rushdie belonged to an older generation of writers. Her interest lay in the sort of narratives these novelists used to shape ideas about Islam and beyond; what sort of Muslim affinities they mapped, and how their ideas complicated Western perspectives against media generated stereotypes.

Discussing the context of her book, Clements presented Edward Said's argument which expressed concern about the malicious generalization of Islam as a form of degenerated foreign culture and an increasing trend in connecting Arabs and Muslims to terrorism, in the West. Said had expressed his frustration when asked to give 'insider'

insight into the Oklahoma bombing of April 1995, being mistakenly understood as conducted by a Muslim. Her book *Writing Islam from a South Asian Muslim Perspective* looks at how the chosen four South Asian Muslim authors have responded to the challenge of writing about Islamic faith in the aftermath of 9/11 attacks, which replaced the Oklahoma City bombing as the most destructive on US soil. It explores the hypothesis that these international novels could be read as part of a post-9/11 attempt to revise modern knowledge of the Islamic world so as to reframe Muslims' potential to connect with others. For example, the themes of "affiliations" and "affinities" describe the kinds of connections various characters of the books convey and the trends these affiliations fall into. "Affiliation" refers to active and selective modes of Islamic connection, and could also be political affiliation. "Affinity" is perhaps a more aesthetic or spiritual connection. She suggested that these terms might help understand the characterization of groups as "good" Muslim and "bad" Muslim. The "good" for instance being understood as Sufis associated with the arts and music, while the "bad" as hardliners such as the Wahabis or Deobandis.



Clements explained that it was important to understand the sociopolitical context of the stories and the kind of Islamic narrative the authors chose to convey. Some of the questions her book asked were: what kind of explanations do the authors give and why? Are their own beliefs reflected in the novels' plots? Another important consideration was how these authors were appropriated as authentic, and hence authoritative spokespeople by the dominant political and cultural forces? This last question was in particular relevant to the reading of Mohsin Hamid's *The Reluctant Fundamentalist*, where the book came

to be accepted as the people's way of understanding the whole situation of Islam in the West.

Describing her chapter on *The Reluctant Fundamentalist* as an example of the kind of analysis her book makes, Clements said that she had assessed how the novel's protagonist and the plot left ambiguous messages of Mohsin Hamid's personal affiliations. Was the author attempting to write an autobiographical piece, given the overlap between Mohsin Hamid's career in real life and that of protagonist Changez? Her main argument being that "Hamid's ludic game-playing fiction reflects and refracts stereotypical images for the Pakistani Muslim nation still framed by fears about Islamist affiliations, in the English-speaking world."

“ While contrasting real and fictional pieces was quite amusing, it suggested the significance attached to narratives from authors belonging to an area where current affairs or the news tended to focus on. ”

She then referred to the article "The Impact of Islamophobia" by psychoanalyst M.F. Davis, who argued that Hamid's novel could be used to understand specific mindsets in a particular time. *The Reluctant Fundamentalist* came out as other true stories were also being shared. One being of Ed Hussain, a British Muslim who had written his memoir on the experience of becoming radicalized and later coming back and reintegrating into society, and these real life narratives were being compared with a fictional piece such as Hamid's novel. While contrasting real and fictional pieces was quite amusing, it suggested the significance attached to narratives from authors belonging to an area where current affairs or the news tended to focus on.

Concluding her talk, Clements said that based on similar evaluations of other authors' novels, her book argued for the need to understand that these novels had limitations and the context in which they were written needed to be taken into account. However, despite the criticism these writers might face, some arguing that they were expats or elites and thus not in touch with local sentiments, still these authors gave a more nuanced perspective on

contemporary Islam than the mainstream media or commercial texts.

The talk was followed by a Question & Answer session. Responding to a question whether these novels were able to convey clarity of opinion, Clements responded that it was not necessary for the authors to give clear or explicit messages of belief or religious alliances, and it was ok for them to be ambiguous. Instead, those interpreting these books like M.F. Davis needed to understand that these were works of fiction which were allowed to go beyond a set format.

“...these authors gave a more nuanced perspective on contemporary Islam than the mainstream media or commercial texts.”

