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Conferences are the lifeline of academia as these promote a culture of research. Conferences also help in building partnerships and networks but more importantly they contribute towards encouraging students, teachers, and policy analysts to share ideas and boldly imagine and design research agendas. In this spirit in 2013, while preparing to celebrate the 150 years of the Forman Christian College (A Chartered University), the CPPG organized its first International Conference, with the expectation that a second would be held after two years. However, while organizing a conference may be easy but publishing the proceedings are a challenge. That entails not only raising additional funds but also persuading colleagues and participants to deliver papers in a timely manner. For us that unfortunately remained an unfinished agenda—largely due to lack of funding. However, we continue to strive and move forward. This issue of our Quarterly carries a short report on the conference of 2013, providing our readers a peep into the theme of the conference, ideas expressed and research shared. Now, we are eyeing 2017, when Pakistan becomes 70 years old and it would be worth celebrating by holding our second International Conference,... [cont. page 35](#)

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CENTRE FOR PUBLIC POLICY
AND GOVERNANCE

Conference Report

Social Change and Security Imperatives: Challenges for Leadership and Democratic Governance in Pakistan

The Centre for Public Policy and Governance (CPPG), Forman Christian College organized an international conference in collaboration with the Embassy of France in Pakistan on 12-13 December 2013. The conference theme "Social Change and Security Imperatives: Challenges for Leadership and Democratic Governance in Pakistan" aimed to explore key drivers and issues of social change in Pakistan. It brought together a variety of academics and researchers from around the world who presented research papers on a variety of issues afflicting Pakistan today. The presentations were followed by detailed question and answer sessions, which gave the audience an opportunity to directly engage with the presenters. The conference was very well received, with a better than expected turnout on both days (between 50-70 participants in different sessions) and obtained positive feedback from the participants and attendees.



Inaugural Session:

The conference was inaugurated by [Professor Ahsan Iqbal](#), Minister for Planning, Development & Reform/Deputy Chairman, Planning Commission of Pakistan. The inauguration was also attended by [Ms. Martine Herlem Hamidi](#), Counselor for Cooperation & Cultural Affairs, [Mr. Gilles Angles](#), Attaché de Cooperation, Embassy of France in Pakistan; and [Dr. James Tebbe](#), Rector FC College.

Dr. Shafqat, Professor and Director, CPPG initiated the proceedings by welcoming and thanking all the participants, the chair, and the French Embassy. In his opening remarks, Dr. Shafqat pointed out that the theme of this

conference was timely and meaningful as it offered us "an opportunity to ask why violence, civil strife and varying varieties of insurgencies are on the rise in Pakistan and Greater South Asia and peace and social justice remains a distant goal". He expressed that "the diversity of language, religion and ethnicity makes Pakistan one of the most dynamic societies and yet increasingly the fabric of this society is being torn apart by escalation in violence; religious militancy; street protests and loss of faith in government; and rise in the number of ungovernable spaces. Thus causing erosion of the glue that holds communities and makes societies resilient and sustainable. Pursing democratic governance in Pakistan demands imagining a culture of peace, and that implies dismantling, disrupting and destroying the nexus of poverty, social injustice and economic inequities."

Dr. Tebbe, Rector, FCC, welcoming the participants, applauded the conference organizers, particularly extending facilitations to the French embassy for sponsoring the conference saying that he believed that the two days (of the conference) could be "formative in setting the thinking in this very important area of study". Dr. Tebbe took the audience briefly through the history of FC College, and the yearlong 150 years of celebrations underway at the college. He underscored the commitment FCC had in promoting more events like the conference saying that "the value that comes with scholarship from around the world knows no bounds and is a launch pad for so many important things".

“ Pursing democratic governance in Pakistan demands imagining a culture of peace, and that implies dismantling, disrupting and destroying the nexus of poverty, social injustice and economic inequities. ”

Ms. Martine Harlem Hamidi, expressed that the Embassy of France in Pakistan was pleased to support the conference. She felt that the strong interest displayed in the conference was a very positive sign. Ms. Hamidi perceptively remarked that "the main issue is to increase positive change by all means; we all have to bear in mind that only

Pakistani actors can make real improvements”.

Professor Ahsan Iqbal congratulated the FC College on its 150 year anniversary. He reiterated the importance of events such as the conference in developing solutions facing the world today. Speaking of the pace of change, he said that human civilization was witnessing an unprecedented speed of change and must adapt to survive. He said that “it is Information which is becoming the new driver of wealth creation, the new driver of progress and prosperity for nations, and all paradigms of (the) past have to be revisited and redone”. He reminded the participants, “This is a moment to reflect and have a new look at myriad of problems with new eyes because the solutions from the past will no longer work.” Pakistan, he claimed had finally chosen a way forward and now we were moving in a positive direction after 65 years. While concluding his thoughts, he remarked, “The year 2013 is a milestone in Pakistan’s history because five important transitions have taken place in an orderly and constitutional manner – one Speaker handed over charge to another Speaker, one Prime Minister handed over charge to another Prime Minister, one President handed over charge to another President, one Army Chief handed over charge to another Army Chief, and one Chief Justice handed over charge to another Chief Justice”.

Session I: Security Imperative including relations with US, China, India, Afghanistan & other regional actors.

The session was chaired by [Ambassador Fauzia Nasreen](#), former Ambassador, Foreign Service of Pakistan, Islamabad. The speakers included [Dr. Jean-Luc Racine](#), Professor & Emeritus Senior CNRS Fellow, Centre for South Asian Studies, Paris, France who presented a paper titled [Pakistan’s regional environment: A security challenge, or an opportunity for change](#); [M. Ehsan Zia](#), CEO, Tadbeer Consulting Inc., Afghanistan who presented paper titled [US withdrawal & prospect of security & economic development in Afghanistan](#) and [Dr. Ijaz Khan](#), Professor, Department of IR, University of Peshawar, Pakistan who presented a paper titled [Security imperative and regional environment](#).

The first session of the conference dealt with security imperatives for Pakistan in the context of its regional environment. Professor Racine discussed the ‘challenge’ of

Pakistan’s regional environment, and whether that challenge could instead be viewed as a potential for change, particularly in the context of Pakistan’s relationship with India. Professor Racine formulated his argument around the critical question of whether the new civilian and military leaderships could be expected to make the best of the current circumstances, or will turmoil in Afghanistan contort both tensions within Pakistan, and the new “great game” rationale at the macro-regional level? He referred to the centrality of Pakistan’s ‘India-centrism’ and consequent focus on security in defining the country’s regional strategy. He also drew attention to the fact that for the new democratically elected PML- N government in power, the economy looms large on the agenda. To meet these challenges, according to him, mending the relationship with India will remain central.



Then, Ehsan Zia discussed the transition of Afghanistan post the US withdrawal and the presidential elections in 2014. He briefly covered three interrelated aspects of this transition: security, political and economic; and their regional dynamics. He elaborated the progress Afghanistan had made in the past four years on all three fronts, and compared the country with where it stood 12 years ago. He also identified gaps and weaknesses which could hinder the transition process, such as corruption which continued to be a key challenge to governance. He was emphatic in underscoring that all three aspects of the transition were equally important for a successful transition, and needed a continuation of regional and international support.

Dr. Ijaz Khan discussed the issue of regional integration from the perspective of security imperatives of four key players: Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and Iran. Using Barry

Buzan's 'Regional Complex Security Theory' (RCST), Dr. Khan postulated that the security policies of each player were intertwined to such an extent that the study of security policy of one could not be done without studying the remaining three. He categorized the security challenges of the region in four levels: "the domestic vulnerability of the states; state to state relations; the region's interaction with neighboring regions; and the role of global powers in the region". Concluding his argument, Khan highlighted the need for regional cooperation in a security environment, as no one country could meet the ongoing security challenges on its own.



Summing up the session, Ambassador Fauzia Nasreen remarked "All the countries (in the region) have to keep on talking with each other". She continued "the most crucial point would be economic integration, and that probably will change the dynamics of the region as a whole". The session concluded with questions from the audience.

Session II: Leadership and Democracy

The session was chaired by Dr. Paula Newburg, Professor & Wilson Chair Fellow, University of Texas-Austin, USA. The speakers included Dr. Mohammad Waseem, Professor of Political Science, LUMS, Lahore, who presented a paper titled [Leadership, democracy and governance in Pakistan](#); Sarwar Hussaini, Freelance Consultant from Afghanistan whose paper was titled [Leadership and democracy, the experience of Afghanistan](#); Dr. Yaqoob Bangash, Assistant Professor & Chairman, Department of History, FC College, Lahore who presented a paper titled [Flirtation or Commitment? Pakistan & its relationship with democracy](#); and Maira Hayat, Lecturer, University of Chicago, USA whose paper was titled [How democracy spread\(s\) through dicta-](#)

[torship: revisiting the Indus Water Treaty, 1960.](#)

“ ... two main power centers in Pakistan: one, a socially progressive but politically conservative middle class which serves as a constituency for military rule; and two, a socially conservative but politically progressive political class. ”

The first speaker of this session was Dr. Mohammad Waseem who analyzed the existing political environment in Pakistan, particularly democracy in the age of terrorism. His framework of analysis focused on what he described as two main power centers in Pakistan: one, a socially progressive but politically conservative middle class which serves as a constituency for military rule; and two, a socially conservative but politically progressive political class. In this context, he analyzed the role of three actors: one, the political leadership, those in government responsible for decision making and those in opposition struggling for staying afloat by raising issues and demanding change in policy; two, the potential of the current democratic dispensation to deliver stability and peace; and three, an analysis of the issues of government's performance in two key areas of security against terrorist activities in FATA, Karachi and Baluchistan, and of economy with a focus on electricity. He cryptically characterized the 2013 elections as being "up by design, and low by performance", saying that great procedural improvements were made in the process of conducting elections but the implementation was lacking.

“ ... with employment intensity of growth remaining the same, another 22 million young unemployed people will emerge by the year 2024. ”

Dr. Bangash's paper dealt with the turbulent relationship Pakistan has always had with democracy. He argued that this "ambivalent attitude towards democracy has been around since day one" and was not an acquired phenomenon but rather a factor since the creation of Pakistan. Beyond the usual explanations of weak political leadership and the power of the military, Dr. Bangash asked the

question whether there was something in the imagination of the country which prevented it from keeping on the path of democracy? He then focused on "understanding the imagination of Pakistan as a country post 1947", and using the debates of the Constituent Assembly as the primary resource to "analyze what these constitution makers really thought". Analyzing the content of speeches of these constituent assembly members, his work examined the attitude of the governing class, the role of religion and religious discourse, and the understanding of the common man towards the subject of democracy.

Sarwar Hussaini dealt with the issue of Afghan transition post US withdrawal in 2014, focusing on political leadership. His period of analysis started from 2001 to the current time and could be "best described as a transition period going from chaos and war to democracy". He spoke of the two major external factors in Afghanistan – international presence and the proxy wars which had "at times served as limiting factors, and at other times served as boosting factors for democracy". He also highlighted some of the achievements over the past 12 years such as the progress made in the field of human rights, and development in democratic processes such as elections and other relevant systems. He listed some of the failures and challenges that would be critical going forward including "a highly centralized presidency system, limited space for political party role, widespread corruption, a justice system which continues to act as subservient of the executive branch, and widespread fraud as reported in the past elections".

“... under the right set of conditions, entrepreneurship had a great deal to offer Pakistan as a viable economic strategy.”

Maira Hayat was the last speaker of the session. Her paper took the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960 as the point of entry for an examination of decision-making under military rule. The basic premise behind her paper was that "there is something to be said for the materiality of water in politics. It illuminates the failures of political projects and their perceived successes, or how natural the political is". In relation to security, she said "disagreements over what constitutes a threat to security become clear when

seen through water. They change as water flows from east to west, from north to south. It has historical value too for allowing a view into the making of 1971. That is a conversation, post-1971, that Pakistan has been unwilling and unable to have".

Concluding the session, Dr. Paula Newberg congratulated the speakers for a diverse and rich discourse. She observed that the presentations held the promise of democracy in Pakistan and articulated the challenges that confront it. The session was followed by lively comments and questions. One of the participants remarked that holding of regular, fair and transparent elections would ensure democracy in the country.

Session III: Social Change: How interplay of technology & religion is changing culture & values

The session was chaired by Dr. Sabhia Syed, Director, Migration Research Centre, Islamabad, Pakistan. The speakers included, Dr. Mariam Abu Zahab, Senior Lecturer, Institute of Oriental Languages, Paris, France whose paper was titled **Urbanization & radicalization: the construction of the "other"**; Afiya S. Zia, an independent feminist researcher & activist from Karachi, Pakistan who read a paper on **Religious militancy & liberal-secular resistance in Pakistan: Myths, misunderstanding & misinformation**; Charles Ramsey, Executive Assistant to the Rector, FC College, Lahore whose paper was titled **Globalization, media and religious discourse in Pakistan**; and lastly Raheem ul Haque, Senior Research Fellow, CPPG, FC College, Lahore who paper was titled **Face book as new public space for youth in Pakistan**.

The first session of Day II of the conference was initiated by Dr. Mariam Abu Zahab, whose work deals with increasing intolerance of religious diversity and the construction of the "other" on the basis of religious dogma. In Pakistan, she formulated the rise in religiosity and radicalization in the context of massive, unplanned and often forced urbanization. In order to understand the growing intolerance of religious diversity, she exemplified the anti-Shia sentiments in the country. She observed, "the Shias are more and more designated by the media and the people as the 'Shia minority' and in the Pakistani context to designate Shias as a minority is a way of marginalizing them and excluding them from the Muslim community". This

"perception of Shias as a minority is a victory of sectarian discourse in the country" and was a disturbing discourse and trend. Zahab was upfront in stating that, "the government has been very slow in recognizing sectarianism as the core of security challenges faced by the country and no counter narrative has been elaborated by the main political parties".

The next speaker was Afiya Zia, who analyzed and articulated how the narratives produced post 9/11 through "largely donor funded scholarship" had led to much misunderstanding and misinformation. She pointedly remarked that "such (post 9/11) trends have benefitted many including, not just handlers, NGOs and donors who have run many ineffective faith-based projects in the country but also, Pakistani-origin scholars in Western think-tanks and academia, who have benefitted from such a turn of interest and events". She was forceful in arguing that there was too much focus on "external factors (in research) to our analytical detriment". She continued, "there is little doubt that Pakistan has undergone political reframing over the last decade, and this is not just because of 9/11, but due to our own unresolved domestic civil-military politics and religio-sociological upheaval, apart from the sub-national thrust that no one seems to want to discuss anymore". She was robust and incisive in highlighting that squeezed in by all the competing narratives, the abstract concept of what was liberal and secular resistance in Pakistan had become inverted and identifiable in the form of NGO human rights activists, feminists, critical analysts and some sections of the media. This made for a convenient distraction from the structural challenges that prevented social transformation in the country.

“... until a new elite emerges and consolidates itself, it's improbable that Pakistan will have any form of economic development.”

Charles Ramsey then followed up with his work, which dealt with religious discourse in the media, particularly television in Pakistan. He highlighted some key statistical trends in media usage in Pakistan, and argued that despite the proliferation of media outlets in Pakistan, the overall impact on religious discourse had been constricting rather than liberalizing. Ramsey used a theoretical framework to

interpret statistical trends in media usage to assess how access to these voices had affected the social construction of knowledge, and its bifurcation in Western and non-Western. He articulated that the "media has brought discussion on the future of the Pakistani state in the public arena" and one of the central questions being asked in these discussions was "should we remain in this system or do we need to move into a really Islamic system?"

“... the government has been very slow in recognizing sectarianism as the core of security challenges faced by the country...”

The last speaker of the session was Raheem ul Haque who assessed whether Face book could be classified as a public sphere. The key questions that his exploratory research raised were: Whether Facebook was a representation of youth dominated space? Would this public space expand civic and pluralistic participatory engagement, or reinforce existing stereotypes, thus further hardening polarities? and lastly what would this competitive ideational arena suggest regarding the direction of religious and political discourse in Pakistan? Haque stated "I'm not arguing that Facebook as a medium or technology mediated discussion leads to segmentation across the board, but in conditions of anonymity, it does lead to segmentation and extremism of views across the board". Further his analysis suggested that "deliberations within religion, given that religion is such a huge part of identity and messaging among the youth, becomes a prerequisite for any discussion towards public sphere in Pakistan".

Dr. Sabhia Syed applauded the wide spectrum and depth of presentations. The question-answer session echoed concern on the increasing "Sunni-fication" of Pakistan.

Session IV: Elite transformations & Economic Development

The session was chaired by **Mr. Javed Masood**, a member of the Board of Advisors, CPPG, FC College, Lahore. The speakers included **Dr. Tayyeb Shabbir**, Professor of Finance, California State University & Wharton School, UPenn, whose paper was titled **Entrepreneurship a Panacea for Pakistan: Challenge & opportunities in an elitist economy**; **Dr. Akbar Zaidi**, Professor, Columbia University, New York,

USA who read a paper on [Elite transformation & failed economic development: the case of Pakistan](#); and [Dr. Akmal Hussain](#), Distinguished Professor of Economic, FC College, Lahore whose paper was titled [Demographic change, equitable development & the security challenge](#).



Dr. Tayyeb Shabbir started the session by discussing the idea of entrepreneurship as a panacea for economic development in Pakistan. He argued that under the right set of conditions, entrepreneurship had a great deal to offer Pakistan as a viable economic strategy. According to Shabbir, the three main impacts of entrepreneurship were that it was “pro-growth, pro-sustainability, pro-poverty alleviation”. He particularly focused on a critical analysis of: (a) connection between ‘youth bulge’ and domestic security (b) prospects of re-channeling remittances as sources of funds for entrepreneurship, (c) governance reforms that may be necessary to break the vicious cycle of failure and finally, (d) the promise of e-commerce and implied democratized access to the global market place as a possible antidote to elitism that marked Pakistan’s economy and social structure. He concluded by emphasizing the need for an “enabling environment and proper strategies for successful execution of a very promising opportunity” and looking beyond the simple hope that “the government will do it”.

Dr. Akbar Zaidi then provided an interesting analysis of Pakistan’s elite in the context of their role in development. He argued that as the elite in the country had “evolved and transformed over the past 60 years”, rather than playing a more developmentalist role as it once used to, the elite had “abandoned the pretense to ‘solve’ Pakistan’s development problems”. Zaidi asserted that “the role of elite that led to development, as it does in other countries,

has completely been marginalized” and “until the new elite emerges and consolidates itself, it’s improbable that Pakistan will have any form of economic development”.

Dr. Akmal Hussain was the last speaker of the session. He discussed equitable development as a means for a potential solution to Pakistan’s security and growth challenges. Hussain started with some preliminary growth projections for Pakistan in the next decade, saying that even in the most optimistic scenario, “with employment intensity of growth remaining the same, another 22 million young unemployed people will emerge by the year 2024”. He suggested that Pakistan needed to get on to a new trajectory of livelihood intensive and sustained high economic growth. He analyzed the role of social enterprises and of giving more ownership to the poor in the process of development. Thus articulating a new approach, whereby higher and sustained growth could be achieved by giving access to the middle classes and poor of productive assets, skills, quality education and health within a framework of broad based competition. With this approach, a higher GDP growth could be achieved through equity. He concluded, “by restructuring the growth process so as to make it more equitable, equity can become a means to a much higher and sustained growth.”

Javed Masood, while concluding the session provided a comprehensive overview of development challenges confronting Pakistan and gleaned through some of the options that decision makers could consider.

Session V: Governance and Terrorism

The last session of the conference was chaired by [Prof. Sajjad Naseer](#), Professor, Political Science, Lahore School of Economics, Lahore. The speakers included [Dr. Manzar Zaidi](#), Advisor to UK High Commission in Pakistan, Lahore, whose paper was titled [Challenges & opportunities for designing a counter-terrorism policy](#); [Mr. Amir Rana](#), Director, Pak Institute of Peace Studies (PIPS), Islamabad, who presented a paper titled [In search of a Counter-Terrorism Policy](#); [Dr. Ayesha Siddiq](#), an independent researcher from Islamabad whose paper was titled [Terrorism in a Fragile Limited Access State](#); and lastly [Mr. Raza Rumi](#), Senior Research Fellow, Jinnah Institute, Islamabad who presented the paper [Governance Failures and Terrorism](#).

The session dealt with what were arguably Pakistan's biggest current challenges – terrorism and governance. Zaidi started the session by discounting the relationship between terrorism and governance as a "simple inverse" one. Instead, he described the nature of the relationship between democracy, governance and terrorism as triangular, while suggesting the need for context in developing a counter terrorism strategy. Zaidi argued that the poor regulatory quality of the state and the socio economic crisis greatly impacted Pakistan's quest for security, by providing declining rational choices for the state to act upon. He further argued that the current dialogue or negotiation process between the state and non-state actors had been "little more than cosmetic". In conclusion, he remarked that, "the intelligence led policing model in which we strengthen our police structures to better combat terrorism has been lacking".



Amir Rana then analyzed Pakistan's attempts to develop a counter-terrorism strategy, particularly since the 2013 elections. He highlighted that "the major flaw of connectivity" with a broader counter terrorism strategy continued to persist in the approach of the government towards terrorism. He asserted that the security challenges facing the country would not go away simply because of isolated responses here and there. Instead, a comprehensive counter-terrorism and counter-extremism strategy was required to connect these responses. He particularly emphasized the importance of an informed public opinion, which was badly needed to counter critical threats and concluded by saying that both the state and society needed to combine their strengths to impinge on the ideological and political domain of the extremists.

Ayesha Siddiqua's presentation diverged from the previous two speakers as she ventured to analyze the "why" behind terrorism in Pakistan. Her thesis went beyond issues such as bad governance, poverty and underdevelopment and looked at the nature of state to answer the question of what caused terrorism. Her main argument was that terrorism was intrinsic to the nature of states that failed to maintain monopoly over violence, because this was the tool through which elite interests were negotiated or elite formations were done. She described and projected Pakistan as a fragile limited access order where violence was essential for gaining greater influence, which in turn, was critical to elite interests.

“ ... terrorism was intrinsic to the nature of states that failed to maintain monopoly over violence, because this was the tool through which elite interests were negotiated or elite formations were done. ”

The last speaker of the conference was Raza Rumi who analyzed governance failures and terrorism in Pakistan. He built his argument around the "governance-terrorism nexus" by highlighting that currently 50% of Pakistan's territory constituted ungoverned spaces. Formal institutions were on decline and informal institutions controlled by insurgents, rebels and terror outfits were on the rise. In terms of what needed to be done going forward, he categorized his recommendations in medium and long term. In the medium term, the state: needed to develop a comprehensive national counterterrorism policy and empower its owner, NACTA; develop coordination among intelligence agencies; conduct sub-national reform of the criminal justice system; and constitute an empowered local government. In the long term, there was a need to rethink citizenship in FATA and Baluchistan; address the issues of ungoverned spaces in the country; and enhance parliamentary input into the policy process. Concluding the session, Professor Sajjad Naseer synchronized the diverse views on governance and security, and observed that the presenters and their research had shown a new direction in tackling these issues.

Roundtable:

The conference concluded with a roundtable discussion

among panelists to obtain final comments and thoughts on the conference. Dr. Paula Newberg candidly remarked that the conference sessions had been very rich, robust with respectful discussion, and the tone of narrative was constructive. Some of the questions raised and discussed by the panelists for future discourse were: "What is the direction of nationalism in Pakistan? What do we imagine citizenship to look like? How do different factors affect different regions? What can be done to address the increasing regional/district wise variation? Was the conference sufficiently interdisciplinary? Could some of these issues be combined for more in depth analysis? How does one create a balance between prescriptive and academic research?" These issues were discussed during the roundtable and diversity of views was noteworthy.

“... both the state and society needed to combine their strengths to impinge on the ideological and political domain of the extremists.”

Recommendations:

Overall, the first international conference organized by the CPPG was a much appreciated and successful event. The turnout was significant, and the quality of discussion during the question answer sessions indicated an awareness of the issues under discussion, as well as the need for pertinent policy recommendations going forward. The conference was primarily an academic moot; however, during the discourse, emerged a broad consensus on a number of questions/themes that merit attention of academia, researchers, policy makers and the donor community:

- The importance of Pakistan's regional relationships was highlighted by a number of panelists, particularly in the context of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014. Two relationships in particular were considered critical: Pakistan and India; and Pakistan and Afghanistan. Most of the participants favored cooperative regional approach to security issues.
- The question of identity continues to rouse passions among many in Pakistan. In a time of rapid globalization and rising nationalism, it has become even more important. How do Pakistanis define themselves? What are the challenges to their identity? Since the issue is pivotal, therefore, an inter-disciplinary conference focusing on the theme was strongly favored by the participants.
- Pakistan has been witnessing growing intolerance of religious diversity, and many panelists termed it as "increased Sunni-fication" over the past decade. Most participants seemed to agree that the government has been slow in recognizing sectarianism as a critical security challenge confronting the country. A sizeable number of participants were of the view that the main political parties had been reluctant to develop a counter narrative. Academia, civil society, policy makers, political parties and their leadership were encouraged to band together and contribute towards developing a counter narrative.
- The freedom of the media is still a relatively new phenomenon in Pakistan. Constructive engagement with media (electronic and print) was considered essential for developing a broad-based and inclusive discourse on issues related to socio-economic development; particularly religion, personal freedoms, maintaining balance between security, democracy and political order, citizen rights and building an informed citizenry.

Dialogue Report

Energy Policy & Institutional Coordination

The Centre for Public Policy and Governance (CPPG) had published an issue of the Quarterly Research & News titled *Special Issue on Energy Crises & Policy* in October, 2013. Subsequent to the publication, CPPG held a policy dialogue on "Energy Policy and Institutional Coordination" on January 30, 2014 to collectively deliberate on the issues, and develop a consensus on the way forward. Professionals from International Power Producers (IPP), Power Distribution Companies (DISCO), Energy Department of Punjab, Federal and Azad Kashmir Government, energy planning consultancies, and energy technology firm participated in the dialogue.