Asked about what she meant when she spoke about the “ambiguity” in these works, Clements responded that several things were ambiguous in these novels as one was left with questions like: What is the intention of the writer? What do they want the readers to take away? Is the author feeding into the Western appetite of curiosity about this part of the world, and reinforcing ‘orientalist’ perspectives? Are the interests commercial? She said that it was important to be a critical reader and be aware of the context so as to put these novels into perspective to achieve an objective view-point.

Answering a question whether authors writing about Islam in South Asia were conveying a particular interpretation of religion in their work, she suggested that generally, it was the version of Islam that Western readers wanted to know about, but one also got different categories. Militant Islam was of course discussed which implied a fanatical Islam, but also Sufi Islam. It could also be that books were more about culture and morals rather than specific religious ideas, as in Rushdie’s *Shalimar the Clown*.

Dr. Yasmin Saika, Hardt-Nickachos Chair in Peace Studies at the Center for the Study of Religion and Conflict, Arizona State University was invited to deliver a talk on “History, Again: Narrating Lived Experiences” on October 8, 2015.



Saika began by providing a context to her talk stating that the national narratives in which the map and state came together to define an official narrative determined South Asian history. It is then circulated through textbooks and repeated through the examination system, creating a collective memory that re-circulates, ultimately taking the form of ‘established history’.

Discussing the process of research for her award-winning book *Women, War and the Making of Bangladesh: Remembering 1971*, she had come to realize the contrast between history and political narratives, where the political had a strong sentiment for focusing on ‘the other’ i.e. the enemy who had done extreme violence. This led her to the question of ‘who violated whom?’ and finally to explore the most vulnerable group, women.

Contrasting interview and oral history methods for writing history, she argued that the interview method was constraining as it tended to generate formulaic responses while oral history was a window into something. Oral history involves systemic and methodological approaches that include questionnaires, lived stories, multiple frequency interviews and dialogues. It is a trilateral conversation between the author, the narrator of the story and the reader, and the bottom line of such a conversation is trust. She further discussed the informal method she had used whereby she sat with one person many times and the stories that are now part of her book were the product of two years of continuous interaction.

Specifically, her book looks at the losses of women during the war, advocating that in the face of massive violence and dehumanization, both victims and perpetrators, women and men, were transformed. As a result, a capricious form of human understanding that she referred to as '*insaniyat*' (humanity) generated a consciousness of suffering. The discourse of *insaniyat* signifies the war survivors' universal struggle for justice, rendering hope for human understanding between the people of Pakistan, Bangladesh and India. Her experience further taught her that the purpose of history was not to narrate stories about grand events, but rather to make history a source for developing an ethical and moral space.

Saika's analysis of men's experiences of the 1971 war located them within two cores: illusion and illumination. Illusion refers to how men, who are trained to fight and kill are represented as guardians of the nation and their bravery is summoned for the act of killing and brutalizing their enemies. But after the war, the same men seemed to have developed deep anxiety and moral dilemmas. Remembering those whom they had destroyed, generated a new kind of illumination. She explained that the connection between illusion and illumination allows for reconvening of humanity in the subcontinent.

“...the concept of 'other' to project hate was absent in early Islamic society and instead, interdependence and reciprocation of rights and duties formed core principles.”

She stressed that in order to engage with the issues of humanization, a tour into hate was a pre-requisite. Considering Pakistan and Bangladesh, two predominantly Muslim countries, the genealogy of hate has to be understood through an investigation of how the figure of the 'stranger' developed in Muslim societies. Frank Roosevelt, a well-known scholar of Islam, has argued that the concept of 'other' to project hate was absent in early Islamic society and instead, interdependence and reciprocation of rights and duties formed core principles. Rather, the category of '*ajnabee*' (stranger) developed to describe travelers, wayfarers and non-Muslims, who were seen as foreigners. Saika described how established communities

living within a certain security of political identity turned against these people and identified them as outsiders. For instance, the 13th century Mongol invasion of Baghdad precipitated Muslim fear while the newly created schools of Sharia divided Muslims into exclusive groups, confusing people and giving rise to fear and hate of those who were different from them. Therefore, she insisted that a non-Muslim was not so much the 'other' as Muslims within Muslim communities were the 'other-ites.' Further, the colonial policies of intelligence and surveillance in the Indian sub-continent led to paranoia, and encouraged a culture of skepticism as ordinary people were transformed into potential enemies of the colonial state.