During the policy dialogue, a broad consensus emerged among the experts on the following key points: one, lack of an integrated policy, planning, implementation and management had resulted in gross inefficiencies; two, though additional power generation capacity was required to bridge the supply demand gap, still the resolution of energy crisis demanded improving governance of the sector; three, the government needed to pay close attention to the market structure and set planning priorities accordingly; four, the government needed to rationalize the legal and regulatory framework, and develop institutional capacity through competent leadership, effective corporate governance and human resource development.

The participants were presented with the following set of questions, dialogue and discussion ensued and evoked responses were recorded as under:

Is Power Policy 2013 sufficient or does lack of an integrated policy adversely affect the sector? The non-public sector participants agreed that the Power Policy 2013 was overly ambitious and unrealistic. For example, the objective of building stated number of hydro power plants by the year 2020 was unrealistic, as a hydroelectric plant needed at least 10 years to build. It was suggested that the government needed to build political consensus, set clear goals, assess the costs that these projects entailed and show commitment to achieve these goals. It was underscored that the power sector constituted only 18% of total energy needs of Pakistan, and its woes were directly linked to the underlying energy mix. Therefore, the desired

energy mix of coal, nuclear, gas, oil and renewable sources should be developed based on the overall energy needs. It was also thought that the public-private mix in terms of exploration, generation, transmission and distribution should be part of the larger energy plan.

“ ... integrated planning required correct demand projection estimates inclusive of industrial growth, and demographic and behavioral changes. ”

Intensive consultation was recommended between the federal and provincial governments to dispel any misperceptions, so that policy along with the execution plan could be adopted. In that spirit creation of a National Energy Authority was recommended.

Is there a need for a new energy plan or can earlier plans be used? Integrated Power Plans of 1994 and 2011, and Integrated Energy Plan of 2005 had been made by professionals using sophisticated planning tools, soft-wares, rigorous analysis and due deliberation. These minimal cost plans articulated the energy mix based on achievable goals and suggested sites for new projects among other concrete recommendations to achieve the defined goals. The government need not start from scratch but build on the above stated plans and concentrate on implementation of an integrated energy plan and least cost power generation plan. But integrated planning required correct demand projection estimates inclusive of industrial growth, and demographic and behavioral changes. The real unconstrained demand in Pakistan was 25,000 MW against the production of 11,000 MW. Thus, any integrated plan should include an energy conservation plan.

What are the major governance issues of the Energy Sector? Executing the ambitious policy objective of Power Policy 2013 and good governance of the energy sector in general was dependent on having a competent team, which could conduct informed decision making; take ownership of the decisions and could be held accountable for them. Current team was devoid of these, because of a lack of concentrated effort on the part of the government. The

current Minister for Water and Power had to divide his time between multiple ministerial portfolios. Further, personnel occupying key positions were not permanent such as Secretary Water and Power, and top managerial positions in NTDC. Thus, the top management was reluctant to make important decisions, avoiding both ownership and responsibility for the posts they occupied. There were also too many decision-makers given the organizational structure of the sector. This would not be a problem in the presence of a strong regulatory authority but NEPRA had been without a chairman for about a year now and its role as a regulatory body epitomized poor management mainly attributed to incompetent and insufficient human capital.

Coordination among various federal departments and between provincial and federal departments needed to be improved. CCI as an overall governing body could be made more effective by defining clear Terms of References. Judiciary was another important actor as court's delay in decisions could indefinitely delay tariff determination impacting the whole sector. Given the ongoing and continuous process of litigation in the sector, it was important to improve the awareness of the court so that cases could be systematically organized and dispensed with according to their severity.

DISCOs played a central role in the power system. Thus, improved governance and management of DISCOs was critical in resolving the Circular Debt problem. This required that the quality of human resource in DISCOs was enhanced and its top leadership had the necessary corporate management experience rather than distribution engineering skills. Additionally, inconsistency in appointments in government institutions as well as lack of security of tenure further impacted the performance and productivity of the leadership as well as of the institution. Entities like LESCO had become notorious as their leadership appointment had become a game of musical chairs, and same was the case with the management and the Board.

What is required to improve the regulatory enabling environment? The Punjab Government representative stated that the sector was overregulated and there was a need to rationalize the various regulations in place to ensure the existence of an enabling environment for the private sector. This should include the rationalization of various

laws including the colonial administration's Electricity Act 1910, the WAPDA Act, the NEPRA Act 1997 among others, and constitutional guarantees including the 18th Amendment that resulted in contradictory legal dispensations.

“ ... power sector constituted only 18% of total energy needs of Pakistan, and its woes were directly linked to the underlying energy mix. ”

There was a broad consensus among the participants for a shift from the single buyer model to the multiple buyer model. This required that initially the Central Power Purchasing Agency (CPPA), which was currently tasked as the sole purchaser of power be made independent of NTDC, followed by introduction of a multi-buyer culture, whereby a DISCO was able to directly buy power from a generation company. This arrangement was part of the roadmap when WAPDA was unbundled, however neither the license had been followed nor the power sector had matured to allow this transition. Thus other than regulatory allowance, DISCOs should be required to develop their expertise and resources to make the transition to a competitive market-based multiple buyer system, as a policy.

In the 18th amendment, electricity was made a federal subject with the implication that all provinces would have to follow the uniform tariff rule. The federation could not charge a different tariff from two different regions owing to political issues even though bill collection and losses varied across them. However, the participants argued for a differential tariff, so that each province or DISCO could charge a different tariff based on its own performance.

Is cost of energy linked to sector's governance or only to the energy mix? Cost of electricity against the affordability of the consumer was highlighted as one of the most important issues as high costs translating into high tariff of electricity only led to increased theft, a plague which was already extremely difficult to control. The current government's measures to control theft through police had not worked. Instead, there was a need to develop an integrated theft control strategy inclusive of Smart Meters, institutional accountability and better law enforcement mechanisms. Thus, the underlying energy mix, efficiency of GENCOs and DISCOs, and preferences in new

projects became important in the context of energy costs.

In terms of generation, while the efficiency level of IPP furnace oil plants stood at 38%, GENCOs including Jamshoro and Muzaffargarh instead ran at an efficiency level of only 25%. This gap could be bridged through competent management and rehabilitation of existing government owned plants. Similarly in terms of distribution, although NEPRA had given a directive to all DISCOs to conduct a technical losses evaluation study, only a few DISCOs had actually done the study while none had executed a plan to minimize the losses.

“... argued for a differential tariff, so that each province or DISCO could charge a different tariff based on its own performance.”

Hydropower was without question the cheapest form of electricity production and thus should be given the highest priority. Though alternate energy sources like wind and solar should be part of the solution, their efficiency and cost needed to be kept in mind in terms of planning. Solar plants utilized approximately 17% of the total plant capacity while wind power plants capacity factor was 28 to 30% depending on the wind corridor. Thus these sources were expensive in terms of cost and their generation seasonal.

It was also observed that the price of energy needed to be rationalized to incentivize efficient generation. For example, the cost of gas to boilers was cheaper than to Turbine Cogen which was 20% more efficient than boilers, thus inadvertently discouraging use of a more efficient technology.

Is privatization a panacea for energy security? The process of WAPDA's unbundling that began in 1994 conceived of private independent entities regulated by NEPRA. However, this process was stalled and currently these companies including DISCOs and GENCOs were more like subsidiaries of the Ministry of Water & Power rather than independent entities. The Secretary Water & Power and the head of PEPCO were known to give regular directions to DISCOs as if they were subsidiary businesses, and were deeply involved in appointments and postings, while the member

of their BODs were also appointed on political basis by the Federal Government. Moreover, the employee union of DISCOs and GENCOs were still linked with WAPDA even though on paper, they were independent companies.

Participants were of the view that all DISCOs and GENCOs should be made private limited companies in the true sense, such that they were completely independent of PEPCO, and could take their own strategic decisions to improve their efficiency under qualified and competent leadership. But privatization required an effective and credible regulatory body as a pre-requisite.

What are the issues involved in starting new hydropower projects? Hydropower projects were critical in resolving Pakistan energy crises because of their low power production costs and because Pakistan enjoyed a huge hydel potential. For example, Azad Jammu & Kashmir (AJK) has a 9,000 MW potential for hydropower. Of this, 3,800 MW projects had been assigned to IPPs but few had actually been established. The participants raised the following issues regarding the underutilization of hydropower. One, IPPs were reluctant to invest in hydel power because it involved large and long-term investment as an average hydel plant took 6–7 years as compared to 2–3 years for a thermal plant. Thus, the state would have to invest itself rather than waiting for IPPs. Two, the federation must respect the constitutional guarantees of the provinces by paying them the obligated net hydel profit as its non-payment led to a lack of confidence among provinces. In case of AJK and Gilgit Baltistan which were not constitutional provinces, the centre should follow the same standards as of other provinces. Additionally, local people needed to be provided the first rights of water for irrigation and those displaced needed to be fully compensated for their property, and rehabilitated. Three, to fully tap the hydro power potential of the North, integrated planning including long term transmission requirements was required else there was a risk that transmission corridors would be blocked and become unable to bring power for future projects.

What are the issues involved in attracting private sector investment? A participant indicated that according to the Power Policy 2013, Pakistan needed about \$80 billion investment in the next 10 years to fulfill its energy needs. In this regard, the participants agreed that while private investors may make investments in 200–400MW power

plants, the larger projects would have to be in the public sector domain. Thus, the role of the private sector should be enhanced by encouraging investments in smaller plants, and the following issues were articulated to facilitate this process. One, an approved integrated energy plan vetted by the regulatory body with suggested sites, would facilitate investors to make informed investment decisions by increasing the transparency of the system and shortening the approval process. Two, while the Board of Investments was able to bring private investors, still lack of a functional one-window operation led to impediments in the process as there was a disconnect between policies and institutions of the province and the center. Additionally, the center did not accept the letter of intent or sovereign guarantees of provincial government. Three, distributed responsibilities and lack of coordination between multiple institutions was a serious impediment for the investors as it made for a complex environment for project approval. Four, Wheeling was a mechanism by which a private party could produce power at one location and use it at another location. Although a Wheeling policy existed, NEPRA took a long time to process a Wheeling charge application while the DISCOs discouraged it all together, leading to its non-use. Thus, a decision on a blanket Wheeling charge calculation at all KV levels, which was approved by DISCOs and NTDC would spur investment by the private sector.

An assessment of existing initiatives by the Punjab Government: There was a detailed discussion on new projects announced by the Punjab government. The government representative argued that the pace of work on both the 1000 MW solar project and the Punjab Coal Initiative 2014 indicated the political will of the Punjab government to successfully execute the projects. The Punjab government had selected the sites, involved independent experts, and made every effort to coordinate with all departments and the power purchaser to implement the plan. But other participants highlighted the following issues suggesting that the Punjab government should instead follow well-thought out energy plans made by professionals and involve both professionals as well as departments in a consultative decision-making process rather than merely assigning them the responsibility of project implementation. One, for the 1000 MW solar project, the capacity factor was only 17% and a 220 KV network was required for power evacuation, which required a huge investment

increasing the cost of generation. Instead, the global trend was to build small solar power plants of 10-15 MW in various locations and embed them in the distribution system. This way existing transmission and distribution system could be utilized. Two, the 1200 MW coal power plant in Sahiwal was poorly planned because it would require 50 trains per day to transport coal from the coast, which the current railway system and port facilities would be unable to support. Additionally, the cost of diesel would also push up the basket price. Instead, a coal power plant at Gadani was the practical option as power could be generated at the coast and transmitted through the network.

List of Participants

Mr. Hassan Jaffer Zaidi	CEO Power Planners International (PPI)
Mrs. Saniya Awais	Managing Director, Punjab Power Development Board Government of Punjab
Mr. Shahid Khan	Chief Executive Pakgen Power Limited, A Nishaat Company
Mr. Abid Lodhi	Ex-CFO LESCO
Syed Mubashar Masood	Ex-Legal Director, LESCO
Mr. Arif Alauddin	Managing Director Enercon, Government of Pakistan
Mr. Munawar B. Ahmad	CEO EMR Consult
Mr. Omar Zafarullah	Country Manager Turbomach - A Caterpillar Company
Mr. Mushtaq Gorfi	Managing Director, AJK Hydro Electric Board
Dr. Saeed Shafiqat	Professor & Director, Centre for Public Policy and Governance

:Dr. Sikandar Hayat, Distinguished Professor of History and Public Policy, Forman Christian College and author of the book, *The Charismatic Leader: Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah and the Creation of Pakistan*, was invited to deliver a talk on [The Charismatic Leadership of Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah](#) on March 20, 2013.