“...the purpose of history was not to narrate stories about grand events, but rather to make history a source for developing an ethical and moral space.”

Saika then described how the process of writing a new history in post-colonial Pakistan commenced around 1948, identifying primary and secondary citizens and drawing boundaries between 'us' and 'them' whereby the Bengali body was stigmatized and eventually deemed Pakistan's enemy. This included the colonial myth of Punjabis and Pathans as martial races fit for fighting as opposed to non-martial races which stiffened the divide between East and West Pakistan, while the state's adoption of the policy of jihad as an Islamic duty further narrowed the scope of history. The Pakistani soldier was re-imagined as a religious warrior and the Bengali was primarily targeted to be remade into a good Muslim subject. Ulema were appointed to teach the ideals of Islam to the children in rural East Pakistan. Further, in 1965, the military administration ordered that the history of East Pakistan be re-written; Muslim valor was constructed against Hindu weakness. The Bengali language with Sanskrit roots was viewed as a Hindu language and therefore undermined, while Urdu was promoted as a Muslim language. Similarly, Muslim meat-based food was differentiated from vegetables and fish based Bengali or Hindu food, and so on. She argued that this hypocrisy of a trivial religious identity meant closing the sight of mutual conversation between East and West Pakistan. The Bengali refusal to

accept their second-class status increased the army's suspicion against them while the distancing of the Bengali as a stranger in Pakistan produced in the official lexicon, seeped into public perception consequently making them into the '*dushman*' (enemy).


“ The Bengali language with Sanskrit roots was viewed as a Hindu language and therefore undermined, while Urdu was promoted as a Muslim language. ”

However, to confine this discussion to West Pakistani rulers alone would be an oversimplification as the same phenomenon of 'othering' the West Pakistanis also happened in East Pakistan. Bengali antagonism towards West Pakistan manifested in extreme protests and lawless politics. It started with the Bengali language movement in 1952. The illusory 'sonar Bangla' (golden Bengal) and the circulation of the figure of revolutionary in literature, particularly in the poems of Tagore and Kazi Nazrul Islam, were adopted for imagining freedom from West Pakistani colonialism.

Concluding her argument, Saika stated that the loss of '*insaniyat*' in violence and people's inability to recognize the humanity of the 'other', the victim were a recurring theme in her findings. During the 1971 war, perpetrators did not recognize their violence as destruction, and only later a sense of human void became apparent. Many perpetrators admitted that a radical attempt at destroying their enemy had left them with a need to find their own individual selves as human beings. Saika thus argued that memory worked as a silent witness encouraging reversal from a national to a human understanding and through this human quest, survivors helped us imagine a new history in the sub-continent.

However, reintegrating this human awareness of perpetrators from 1971 became more formidable in the present context of war crime tribunal in Bangladesh whose explicit intention seemed to hold accountable and punish only one group, the Jamat-e-Islami even though several other groups were involved. She stated that this selective accountability could not deliver justice, as for true change

to occur, an acknowledgment of war crimes and a genuine apology had to be offered to the victims. Additionally, in order to move forward, victims should be encouraged to forgive. Referring to the Gandhian approach of condemning colonial policies without blaming the English as a community of oppressors, she argued that this shifted power from structures like the state by offering an alternative vision based on human rights. Similarly in Islam, the concept of '*haq*' emphasizes truth and justice, which rather than an assertion of Sharia, encourages humanistic thinking to find solutions to crimes. The role of history writing in Pakistan today calls for such awareness so that communities can move beyond narratives of the state as perhaps through such an approach, people across the divided borders of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh can begin to recognize and appreciate each other as human beings sharing similar dreams and hopes.



During the Q&A session, in response to a question whether the world was becoming more accepting of new ideas or of rejecting diversity, Saika raised the continuing issue of violence against minorities in South Asia: the Christians and Ahmedis in Pakistan, the Urdu speaking in Bangladesh and a similar pattern in India. Yet during her research, she had found that younger generations in particular were more open to new ideas, more willing to learn and understand different points of views, and more likely to feel like a global citizen.

## Visitors and Activities

August 16, 2016

CPPG organized a seminar with Professor Richard A. Falk on [Climate Change, Nuclear Disarmament and Humane Global Governance](#).

September 8, 2016

CPPG organized a seminar with Mr. Rizwan Saeed Sheikh on [Emerging Trends in US – Pakistan Relations](#).

October 6, 2016

CPPG organized a seminar with Dr. Charles Ramsey on [Confronting Religious Extremism in China's New Silk Web](#).

October 17, 2016

CPPG organized a seminar with Dr. Saeed Shafqat on [China's Rise: How is it impacting the Gulf, Iran, Pakistan and Beyond?](#)

October 20, 2016

CPPG in collaboration with CRSS organized a Policy dialogue with Ms. Shazia Marri & Mr. Sayed Ishaq Gailani on [Rationalizing Discourse on Pak – Afghan Relations: Is a Reset from Acrimony to Amity possible?](#)

October 27, 2016

The CPPG organized a seminar with Dr. Azmi Mohammad on [Shari'atization of Islam in the Post-Secular World](#).

November 3, 2016

CPPG organized a seminar with Dr. Ummad Mazhar on [Terrorism, Education and Development](#).

November 8, 2016

CPPG organized a seminar with Dr. Marvin Weinbaum on [Pakistan and Afghanistan under the Gaze of Incoming US President](#).

January 16, 2017

CPPG organized a Policy Dialogue on [The 18th Constitutional Amendment: From Inception to Implementation](#).

January 23–27, 2017

CPPG organized a Workshop in collaboration with the Grief Directory on [Deliberate & Devise a Response for the Sufferers & Survivors of Political Violence in Pakistan](#).

February 16, 2017

CPPG & History Department organized a talk of Dr. Roger D. Long on [Liaquat Ali Khan: Jinnah's Right Hand Man](#).

February 27, 2017

CPPG organized a seminar with Dr. Raja Ali Saleem on [Turkish Nationalism and Islam](#).

March 29, 2017

CPPG organized a seminar with Mr. Suljuk Mustansar Tarar on [From Millennium Development Goals \(MDGs\) to Sustainable Development Goals \(SDGs\): Change in Development Paradigm](#).

April 18, 2017

CPPG organized a seminar with Mr. Slimane Zeghidour on [The Image of 'Muslim' in Europe: A Century of Positive and Negative Stereotypes](#).

May 4, 2017

CPPG organized a seminar with Mr. Adnan Rasool on [Regional Organizations: The Good, the Troubled and the Irrelevant – Why ASEAN thrives while SAARC and AU struggle](#).

August 15, 2017

CPPG organized a seminar with Dr. Richard A. Detweiler on [From Learning to Life: The Long-Term Impact of a Liberal Arts Education](#).

September 8, 2017

CPPG in collaboration with South Asia Partnership Pakistan (SAP-PK) organized a National Workshop on [Shrinking Spaces for Civic Actions in Pakistan](#).

September 25, 2017

CPPG organized a consultation session on the [Social Welfare Policy of the Government of Punjab](#).

September 26, 2017

CPPG organized a seminar with Dr. Charles Ramsey on [Sufism, Pluralism and Democracy](#).

October 9, 2017

CPPG organized a seminar with Dr. Jonathan Mitchell on [Impact Assessment: A Critical Tool for NGO effectiveness](#).

## Recently Published

October 12, 2017

CPPG organized a consultation workshop on **Positive Youth Development & Community Engagement.**

October 19, 2017

CPPG organized a seminar with Dr. G. Shabbir Cheema on **Urban Governance Challenges and Innovations: Asian Experiences and Implications for Pakistan.**

October 23, 2017

CPPG organized a seminar with Dr. Christophe Jafferlot on **The Growth of Indian Cities: What Place for Minorities?**

October 31, 2017

CPPG in collaboration with CSCCC organized a day long consultative workshop on **Framing the Agenda on Climate Change.**

November 13, 2017





CPPG organized a seminar with Mr. Ignacio Artaza Zuriarain, Country Director UNDP on **Sustainable Development Goals (SDG's): Global Significance and Local Relevance.**

November 24, 2017

CPPG organized a seminar with Dr. Faran Shoaib Naru on **China Belt and Road Initiatives and Prospects for Pakistan.**

December 14, 2017

CPPG launched a report on **Social Welfare Department at the P&D Auditorium.**



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