Dr. Hayat began his talk by drawing upon the German sociologist, Max Weber's theoretical work on charisma. Weber had identified two perspectives on charisma. In his later writings on 'charismatic leadership', Weber conceptualized it as rational-ascetic type of leadership as opposed to his earlier orthodox concept of charismatic leader as an emotional demagogue. The First World War and particularly the irresponsible and irrational leadership of Wilhelm II had helped change his mind. He now promoted the concept of a rational sober leader who had both a sense of 'responsibility and proportion', along with 'passions', but tempered with 'reason'. Thus, only a leader who could stand the test of reason and rationality was a charismatic leader.

Weber stressed that charismatic leadership was a function both of personality and circumstances- a situation which necessitated its emergence. Leadership was thus not simply a personal quality as both personality and the situation together constituted political leadership particularly of the charismatic type. In fact, Weber identified and explained three kinds of leadership. One, a 'traditional leadership' which was obeyed out of traditional beliefs and habit due to kings, tribal chiefs and feudal lords. Two, a 'charismatic leadership' which was obeyed due to the exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person. In other words, because a leader inspired and moved people. Third, a 'legal-rational leadership' obeyed for its legitimate authority because people

believed in the legality of rules, and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules. In this scheme of things, charismatic leadership was meant to be a transitory form of leadership; a transition from traditional to legal-rational authority.

Hayat stated that Weber had defined charisma as "a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities. These are such as not accessible to the ordinary person but are regarded as of divine origin or exemplary and on the basis of which an individual concerned is treated as a leader". Based on the above stated two perspectives, the earlier emotional and the later rational, Weber's account of the salient features of charisma was as follows: one, charisma depended on 'recognition' by followers and thus no recognition meant no followers; two, recognition meant 'complete personal devotion' to the leader, born out of 'enthusiasm, despair and hope' in a crisis-like situation; three, the leader must have the heroic quality of passion which must be tempered by reason and sense of responsibility; four, the leader must be sober and rational, otherwise it would be a case of 'false' charisma; five, a leader must be devoted to his 'cause' and the only one who could lead 'in spite of all' because of his true 'calling' for politics; six, the leader must be an organizational person and should work for his vocation i.e., politics through an organization such as, a political party to promote his cause and accomplish his mission; seven, the leader must be economically independent of the income politics can bring him such that politics cannot be his primary source of income; eight, the leader must demonstrate 'proof' of his charismatic power because if unsuccessful for long, or above all if his leadership failed to benefit his followers, "it is likely that his charismatic authority will disappear".

Hayat then presented a systematic, operational framework for the study of charismatic leadership, a combination of both personality-related and situational factors. In terms of personal attributes, a charismatic leader required the following personality characteristics: one, he needed to be perceived by the followers to possess exceptional, extraordinary personal qualities; two, he must have the ability to offer to the followers a way out of their difficult, distressful situation, 'a formula' for their salvation; three, he must


have an absolute faith in himself, his mission and the cause he espoused; four, he must have a sober, rational character – passionate but with reason; and lastly he must have the ability to manifest his charisma before attaining actual power. Further, the situational factors included: one, the followers were confronted with difficulties, crisis, or maybe a set of crises; two, the followers were lost, frustrated and in a state of despair; three, the followers wanted a way out of their distressful situation.

In the light of the aforementioned theoretical framework, Hayat then proceeded to analyze the charismatic personality of Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah during the creation of Pakistan, the distressful situation of Muslims in India, and how Jinnah indeed delivered on his formula, the separate state of Pakistan for the salvation of the Muslims.

“... charismatic leadership was a function both of personality and circumstances...”

Discussing Jinnah's Personality, Hayat articulated a number of points in light of the charismatic leadership framework. One, Jinnah was a man absolutely sure of himself and of his cause, the Muslim cause, and particularly the Pakistan demand, after the adoption of the Lahore Resolution in March 1940. He had immense faith in himself and “never courted popularity”. He told one of his political rivals, “You try to find out what will please people and then you act accordingly. My way of action is different. I first decide what is right and do it. Then people come around me and the opposition vanishes”. It was precisely because of this conviction that nothing could detract him from his mission. He could “neither be bought nor cajoled; neither be influenced nor trapped into a position that he had not himself decided upon”. Two, Jinnah not only could feel Muslim aspirations but he was the only Muslim leader of India who could express, aggregate and articulate these aspirations in concrete propositions whether in the form of his ‘Fourteen Points’, or eventually in the demand for Pakistan. None of his opponents and particularly the ‘nationalist’ Muslims, who were pro-Congress, could offer any viable alternative to Pakistan for the protection of Muslim rights and interests in India. Three, Jinnah was a

constitutionalist and a lawyer who was ideally suited to negotiations with the British to secure the interests of Muslims in the final phase of the freedom struggle. He was part of almost all constitutional deliberations of India, be it inside the assembly or outside, whether between the Muslim League and the Congress or between the League, Congress, and the British. Four, Jinnah was a sober, rational leader, not a demagogue. He always “avoided the display of emotion in public”. This did not mean that he was devoid of passions. He believed passionately in his cause of Pakistan. Indeed, he was to “hasten his death to a cause to which he gave his will and logic, as passionately as Gandhi led his disciples, with zeal and intuition”. Five, Jinnah was a keen organizer in public life. Nothing was to be taken for granted or left to chance. He never operated outside party routine and discipline. His entire political life revolved around parties, the Congress, Home Rule League, and eventually the Muslim League, after 1913.



Six, Jinnah was a keen strategist who knew fully well when to take the tide and when to make amends. He always knew his limitations as well as the weak points of his opponents. Thus through his ‘unrivalled tactical skill’, he was able to take advantage of every situation, however ‘unpromising’. The mistakes of the Congress, for instance, helped him to “convince the vast majority of the Muslims that Congress rule meant Hindu domination”. The mistakes of British rulers who underrated him and his cause by insisting that his Pakistan demand was “a deliberate overbid”, cost them dearly. In the end, they were forced

to concede to Pakistan despite their vehement opposition to the partition of India. Seven, Jinnah was a man of character. Almost all of his contemporaries in politics saw him as “a man of high integrity, principles, sincerity, honesty, incorruptibility and honour”. Dr. Syed Hussain, a nationalist Muslim and Congress Minister, who was opposed to the idea of Pakistan swore publicly: “Though I am opposed to Pakistan, I must say that Mr. Jinnah is the only man in public life whose public record is incorruptible. You cannot buy him by money or by offer of post. He has not gained anything from the British.” Eight, Jinnah was one of the self-sufficient, indeed rich political leaders of India. His primary source of income was his enormous legal practice. Thus, as a charismatic leader, as Weber suggested in his formulation of the concept, he was “economically independent of the income politics can bring him”. In fact, Jinnah himself contributed to the activities of the League.

Elaborating upon the situational factors, Hayat emphasized that Jinnah’s political struggle, especially after his return to India in 1935 from his self-imposed exile in London, was meant to address the distressful situation of Muslim India as the Hindu majority community, led by Congress, advanced towards self-government and freedom. Some of the main difficulties explaining the distressful situation of Muslims in India were as follows.

“Almost all of his contemporaries in politics saw him as “a man of high integrity, principles, sincerity, honesty, incorruptibility and honour”.”

Hindu-Muslim Communalism: Hindu-Muslim communalism reflected in the religio-cultural differences between the Hindus and Muslims had a major impact on the political life and processes in India. In spite of Jinnah and other Muslim leaders’ efforts to promote Hindu-Muslim unity, the two communities remained distinct and indeed became mutually hostile as India began to advance towards freedom. The prospects of a Hindu-majority government in India agitated the Muslims and reinforced their fear of being overwhelmed by the system. The Congress’s failure to accommodate the Muslim League in the provincial governments in 1937-39, particularly in the UP where the League did fairly well, alarmed the Muslims and made

them insecure and helpless, indeed suggesting to them that the partition of India and a separate homeland was the only viable alternative to communal conflict between the Hindus and the Muslims in India.

The Constitutional Problem: The representative system of government introduced by the British in India through its various constitutional reforms, i.e., the 1909 Act, the 1919 Act, and the 1935 Act made the Muslims a ‘minority’ in India, and a permanent one at that. The system, based on numbers, was inherently biased towards the majority community, the Hindus, and there was nothing the Muslims could ever do about it. They were a minority community, and in ‘democracies, majorities rule’. But, as Jinnah put it, the Muslims were not prepared to submit to a “government with the Hindu majority and Hindu rule throughout the country.”

“... prospects of a Hindu-majority government in India agitated the Muslims and reinforced their fear of being overwhelmed by the system.”

The Devolution of British Authority in India: The British rule in India rested on their physical strength and resources to hold their “prized possession.” Steadily their power to coerce began to erode. Although the British were able to put down the challenges to their authority during the Khilafat and the ‘Quit India’ movements, they found it extremely difficult after the Second World War to resort to arbitrary use of power to put India down. In September 1946, the Viceroy, Lord Wavell, was willing to concede that, “on administrative grounds we could not govern the whole of India for more than a year and a half now... the withdrawal should be completed not later than the spring of 1948”. However, the Second World War alone did not terminate British rule but an increasing loss of legitimacy added to their woes. From 1858 Act to 1935 Act, the British had come up with constitutional reforms, to associate Indians in the system of government in order to legitimize their rule, but it did not help anymore. Paradoxically, however, each constitutional advance proved to be a major step towards the devolution of British authority in India. In turn, this transfer of power strained Hindu-Muslim relations, as one British author put it: “The fact is that the more we delegate our authority to the natives of India on

the principles which we associate with self-government, the more we must necessarily in practice delegate it to the Hindus, who make the majority, however much we may try to protect the rights and interests of the Muhammadan minority." Indeed, the more the process of devolution proceeded and more the prospects of British withdrawal became imminent, the more the conflicts between Hindus and Muslims increased. The anticipated freedom not only moved the Muslims towards a greater realization for their rights and interests, it also fanned their old, lingering fear of Hindu domination. This was the herald of a crisis in which the Muslims having lost power to the British, in the wake of 1857 Uprising, were now confronted to the possibility of losing it permanently to the Hindus in independent India.

The Leadership Crisis: The Muslim leadership in India was composed of: one, the social elites such as, the nobility, gentry and land owners; two, provincial leaders of the Muslim-majority provinces; and three, the ulama, particularly the ulama of Deoband associated with the Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Hind. The social elites were patronized and promoted by the British. They were given special representation in the legislative councils under various constitutional reforms. Though the social elites took advantage of their favorable position to advance Muslim interests, they could not offer any long-term solution to the Muslim predicament in India. Thus, the Muslim masses found little comfort in the status-quo oriented politics of the social elites. In addition, the pro-British policies could hardly allay Muslim fears and apprehensions as the Hindu majority led by the Congress advanced towards the goal of freedom of India.

The provincial leaders were a product of the system of 'dyarchy' introduced in 1919 and reinforced by the 1935 Act, the grant of provincial autonomy, and were a formidable force in Muslim politics. However, once the British, during the Second World War, were forced to enter into negotiations with the Indians, with the League and the Congress, the two all-India organizations at the centre, the provincial leaders were pushed out of the main stage. Ultimately they could not even play a decisive role in provincial matters, let alone in the politics of India as a whole, as became evident in the division of Punjab and Bengal.

“ ... charismatic leaders were not born in a vacuum. They emerged when there were many leaders around but could not deliver, ”

The ulama were a product of the traditional madrasa school system and were custodians of religious learning and values. However, the Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Hind, established in 1919 committed themselves to 'composite nationalism' without really understanding the long-term implications of such a concept for Muslims, the rise of Hindu nationalism, Hindutva being a case in point. In fact, they were more concerned with "safeguards against interference with the Sharia" rather than the political future of the Muslims.

Hayat argued that there was no denying that the traditional Muslim political leadership, as a whole, failed to produce any farsighted leader who could understand the difficulties faced by the Muslims and show them a way out. He pointed out that charismatic leaders were not born in a vacuum. They emerged when there were many leaders around but could not deliver, leading the people to turn towards a charismatic leader as their ultimate savior. Rather than a dearth of leaders, it was the special quality possessed by the charismatic leader coinciding with the crisis like situation that led him to emerge from the lot as a distinct leader.



Jinnah's Formula and the Creation of Pakistan: Jinnah, after exploring formulas meant to help the Muslims, the latest being his 'Fourteen Points', declared on 22 March 1940 at the annual session of the Muslim League in Lahore that the only way Indian Muslims could survive and

“develop to the fullest their spiritual cultural economic, social and political life” was to have their own “home-lands, their territory and their state”. On 23 March 1940, the League endorsed Jinnah’s formula of a separate state for the Muslim nation and, in a resolution, adopted on 24 March resolved that “geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted, with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are a majority, as in the North-Western and Eastern zones of India, should be grouped to constitute ‘Independent States’ in which the constituent units will be autonomous and sovereign”. Jinnah’s formula, as given in the Lahore Resolution, had tremendous appeal for the Muslims as it ensured them physical protection and political survival as well as an independent political community, free to shape its own destiny according to its own religion, culture and norms. They enthusiastically supported him and, in the process, validated his status as a charismatic leader of Muslim India. But Jinnah knew that he had to get everybody to agree to the formula he had now resolved upon. He had to make a strategy to mobilize the Muslims for the creation of Pakistan.

“ Jinnah also took advantage of Congress’ absence from the political scene during the ‘Quit India’ movement to secure the support of pro-Congress Muslims. ”

Jinnah launched his strategy of political mobilization based on a number of systematic moves. In the first instance, he modified the organizational structure of the Muslim League to make room for the newly mobilized social groups such as, the educated urban middle classes, who had responded very positively to the demand for Pakistan. Jinnah followed this up by concentrating powers in the hands of the President of the Muslim League so that the party could emerge as ‘the sole representative body’ of the Muslims of India. In addition, he planned a mass mobilization campaign to reach all groups and classes of Muslim society. Finally, Jinnah decided to make the most of the ongoing war (the Second World War), with the Congress not cooperating with the British and making many mistakes in the process, to help win the support of

reluctant Muslims. For instance, Jinnah took advantage of the Congress’ resignation of its ministries in the provinces in protest against the British declaration of war in 1939, and went on to install League ministries in Assam, Bengal, Sind, and NWFP provinces. The League badly needed these provinces to strengthen its claim on Pakistan. The Punjab was already on board through Jinnah-Sikandar Pact. Jinnah also took advantage of Congress’ absence from the political scene during the ‘Quit India’ movement to secure the support of pro-Congress Muslims. This was amply proven in the 1945-46 elections with the Muslim League bagging all 30 seats in the Central Legislative Assembly. The League did equally well in the provinces, especially in the Punjab, where it won an overwhelming majority. This electoral victory, though immensely critical, represented for all practical purposes the halfway mark on the road to Pakistan.

Jinnah also had to force the British to concede the demand for Pakistan. The British had opposed the Pakistan demand because of their considerable economic, strategic and political interest in a united India and thus wanted to retain the unity of India at all costs. Hindu leaders considered the territorial integrity of India as the very essence of Hinduism. They saw the partition of India as “vivisection-cutting the baby into two halves.” Thus the creation of Pakistan was not to be an easy task and Jinnah had to make the most of his leadership abilities and skills to work for Pakistan. He had to furnish proof of his charismatic power. Jinnah found the war conditions ideally suited to his task. Especially in the early years, the British were on retreat in Singapore, Malaya (Malaysia), and Burma (Myanmar). The Congress was in political wilderness following the resignation of its ministries in 1939. Jinnah’s wartime strategy was to advance the case of Pakistan as much as he could. The British sought cooperation, not opposition to the war. Jinnah understood this better than the Congress. Thus he decided to cooperate, but only selectively, at the provincial level since it would help reinforce the League in the Muslim-majority provinces. He would cooperate fully only if the British conceded the demand for Pakistan first. Eventually the British had no option but to conciliate him and responded in 1940 in the form of the August Offer, which assured the Muslims that the British could not impose a system of government upon “unwilling minorities”. This assurance was an important victory for Jinnah.

This was followed by the Cripps Proposals of 1942, conceding the 'non-acceding Provinces' the same status as that of the Indian Union, thus advancing the cause of Pakistan further. The Cabinet Mission Plan of 1946, comprising Muslim-majority areas in its Sections B and C, ensured that the Muslims could reach their "goal and establish Pakistan." Congress' attempt at manipulating the plan prompted Jinnah to reject it eventually, indeed resorting to 'Direct Action' to achieve Pakistan. The result was foregone. There were communal riots all over the country, creating a civil-war like situation. On 3 June 1947, the British government was constrained to announce the Partition Plan, and after the division of the Punjab and Bengal under the plan, Pakistan came into being on 14 August 1947. On 15 August 1947, Jinnah took oath of office as the first Governor-General of Pakistan.

In conclusion, Hayat stressed that Jinnah succeeded in his mission because he offered a despaired people at a particularly distressful moment in their history, a charismatic leadership with an abiding faith in himself as well as the cause that he espoused. Various stages in the struggle for Pakistan clearly demonstrated "the really decisive role that Jinnah played at various junctures and in its emergence". But for him, the struggle for Pakistan could well have been lost, Hayat concluded.

Subsequent to the talk, a question and answer session ensued. A question was raised regarding what happened after a charismatic leader and how, if possible, a successor was created. Hayat responded that, according to Weber, charisma was never entirely transferred as it was essentially a personal attribute. It could only be partially transferred, but this required a conscious effort on the part of the charismatic leader to 'routinize' it in an institution or person. In the struggle for Pakistan, Jinnah's charisma was routinized in the League. In the post-independence phase, after Jinnah's assumption of the office of the Governor-General and after relinquishing the presidentship of the League, this charisma was transferred to the state of Pakistan. Jinnah's charisma was thus routinized in the state of Pakistan as Pakistan and Jinnah were inseparable.


Replying to a question, whether charismatic attributes varied in different societies, cultures and traditions, Hayat stated that charisma would always be rooted in the ratio-

nality and sobriety of the person, regardless of culture and society, but its outward manifestation would be reflected by the cultural norms and symbolism of the society that the leader belonged to.

Responding to a question pertaining to the place of religious minorities in a state created on the basis of a religion, Hayat argued that Muslim nationalism in India was a blend of both modern and traditional norms. On the one hand, it promoted the modern concept of nationalism based on the rights and interests of Indian Muslims as one nation. On the other hand, it stressed the tradition and ideological character of Islam. The reconciliation of the two, that is, nationalism and Islam, in the demand for Pakistan, as a nation-state, made room for all communities, including the minorities residing in Pakistan, as "citizens of this State with equal rights, privileges and obligations". Jinnah's views on the constitution and the character of the state were absolutely clear. He was neither interested in theocracy nor secularism. He left it to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan to decide what type of system or constitution they wanted for the country. He only hoped that it will be a "democratic type, embodying the essential principles of Islam."

“ ... Jinnah succeeded in his mission because he offered a despaired people at a particularly distressful moment in their history, a charismatic leadership with an abiding faith in himself as well as the cause that he espoused. ”

:Dr. Ishtiaq Ahmed, former Professor at the Department of Political Science, Stockholm University (1987-2007), currently Visiting Professor at the Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS) and author of the book *Pakistan: The Garrison State, Origins, Evolution, Consequences (1947-2011)*, was invited to deliver a talk on [Pakistan: Signposts of a Garrison State](#) at the Centre for Public Policy & Governance on November 2



Dr. Ahmed began his talk by stating that the modernist Muslims led the movement for Pakistan, however, immediately after its inception it acquired the overtones of an ideological Islamic State. Reconciling the Muslim nationalist identity with the Islamic identity became a challenge and continues to be debated. With the onslaught of 9/11 and what followed, Pakistan acquired the unenviable reputation of the 'epicenter of international terrorism'. Furthermore, military's deepening involvement in the internal and external affairs of the country led some analysts to label it as the 'Deep State'.

Tracing the origins of militancy, donor-dependency and evolving civil-military relations, Ahmed gave a historical overview of Pakistani politics. He argued that American involvement in South Asian politics was via China where they were supporting the Kuomintang against the winning communists. Thus, America desired a strong united India against the threat of communist China, and was opposed to the idea of Pakistan. He made an interesting observa-

tion by claiming that the US President, Roosevelt was a committed liberal who was against creating a state in the name of religion. While, the Soviet Union saw Mahatma Gandhi's non-violent position as counter revolutionary, and thus supported Pakistan with its emphasis on Islamic socialism and justice.

Ahmed then went on to elaborate on his theoretical framework of 'Post-colonial Garrison State' and how it applied to Pakistan both historically and contemporaneously. Referring to Harold Lasswell, he stated that 'Garrison State' was a multifaceted concept characterized by the military dominating the state in all sectors of life. He traced the origins of Garrison State in real or imaginary foreign threat, and thus perpetual insecurity that encouraged military dominance. He then invoked Hamza Alvi's concept of 'Post-colonial State' which contended that an overdeveloped state dominated an underdeveloped society. He argued that it bore similarity to a neo-Marxist standpoint derived from classic Marxist theory of state which considered state merely as an instrument of the ruling class. Pakistan had a bureaucratic military oligarchy that represented institutions of a national character. Civil bureaucracy and the military constituted an oligarchy in which the military increasingly was to be the senior partner. The Post-colonial Garrison State was a synthesis of these two concepts in which a military came to dominate the state by emphasizing the fear of foreign aggression while successfully finding donors willing to train and arm it.

“... exorbitant defense expenditure had depleted the resources that could have been dedicated to a human development agenda...”

Discussing Pakistan's donor dependency, he stated that in the 1950's when Nehru said that he would pursue non-alignment-- not ally with the US or Soviet Union, the US turned to Pakistan. The first consignment of arms and aid arrived in 1951, which was a mere \$10 million while Pakistan had asked for \$2 billion, he claimed. Over time, as Cold War intensified, Pakistan became more important and worthy for the US. In 1954, the first formal military agreement between US-Pakistan was made followed by

another agreement in 1959. Though there was no mention of India in the main agreement, supplementary documents from the US State Department stated that under no circumstance should arms be used in a war with India. This became clear when Pakistan and India went to war in 1965. US imposed an arms embargo on Pakistan, as the US wanted Pakistan as an ally but not at the cost of its friendship with India. This prompted Pakistan to deepen friendly relations with China, which had an adversarial relationship towards India. The third country that Pakistan was heavily reliant on was Saudi Arabia. With Khomeini's accession to power, the contest to lead the Muslim world began between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Due to majority Sunni population, Pakistan had leaned towards Saudi Arabia. In conclusion, such relationships not only created political and economic dependency but also brought along cultural and ideological dependency resulting in the rise of sectarianism and militancy.

“ military came to dominate the state by emphasizing the fear of foreign aggression while successfully finding donors willing to train and arm it. ”

Dr. Ahmed then narrated major historical events to trace the origins of the Garrison State. The serious leadership crises post Jinnah and Liaquat led the civil services to dominate from 1951-58. General Ayub's 1958 military coup achieved considerable economic growth but East Pakistan developed grievances about its share. The 1965 war with India redefined patriotism while the secession of East Pakistan was wholly blamed on Indian intervention rather than a measured and balanced assessment of where Pakistan went wrong. Under Prime Minister Z.A. Bhutto, a consensus constitution was formulated which had more Islamic clauses than any earlier constitution of Pakistan. Zia shepherded Islamization and implementation of blasphemy and Hudood laws; the Iranian revolution ushered in Islamic fundamentalism, and lastly, the Afghan Jihad radicalized the whole region giving birth to many Kashmir, Afghan & Al-Qaeda militant groups. According to him, the 1988 elections did restore democracy, however, he described the era of 1988-2008 as that of the 'Deep State'.

In conclusion, he stated that Pakistan had followed the trajectory of an overdeveloped and overspending state, which facilitated the ascent of military. The exorbitant defense expenditure had depleted the resources that could have been dedicated to a human development agenda, and this primacy of security over education has been very costly. He underscored the primacy of economics over ideology and called for abandoning patronage of the Taliban.

Suggesting a way forward, he argued that Pakistan needed to radically revise its priorities; it should seek peace through normalization of relations with India and Afghanistan; through SAARC-- trade, tourism, and creation of a conducive climate for domestic investment. Focus on humanitarian issues of floods, water scarcity, climate change and population growth.

During the question answer session, asked if the concept of Garrison State included an element of ideology? He responded that Ideology was part of the Garrison State as it celebrated military might and power. He hastened to add that the ideological dimension dominated the most in Pakistan, and was essential to the survival of its Garrison State nature.

Answering a question, whether Pakistan could survive purely through internal rent seeking, he responded that Pakistan was still largely dependent on remittances and foreign lending. It was dependent on the US, China and Saudi Arabia for economic assistance and would likely to remain so unless we produced an internal economic base for the Garrison State.

“ ...ideological dimension dominated the most in Pakistan, and was essential to the survival of its Garrison State nature. ”

:Dr. Roger Begrich, a legal, political and medical anthropologist, and post doctoral fellow at the Institute for European Global Studies, University of Basel, Switzerland, was invited to deliver a talk on **Marginality and the State: A Case Study of Jharkhand, India** at the CPPG on March 19, 2014.



Dr. Begrich began his talk by stating that he had employed an anthropological approach to study the state, its interaction with citizens and used qualitative and ethnographic methods of research. Elaborating, he presented the anthropologist's conceptualization of state. According to him, Radcliffe Brown defined the state as an entity over and above human individuals making up society, with the attributes of sovereignty and will embodied by state law. Philip Abrams viewed the state primarily as an instrument of legitimate disinterested domination. Gupta had argued that the state legitimized itself to the populous through development projects like health care and employment schemes. In his view, state was not a coherent entity but rather discrete and fragmented, while the boundary between state and civil society was fuzzy and constantly shifting. Premised on the afore-mentioned conceptualizations, Begrich proceeded to discuss how the indigenous peoples associated and interacted with the state. In that context, he presented a case study of the marginal aboriginal population of the Indian State of Jharkand.

Jharkand, India was a southern part of former Bihar, an area that had been traditionally dominated by Adivasi--the indigenous tribal people. But by the 1990s, the tribal population had been reduced to one third of the original population. According to the most recent census of 2011, indigenous population was approximately 100 million or 8.6% of the total population of India. Jharkhand became a state only in November 2000, prior to which there were

various movements demanding statehood. However, the government's eventual concession to confer statehood was a decision based on political expediency rather than the demands of tribal leaders.

He had studied the Adivasi population residing both in rural as well as urban environment and observed that tribal aspirations were geared increasingly towards a life in an urban setting rather than as cultivators. Though the main focus of his talk was the perceived and projected distinction of being a tribal. The notion of tribal status was contested in international law as well as in India. During the mid nineteenth century, the distinction between caste and tribe was solidified and tribes all over India were established as different from mainstream Hindu populations. This distinction was categorized as two different races. Further, the practice of alcohol use became a significant marker of difference between tribal and non-tribal populations, and continued to be in contemporary India. Tribal population's drinking practices were considered completely different from the rest, as primitive, dangerous, and thus Adivasi were looked at as drunkards. Since the British era, the drinking practices of Adivasi carried a social stigma that had been internalized by the population.

“ ... while the state had been unable to implement alcohol prohibition, the anti-state Maoists were taking practical measures to implement the state law of alcohol prohibition. ”

Begrich drew attention to the liquor laws, the identification of intoxicating substances for licensing and taxation, and how differences between indigenous and non-indigenous populations were manifested in these laws. Customary forms of alcohol used by Adivasi could not be licensed, however were easily available for purchase. Many families had no other means of livelihood other than preparing and selling alcohol. This issue was particularly pertinent in areas in which people had been displaced due to industrial development and construction, thus losing their land and livelihood. Further, the private sector jobs were stratified according to caste and religion, making it a rarity that an Adivasi would find a job in the private sector, for instance as a shopkeeper.

Alcohol played a pivotal role in how the Adivasi experienced their relationship with the state and the mainstream population. The Adivasi continued to depend on the sale of alcohol even though it was illegal. The police had an intermittent and observatory presence through occasional visits. Police did not make any effort to eliminate the sale of alcohol nor did it completely tolerate, thus causing a considerable degree of anxiety among families, which depended on the sale of alcohol. This trend illustrated the way in which the Adivasi had been subjected to the arbitrariness of state representatives, the police and excise officers.

“ It was ironic that Adivasi had subjected themselves to the criteria, stigmatization and expectation of the mainstream society as well as the state, ... ”

Apart from alcohol consumption, another aspect that differentiated tribal populations from the mainstream was the practice of religion. The question of whether the Adivasi were Hindus or not had been studied for decades. Colonial administration and ethnographers had identified the tribal religions in Jharkand as animism, a category that was present in the census at that time. But the post-colonial India census left only two options, Hindu or Christian, while no Adivasi religion existed as an identifier.

In recent years, a movement had been launched to formalize the traditional Adivasi religion, most commonly referred to as Sarna and be recognized as a distinct religious community in the census. It was now being stated that alcohol was not part of tribal religion, when it could easily be observed that alcohol was an integral part of religious ceremonies, in social interactions as well as in interactions with ancestors and spirits. Begrich argued that this reformist position against alcohol, to try to eliminate it from religious practices, was primarily an outcome of severe stigmatization that these communities had experienced due to their use of alcohol. It was ironic that Adivasi had subjected themselves to the criteria, stigmatization and expectation of the mainstream society as well as the state, by denying the importance of alcohol in the religious life of their community.

Lastly, discussing the Maoist movement, which was considered the biggest threat by the Indian government, he explained that the insurgents were vehemently opposed to rampant alcohol use. The Maoists were active in Jharkand, enjoyed popular support due to their anti-alcohol position and attempted to prohibit sale of alcohol in Jharkand. Similarly, the Adivasi communities were also cognizant of the perils of uncontrolled and widespread use of alcohol as alcohol abuse; wastage of money, domestic violence and neglect of children etc. had damaged the fabric of society and impoverished it. Ironically, while the state had been unable to implement alcohol prohibition, the anti-state Maoists were taking practical measures to implement the state law of alcohol prohibition.

The talk was followed by a lively question and answer session. Responding to a question about the fluid distinction between state and Adivasi, he explained that it was difficult to uphold a strict boundary between society and state because Adivasi were also part of the state. There were various forms of constitutional reservations through which Adivasi could enter careers in the civil administration, bureaucratic positions, police force, and army. Thus the state was not separate from Adivasi at an individual level. But a contradiction existed as the police was understood to be a violent enemy while at the same time, a vast majority of young men wanted to enter the police force because it was one of the few opportunities for a secure job in terms of income, status and respect.

“ Police did not make any effort to eliminate the sale of alcohol nor did it completely tolerate, thus causing a considerable degree of anxiety among families, which depended on the sale of alcohol. ”

Responding to a question on differences between the rural and urban populations, he articulated that in the rural areas, he had interacted with rice cultivators who also collected forest produce. Subsistence was guaranteed by cultivation. Thus people did not depend on alcohol as a means of livelihood and sold it only occasionally. Alcohol was not the basis of a regular income, and was sold in a weekly market or whenever an urgent need for cash

arose, for instance for buying fertilizer or other farming products. The trend was however markedly different in the cities. In urban areas, alcohol was consumed on a daily basis and in many areas over 50% of the families depended on the sale of alcohol. Societal problems were more prominent in the city, which was partly attributable to high unemployment. Even educated and elite Adivasi were often unable to find jobs, especially if they aspired to work in the bureaucracy. Thus alcohol consumption, sale and purchase were an integral part of the culture and economy of urban Adivasi communities.

“Alcohol played a pivotal role in how the Adivasi experienced their relationship with the state and the mainstream population.”

:Dr. Shabbir Cheema, Director Asia-Pacific Governance and Democracy Initiative (AGDI) and Senior Fellow – East West Center, Honolulu, Hawaii was invited to deliver a talk on [Decentralizing Governance: Global Practices](#) at the Centre for Public Policy & Governance on 22nd October, 2014.



Dr. Cheema opened his remarks by discussing the major contemporary global transformations which were interlinked with decentralization practices. First was the process of **democratization**, which has had an upsurge in popularity. According to him most of the world at least had electoral democracy with the exception of a few suppressive regimes. Asian countries were progressing towards mature and some rapidly consolidating democracies. This was reflected in elections, parliaments, freedom of the media, civil society engagement, and independence of judiciary. Cheema argued that decentralization and democracy were inherently linked and one couldn't have effective meaningful democracy without decentralization.

The second primary global trend was **urbanization** as more than half of the world's population now lived in urban areas. Megacities in Asia were emerging as centers of power, innovation and technology. Thirdly, **globalization** had led to a greater and faster exchange of goods, services and capital, and greater mobility of individuals. Also, supra-national institutions and global networks had emerged. Fourth transformation was the rise of **Information and Communication Technologies (ICT)**, which had led to an increased access to knowledge, and shrinking time and space. Information societies were demanding new patterns of government organization and processes.

Cheema then proceeded to analyze the design of decentralization policies of three specific countries: Indonesia, Brazil, and China, who were all significant players in the global economy.

Indonesia - The Big Bang Approach: Indonesia, the largest Muslim majority country, had introduced a comprehensive new decentralization law following months of political protest in 1998. The decentralization policy was aimed at improving public service delivery, increasing community participation and ensuring the accountability of local governments (LG). The country was now divided into provincial, district and municipal regions, all of which were autonomous. Under this law, all central government administrative authorities were transferred to provinces, districts and municipalities except for foreign affairs, defense and security, judiciary, monetary and fiscal policy, and religious affairs. This was referred to as the Big Bang approach to decentralization. Unlike India and Pakistan, Indonesia was a unitary form of government, though it was much more decentralized than many federal governments including that of Pakistan.

Cheema further explained that decentralization had three main processes: de-concentration, the dispersal of government offices; delegation, delegation of selected powers; and mostly importantly devolution, transfer of political and economic power. In Indonesia, a greater emphasis was laid on devolution rather than on de-concentration. A shift from vertical to horizontal responsibility, and clear provisions for the allocation of funds from central to local governments were made. In the last decade, Indonesia had downsized its central government and strengthened local administration. During the first three years of implementation, 2.2 million central government employees were reassigned to regional governments, along with the control of 16,000 service facilities. Majority of public servants were under local government's management and supervision. Indonesia had also increased regional budgets. In the past, development budget had been controlled by the central government. But In 2002, the development budget controlled by central ministries was only 14%. In terms of *political participation and democratization*, provinces had regularly elected governors while districts and cities had elected mayors.

He pointed out that Indonesia had been an autocratic government through the 60s up until the 90s, and the military controlled not only the polity but also the economy. The military control was much more deeply entrenched and stronger than that experienced in Pakistan historically. However, through the process of effective

decentralization, polity had extricated itself from military rule and deepened democratization practices. Empirical evidence showed that fiscal and political decentralization in local public investment had significantly increased public infrastructure (education, health and physical) investment at the district level and increased responsiveness of LGs to local public infrastructure coverage.

“ ... reforming civil service to the new reality of decentralized governance and citizen-based accountability for service delivery was critical. ”

Brazil - Collaborative Governance: Brazil's example showed that social service delivery could be improved through decentralization, provided the country came up with a practicable paradigm of shared or collaborative governance, meaning that the roles of the central, state and local governments were clearly delineated.

Brazil was a federal system, one of the most decentralized in the world where states had constitutionally guaranteed powers and resources. Brazil's decentralization of health and education services was exemplary as each of the three levels of government were involved. For example in health policy, the federal government formulated national health policy, designed health standards, and provided general guidelines. The states designed policies and controlled health service delivery while the municipalities were responsible for formulating, administering and executing programs of local health services. Each of the three levels of government participated in financing with specific responsibilities assigned to state and local governments along with significant autonomy to use their generated resources. Thus, the determinants of success in Brazil were the coming together of shared (collaborative) governance, fiscal and administrative decentralization, and ideological commitment to equity in health policy. The case of education policy followed a similar pattern.

China - Robust Local Governments: Throughout the 1980s and the early 1990s, China implemented a series of reforms to decentralize its fiscal system so as to provide more incentives for local governments to promote economic growth. In 1994, the government introduced tax sharing reforms in order to boost central revenues and

enhance intergovernmental transfers. The provincial role was restricted while local governments were empowered such that they accounted for 51.4 percent of the national expenditures. Table 1 depicted the comparatively high subnational share of government revenue and expenditure in China as compared to other countries. Compared to the decentralized fiscal system, China's political system was still centralized and could be described as a multidivisional-form hierarchy structure.

Cheema stated that many scholars had attributed China's remarkable economic performance since 1978 in part to the country's fiscal decentralization. Decentralization had restrained predatory central interventions while stimulating local policy experiments. The locally diversified structure of the pre-reform economy was said to have facilitated liberalization of the economy, and motivated local officials to promote development. In other words, local governments were catalysts for development.

Fiscal Decentralization Indicators: China vs. Other Countries

Indicator	China	Developing Countries	Transition Economies	OECD Countries
Subnational share of government revenue	48	16.6	18.4	19
Subnational share of government expenditure	74	19.6	22.3	32

Note: Data for China are for 2005. Data for other countries are for various years and adapted from Shah (2004).

Concluding the discussion on case studies, Cheema argued that extensive research on the relationship between decentralization and service delivery had showed a strong positive correlation between the two. Decentralizing governance had many dimensions – political, economic and administrative. While Indonesia and Brazil had made significant progress in political decentralization, China's progress had focused on local economic development and entrepreneurship. Decentralization was part of the ideology of democracy, but also a means to an end, the end being service delivery. However, while it was possible to learn from the paradigms of other countries, what worked in China or Brazil, may not work in Pakistan due to dif-

fering cultural and political environments. Policy makers needed to delineate the policy and implementation for their own context.

“ Punjab alone was bigger than 40 countries, so there was unarguably a need for more provinces. ”

Cheema then shared a recent research on decentralization conducted by the Harvard University Study Group on Decentralized Governance. It constituted 25 leading decentralization experts from around the world and carried out an assessment of recent experience in Africa, Latin America and Asia, specifically looking at a diverse set of ways in which countries designed and implemented decentralization programs, and how decentralized governance contributed to development objectives and challenges. The study found that there was no one-model-fits-all and each country needed a different combination of reforms. However, it was essential to determine the scope of decentralization ranging from administrative, political and fiscal, while a gradual pace of reform should be part of a comprehensive strategy to restructure the state.

He explained that though there was mixed evidence on the impact of decentralization on economic growth, still decentralization did make a significant difference in service delivery and public participation. Thus, the case for decentralization needed to be made same as democratic governance i.e. as a means to an end (improve service delivery) and as an end in itself (promote democracy). Another global lesson learnt was the need for provincial and local capacity building to effectively implement decentralization programs: one, the ability of local governments to mobilize resources; two, introduction of new methods and skills for public administration; three, demands and participation of civil society; four, training and re-orientation of officials at national and local levels to promote intergovernmental coordination and collaborative governance.

The study also found the following evidences: one, political devolution could have positive impact on the accountability of government and sustainability of democratic process, provided it was undertaken in the context of an agreed constitutional framework; two, evolution must be

accompanied by mechanisms and instruments to promote accountability such as transparent procedures for public procurement, participatory budgeting and auditing, promotion of ethics and civil society engagement; three, there was a need to mobilize political support and ownership at the national level because national governments often announced major decentralized governance programs through their policy statements but were reluctant to devolve resources to local governments. A downside to decentralization was a rise in disparities among different regions of a country thereby further increasing the gap between rich and poor provinces. Thus a need for intergovernmental sharing of revenues, and mechanism of central transfer to poor provinces to ensure that both growth and equity objectives were achieved.

“ Empirical evidence showed that fiscal and political decentralization in local public investment had significantly increased public infrastructure (education, health and physical) investment at the district level. ”

Cheema then focused on decentralization in Pakistan stating that the 1973 Constitution, 2009 National Finance Commission Award and 18th amendment to the Constitution were landmark events in strengthening the Pakistani federation. The 18th amendment had refurbished and revitalized two federal institutions: the Council of Common Interests (CCI) and the National Economic Council (NEC). The list of federal-provincial concurrent responsibilities was deleted, selective functions were reassigned to the federation under CCI guidance while others devolved to the provinces (17 ministries & provincially owned entities). This had given the provinces control over all local government institutions and residual functions not enumerated in the constitution. The provinces now had a free hand regarding all public services delivered within their territory. Fiscal consequences of the amendment were as drastic, as the federal-provincial share of expenditure had changed from 65-35% (2010) to 45-55% (2015). Federal government had ceded the responsibility of taxes on immovable property, estate and inheritance, value-added tax (VAT) on services, and zakat and usher (religious taxes) to the provinces. Further, provincial privileges to borrow through

domestic and foreign loans were expanded, subject to conditions imposed by the NEC.

In conclusion, he argued that it was important to recognize the impact of these changes and the need for reform for multi-order governance, and this required mobilization for continued political support. One aspect of the challenges was inter-provincial such as the issue of natural resource ownership, inter-provincial water and gas distribution, and new hydroelectric projects for which the federal government required prior consulting with the provinces. The second aspect was intra-provincial governance: revenue generation through taxation of agriculture income, capital gains and services; and building effective local governments as the third tier. Further, reforming civil service to the new reality of decentralized governance and citizen-based accountability for service delivery was critical. Summing up, he stated that at the end of the day, a difference would be made only through collaborative or shared governance between federate state and local governments.

“ ... many scholars had attributed China's remarkable economic performance since 1978 in part to the country's fiscal decentralization. ”

The talk evoked a number of questions from among the participants. Regarding a question on additional provinces in Pakistan, he cited recent studies to state that federations that had eight or more provinces were more likely to be successful as federations. Punjab alone was bigger than 40 countries, so there was unarguably a need for more provinces. However in comparison to Punjab, provincial division was a more politically sensitive issue in Sindh, which made the process more challenging.


Regarding a question on governance in militancy prone areas where devolution may result in more power to the warlords, he referenced case studies to suggest that building on indigenous institutions was a successful governance model in insurgency prone areas. However, indigenous institutions may be suppressive and cruel. Nevertheless, working with locals and power sharing was better than imposing centralized control in a traditionally ruled society.

Replying to a question on the reasons for the failure of local government systems, he cited a recent study conducted in Asian countries' which found that the Members of National or Provincial Assembly instead of performing their primary role, practically became local counsellors. It was thus pivotal that provincial and national governments recognized the importance and centrality of the local governments.

In response to a question regarding the impact of civil military relations on decentralization, he stated that greater military control had resulted in political alienation and breakup of federations. Military dominated governments almost always pushed for a higher level of centralization with destabilizing effects on a federation. Thus, military domination was inherently incompatible with decentralization.

“ ... the federal-provincial share of expenditure had changed from 65-35% (2010) to 45-55% (2015). ”

:Ambassador Riaz Mohammad Khan, former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan (2005 – 2008), ambassador to China, European Union, Belgium, Luxembourg, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, and author of the book *Afghanistan and Pakistan: Conflict, Extremism and Resistance to Modernity*, was invited to deliver a talk on **Pakistan and Afghanistan: Future Perspectives on Bilateral relations, the Taliban and the impending U.S. Withdrawal** at CPPG on June 10, 2014.



Ambassador Khan opened his remarks by stating that the three major actors: Afghan government, US and Pakistan could and needed to to play their part to stabilize Afghanistan. He was emphatic in pointing out that perpetuation of conflict in Afghanistan was most injurious to Pakistan's national interest. He persuasively argued that our policy objective should be stabilization of Afghanistan regardless of who governed Kabul. He was up front in observing that the biggest criticism of Pakistani policy had been the way Pakistan had alienated the Northern Alliance-- a major political group in Afghanistan. A continuation of this policy was not in Pakistan's interests.

“ ... perpetuation of conflict in Afghanistan was most injurious to Pakistan's national interest. ”

Pakistan's role was undeniably crucial because of the demographic overlap and tribal affinity between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and also because part of the Taliban leader-

ship had resided (and may still be residing) in Pakistan. However, it was crucial to draw a distinction between Afghan and Pakistani Taliban though both were amorphous and composed of disparate entities. A large number of Pakistani Taliban from madaris and tribal areas had joined the Afghan campaigns, mostly against the Northern Alliance when the Afghan Taliban were in power in the 1990s. He stated that any dialogue with Pakistani Taliban should start with the pre-requisite that they accepted the writ of the state and renounced violence.

“ Sovereignty implied responsibilities with the basic principle to not allow your territory to be used by state or non-state actors against the territory of another country. ”

Discussing the Pak-Afghan issues of contention, Ambassador Khan stated that Afghanistan's legal acceptance of the Durand Line was not likely even if pushed by Pakistan. History of the current border issue went back to the Mujahedeen, who considered Pakistan and Afghanistan as brotherly countries, which should have no border. From the Taliban's standpoint, both countries' citizenry shared a syncretic Islamic identity, and states should be borderless. In his view, a practical solution would be to make Durand Line a functional border. Paradoxically, he said that the presence of NATO had done just that. He argued that the border should be strengthened, giving some order to border crossings while the tribal areas should be integrated with the rest of Pakistan.

Speaking about Afghan reconciliation, he stated that the Afghan Taliban must be persuaded to become part of the reconciliation process. Both parties needed to be candid in articulating their positions as well as limitations. As the US withdrawal continued, Pakistan must ensure that its territory was not used for operations inside Afghanistan, and Afghans who wished to continue the struggle be asked to go back to Afghanistan to continue their resistance movement. The issue of sovereignty over territory was pivotal. Sovereignty implied responsibilities with the basic principle to not allow your territory to be used by state or non-state actors against the territory of another country.

Discussing American withdrawal, he stated that Taliban influence had considerably declined since the US invasion and was now limited to localized control in certain areas while other powerful groups and communities, which had since emerged exercised a high degree of control and authority over specific regions. Taliban today could not capture Kabul like they did in 1996. Further, the US definitely wanted to keep residual presence in Afghanistan for counterterrorism, and prevention of the disintegration of Afghan National Army (ANA). A potential consequence of which gave the Taliban the justification to continue their operations. However, this residual presence would be an assurance against the possibility of Afghanistan completely collapsing and disintegrating upon a complete and sudden US withdrawal. The perception of ANA was that of ineffectiveness in curtailing terrorist attacks and ensuring security. In reality, the ANA had performed reasonably well and demonstrated their ability to contain attacks and defend the cities. Thus, the Afghan government was not likely to collapse in either Karzai's or his successor's tenure. Taliban rule would not resume, they would remain fragmented and violence would diminish with time.

“ Pakistan's problems, government changes and coups were not a result of the machinations of outsiders, but deeds and misdeeds of our own leadership. ”

Commenting on Pak-US relations, he argued that Pakistan should manage the relationship in a manner that was in Pakistan's national interest and learn from other countries, which maintained their ties with the US in ways that protected their national interest. Exemplifying China, he explained that although it had numerous potential points of conflict with the US: South China Sea, East China Sea, Japan, Taiwan etc., but still China's policy towards the US was that of productive engagement. Bilateral trade between the two nations exceeded half a trillion dollars and in 2003, China had 40,000 joint ventures with the Americans. Today, the largest number of students, over 100,000 annually, studying in American universities were Chinese nationals. China recognized that Europe and US were still the fountainhead of knowledge and technology, and was thus taking advantage of that. He concluded by stating that modernization entailed that policies were

steered towards pursuing national interests, which had to be defined in the context of changing times.

The talk evoked a number of questions from the participants. In response to a question regarding conspiracy theories and ulterior motives of the US, Ambassador Khan remarked that Pakistan's problems, government changes and coups were not a result of the machinations of outsiders, but deeds and misdeeds of our own leadership.

Replying to a question regarding continued presence of US forces in Afghanistan, he explained it in terms of status of forces agreement and US public perception. According to the general sentiment today, the American people were against a prolonged engagement in Afghanistan particularly in the absence of concrete results. Due to the seeming intractability of the situation, the first policy review by Obama in 2009 was to limit the objective to just reconciliation, as opposed to attempts to restore democracy, human right protection, and redesigning of society and culture. Further, new agreements were supposed to supersede the status of forces agreement ratified in May 2003, which delineated the legal status of US forces on Afghan soil and included immunity from Afghan courts. If the US government succeeded in getting immunity, it would prolong its stay otherwise it may be forced to withdraw.

“ Instead of jostling with India for a sphere of influence, Pakistan should encourage Afghan-India bilateral relations that facilitated stabilization and modernization of Afghanistan. ”

In response to a question pertaining to regional solutions and Afghan-India relations, he explained that many regional dialogues (6+ dialogue etc.) had not produced any meaningful outcome. Today the focus was on reconciliation which included three main players, US, Pakistan and the Afghan government. Additionally, any country that could help in reconstruction or reconciliation should be welcomed and encouraged by Pakistan. Afghan relations with India were partly along ethnic lines. While the Tajik, Hazara and other non-Pashtun would like good relations with India, some Pashtun Afghans harbored anti-India sentiments. Pakistan should not create hindrances in healthy Afghan-India relations. Instead of jostling with

India for a sphere of influence, Pakistan should encourage Afghan-India bilateral relations that facilitated stabilization and modernization of Afghanistan. Similarly, India must bear Pakistan's sensitives in mind.

“ ... the border should be strengthened, giving some order to border crossings while the tribal areas should be integrated with the rest of Pakistan. ”

Research Report

Lahore Vision 2035: Program Design for Policy, Institutional, and Regulatory Reforms in the City of Lahore

Dr. Imdad Hussain

In 2012, Lahore Development Authority (LDA) and the Urban Unit, Planning & Development Department, Government of the Punjab planned to commission the preparation of an Integrated Strategic Development Plan (ISDP 2035) for Lahore Region. The need for the ISDP 2035 was felt because Lahore's connections to its surrounding cities such as Gujranwala, Faisalabad, Kasur, Sheikhupura, and Muridke had increased manifold by 2012. The intensified interconnections between Lahore and its surrounding cities required new approaches to urban planning. Secondly, it was felt that the myriad problems of Lahore and its surrounding cities could effectively be solved by undertaking urban planning at the level of Lahore Region. Urban planning at the level of Lahore Region required appropriate regulatory, institutional and policy reforms because the task of regional planning could not be accomplished through the then existing regulations and institutions. Hence ISDP 2035 was a timely initiative to accomplish not only the goal of regional planning but also the goal of providing new institutions, policies and regulations.

As the meetings on ISDP 2035 progressed, the Firms Project, USAID and the CPPG decided to support the process. They felt that ISDP 2035, being a technical undertaking, needed a vision. As a result, they jointly designed the Lahore Vision 2035 project to construct a vision for the making of ISDP 2035. Under the Lahore Vision 2035, research-based Position Papers were developed on the following topics: (1) Governance and Management of Lahore; (ii) Transport Planning in Lahore (iii) Water Supply, Sewerage and Solid Waste Management in Lahore; (iv) Real Estate Markets in Lahore; (v) Improving Trade in Lahore Region.

The project worked under the supervision of Dr. Saeed Shafqat, Director, CPPG while Dr. Imdad Hussain served as its Lead Researcher. A Core Working Group (CWG) was established to guide the five researches. CWG comprised eminent experts of urban development: Suleman Ghani, Dr. Nasir Javed, Pervaiz Qureshi, Rabia Nadir, Amir Butt, Chaudhary Arshad, Mazhar Iqbal, Sohail Malik, Raheem ul

Haque, Nazir Wattoo, and Waseem Ashraf. A team of sector specialists, research associates and research assistants, drafted the Position Papers. The main arguments of these papers are briefly discussed here:

“ ... changing land use laws of the Lahore Development Authority (LDA) in favor of low-income people to help them build homes. ”

The Position Paper on [Governance and Management in Lahore](#) by [Khalida Ahson](#) calls for maximum decentralization of the services and institutions in Lahore to improve its governance. It suggests establishing Union Councils as the local units of administration. To facilitate the working of decentralization, it stresses the need for undertaking spatial planning on regular bases. The paper's model on transparency, accountability, and grievance redressal needs to be adopted by the ISDP 2035 managers to take governance closer to the people of Lahore.

The Position Paper on [Transport Planning in Lahore](#) by [Sarah Mushir](#) argues for eliminating institutional overlaps among the transport planning agencies such as Transport Planning Unit, the Urban Unit, Traffic Engineering and Planning Agency, Lahore Transport Company, and the Punjab Metro Bus Authority. It notes the glaring absence of usable data for planning of transport and suggests ensuring the collection and supply of transport data not only to transport officials but also to scholars, researchers, and community activists. The other key suggestions of the paper include: pedestrian and bicyclers-friendly transport planning; provision of public spaces along the roads; education of drivers; traffic management; and reliable public transport.

The Position Paper on [Water Supply, Sewerage and Solid Waste Management in Lahore](#) by [Atif Hasan](#) notes the existence of dedicated agencies such as Water and Sanitation Agency (WASA) and Lahore Waste Management

Company (LWMC) as overlapping because of their inseparability. It argues for devising a system of joint planning for these sectors. It calls for eliminating exclusions in access to these services by adopting low-cost, self-help style of development based on Orangi Pilot Project Karachi's component-sharing model. According to this model, the communities are trained to develop lane level water, sewerage and solid waste infrastructures for themselves while the government provides larger infrastructures.

“... adopting the principles of decentralization, affordability, local solutions to local problems, community-government synergies, and social inclusion.”

The Position Paper on [Real Estate Markets in Lahore](#) by [Dr. Sania Nazir Chaudhry](#) argues for changing land use laws of the Lahore Development Authority (LDA) in favor of low-income people to help them build homes. The paper suggests: provision of home building finance for low-income housing schemes; effective regulatory framework; and transparent transactions. It calls for a real estate market that is accessible and where no land speculation is possible. It calls for encouraging public-private partnership, and protecting and abiding by environment and public safety laws. It suggests to the managers of ISDP 2035 to introduce an effective tax regime along with promising fiscal and monetary policies. The proposals on Katchi Abadis development can help reduce the problems of housing in Lahore.

The Position Paper on [Improving Trade in Lahore Region](#) by [Dr. Imdad Hussain](#) calls for establishing an economic region of Lahore using the formulations of Local Economic Development Theory. It suggests to the Government of the Punjab to provide legislative mandate to local governments in the province to plan and undertake economic development. While encouraging economic development, Government of the Punjab should supply four prerequisites to the local governments: (i) setting up of institutions of economic development; (ii) the provisions for imposing

and collecting taxes from the traders; (iii) providing land for the markets; and (iv) taking care of the environment. The Position Papers have been presented to a large audience comprising government officers, planners, citizens, and activists. The public seminars were well-attended by the stakeholders and citizens. The ISDP 2035 related agencies such as LDA and the Urban Unit have received the Position Papers well. Since the working on ISDP 2035 has started in 2015, the CPPG has been working with the LDA team on ISDP 2035 to embed the aspirations of the Position Papers in the ISDP 2035 preparation exercise. The Position Papers have been consolidated into a brief document entitled Lahore Vision 2035. This document enshrines the principles of Lahore Vision 2035. It calls for adopting the principles of decentralization, affordability, local solutions to local problems, community-government synergies, and social inclusion. It also calls for making Lahore an inclusive, safe, vibrant, educated, and healthier city.

The Position Papers and the Lahore Vision 2035 have been widely disseminated among the stakeholders of Lahore's development. In addition, the CPPG continues to advocate the aspirations of Lahore Vision 2035 to the policymakers. A larger engagement, public action, and public-private partnerships will hopefully lead towards achieving the aspirations of Lahore Vision 2035. Putting the vision into action, it is hoped, Lahore will hopefully become a vibrant, dynamic and a happier city by 2035. CPPG encourages concerned citizens, activists and researchers to join hands in its efforts to advance the goals of Lahore Vision 2035. Interested readers should contact CPPG for the copies of publications.

“... a real estate market that is accessible and where no land speculation is possible.”

Visitors and Activities

July 9, 2014

The CPPG organized a seminar with Dr. Masood Raja on [Humanities in the Neoliberal Modernity](#).

August 5, 2014

The CPPG organized an Open House for [Executive Master in Public Policy & Governance](#) program.

Aug 11, 2014

The CPPG organized an Open House for [MPhil in Public Policy & Governance](#) program.

August 13, 2014

The Director, CPPG held a meeting with Muhammad Irfan Elahi, [Chairman Planning and Development Department](#), Government of Punjab.

September 17, 2014

The Director, CPPG was invited to be a panelist at a seminar on [Electoral Reforms in Pakistan: Civil Society, Media and Academic Perspective](#) by the UNDP

September 18, 2014

Mr. Olivier Huynh Van, [Cooperation Attaché, Embassy of France](#), visited the CPPG.

September 22, 2014

The Director, CPPG attended the Board of Governors Meeting at [National School of Public Policy](#).

September 27, 2014

CPPG organized two public seminars on [Water Sewerage and Solid Waste Management](#) and [Real Estate Markets in Lahore including Land use, Building Control and Zoning](#) under its USAID project: Lahore Vision 2035.

September 30, 2014

CPPG organized a seminar with Dr. Ryan Brasher on [Projecting the State: Political Ideology and State Infrastructure Power in early 20th Century Afghanistan and Iran](#).

October 11, 2014

CPPG held three public seminars on [Governance and](#)

[Management in Lahore, Transport Planning in Lahore and Making Lahore Region Trade Friendly](#) under its USAID project: Lahore Vision 2035.

October 22, 2014

CPPG organized a seminar with Dr. G. Shabbir Cheema on [Decentralizing Governance: Global Practices](#).

November 20, 2014

CPPG organized a seminar with Mr. Tauseef Dilshad Khatana and Mr. Olivier Huynh Van, [Cooperation Attaché, Embassy of France on Local Government System of France and Pakistan: How Similar, How Different?](#)

November 6-9, 2014

The Director, CPPG and Senior Research Fellow participated in an international conference at the John Hopkins Centre, Nanjing University, China on [The Silk Web in the 21st Century: Global Landscape among the West, China & South West Asia](#).

November 26, 2014

CPPG presented a Draft Report on, [Internal Migration and Its Impact on Urban Governance: The Case of Baluchistan](#) authored by Dr. Saeed Shafqat and Ms. Hajra Zafar. Discussants were Mr. Rashid Memon (LUMS), Dr. Imdad Hussain (CPPG), Dr. Sabiha Syed (MRG) and Mr. Mohammad Daud Barech (Secretary, Local Government, Punjab)

December 1, 2014

The Director CPPG attended the first meeting of [Think Tank on Education](#) set up by the Chief Minister, Punjab.

December 9, 2014

CPPG organized a seminar with Dr. Elisabeth Leake on [Post Afghan War: A Historical Perspective](#).

December 10, 2014

CPPG launched a monograph titled [Electoral Politics and Electoral Violence in 2013 Elections: The Case of Punjab](#) authored by Dr. Saeed Shafqat & Maheen Saleem. It was followed by a dialogue with Mr. Arif Nizami, Professor Sajjad Naseer, and Mr. Khaliq-ur-Rehman.

December 15-16, 2014

The Director, CPPG presented a paper on [Pakistan and Changing Dynamics of South Asia](#) in an International Conference in Paris, France.

January 28, 2015

CPPG organized a seminar with Dr. Hasan Karrar on [Transition Economies, Trade and Mobility: Revisiting the Bazaar Economy through Two Central Asian Bazaars](#).

February 02, 2015

CPPG organized a policy dialogue with Mr. Sardar Ahmad Nawaz Sukhera on [Pakistan's Privatization Program](#).

February 09, 2015

CPPG organized a policy dialogue with Mr. Asim Iftikhar Ahmad on [Managing International Peace and Security: Does the United Nations Need Reform?](#)

February 16, 2015

Mr. Rauli Suikkanen, [Ambassador of Finland to Pakistan](#) and Dr. Olli Ruohomarki, [Deputy Director, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland](#) visited CPPG to exchange views on research prospects.

February 25, 2015

CPPG organized a seminar with Mr. Luqman Saeed on [Understanding Terrorism: Interpreting and Analyzing Data on Terrorism in Pakistan](#).

March 5, 2015

The Director, CPPG, participated in a discussion on [Public Management and Process of change in Pakistan](#) at the National Management College, Lahore

March 11, 2015

CPPG organized a seminar with Dr. Miles Toder on [Governance Issues and the Paths Countries Chose to Develop](#).

March 20, 2015

CPPG organized a special seminar with Dr. Pavel Kabat on [Systems Science and its Relevance to Public Policy](#).

March 24, 2015

CPPG in collaboration with the Open Doors in Pakistan initiative of Embassy of France organized a seminar with

Mr. Jean-Pierre Perrinis on [Being a Journalist in a Disorderly World](#).

April 08, 2015

CPPG organized a seminar with Mr. Ahmed Rashid on [US withdrawal or not from Afghanistan: Implications for Pakistan and the Region](#).

April 13, 2015

The Director, CPPG chaired a panel in the 2nd international conference on [Ethno-Federalism in Punjab and Beyond](#) organized by Dept. of Political Science, FC College.

April 20, 2015

The Director, CPPG gave a talk on [Innovation, Entrepreneurial Skills and Public Policy](#) at the Chemical Entrepreneurship Workshop, FC College.

April 20, 2015

CPPG in collaboration with the Open Doors in Pakistan initiative of Embassy of France organized a seminar with Mr. Jean-Joseph Boillot on [Who are the New Giants and how are they shaping the World: Challenges for Pakistan?](#)

May 13, 2015

CPPG organized a seminar with Dr. Charles Kennedy on [Palestine, Israel, US and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Maintaining the Stalemate](#).

May 18, 2015

CPPG organized a seminar with Mr. Imran Ahmed Siddiqui on [The New Middle East and Strategic Priorities for Pakistan](#).

May 25, 2015

CPPG in collaboration with the Open Doors in Pakistan initiative of Embassy of France organized a seminar with Mr. Ste'phane A. Dudpignon on [Religious Interactions between Iranian and the Indian Worlds](#).

June 02, 2015

CPPG organized a policy dialogue on [Public Debt, International Financial Institutions & Pakistan's Case for Debt Justice](#) with Abdul Khaliq, Institute for Social & Economic Justice; Sarmad Iqbal, Islamic Relief Pakistan and Hafiz Rashid, Punjab Urban Resource Center.

June 11, 2015

CPPG organized a policy dialogue on [Understanding the Organizational Behavior and Professional Culture of Punjab Bureaucracy](#), under its USAID project: Improving Governance in Punjab.

June 15, 2015

CPPG organized a policy dialogue with the author, Mr. Naveed Shinwari on [The Informal Justice System: Opportunities & Possibilities for Legal Pluralism in Pakistan](#), a study published by Community Appraisal and Motivation Programme (CAMP).

June 17, 2015

A delegation from [The Royal College of Defence Studies](#) visited the CPPG for a round table discussion.

[From the Director's Desk cont.](#)

hopefully sometime in 2016. We look forward to your suggestions on a multi-disciplinary theme, potential partners and funding sources. Of course we would like to invite all those who are pursuing research in comprehending, explaining and interpreting the social, cultural, political and strategic transformations that Pakistan is undergoing. Please do help us in achieving our goal...

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Board of Advisors

: **Dr. William B. Eimcke** is the founding director of the Picker Center for Executive Education of Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs.

: **Dr. Salman Humayun**, Deputy Chief of Party, Education Sector Reform Assistance Program (ESRA).

: **Dr. Saba Gul Khattak**, former Executive Director SDPI specializes in comparative politics and state theory.

: **Dr. Anjum Khurshid** (MBBS, MPAFF), Assistant Professor and Director of the Health and Behavioural Risk Research Centre, University of Missouri.

: **Dr. Naushin Mahmood**, Senior Researcher at Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE) specializes in demography and population issues.

: **Javed Masud**, former Managing Director and CEO The Pakistan Credit Rating Agency Limited.

: **Dr. Jack Nagel**, Professor of Political Science, Business and Public Policy, Wharton, University of Pennsylvania.

: **Jean-Luc Racine**, Senior CNRS Fellow at the Center for South Asian Studies, School for Advanced Studies in Social Sciences, Paris focuses on geopolitics of South Asia.

: **Babar Sattar**, LLM, a Rhodes Scholar who writes on social, political and legal issues and runs a law firm AJURIS.

: **Dr. Shafqat Shehzad**, Associate Professor Comsat University, Islamabad and former Research Fellow at SDPI specializes in health economics.

: **Dr. Ayesha Siddiqua** is a security studies expert specializing in defense decision-making and civil-military relations in South Asia.

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